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SUMMARY 
 
 
This study examines the variance in methodologies employed by executives and 
Procurement professionals to engage management consultancy services.  The 
exclusion of Procurement from specific categories of consultancy expenditure is 
then viewed in the context of its aspirations to be a strategic function.  The 
conclusion drawn is that such aspirations are flawed. 
 
Literature in the areas of services marketing, consultancy, value choice, and 
sourcing are examined.  It is noted that the services and consultancy literature 
refers to the subjective approach of the individual to assess value.  In addition, 
literature that stresses the role of individual contingency in value choices 
concludes that individuals will not necessarily refer to price when making such 
assessments.  In contrast, the sourcing literature adopts objective organisational 
approaches to value.  This dissonance is reflected in the research data which 
concludes that senior executives procuring strategy consultancy or ‘coaching’ 
services tend to use subjective value constructs to make selection decisions.  This 
situation is problematic for procurement professionals who refer almost 
exclusively to objective value constructs that are specifically designed to produce 
benefits at an organisational level.  This situation makes unlikely the full 
integration of procurement at a strategic level within the organisation. 
 
The choice of a subjective approach to the research using ideographic 
methodology produced rich and complex data.  Semi-structured interviews with 
senior executives and an extended observation of a consultancy engagement were 
used.  Access of this nature would normally be problematic due to the time 
constraints under which executives work and the sensitivity of the material.  A 
rare opportunity, however, was presented by the status of the researcher as 
employee and this was exploited to gain privileged insights into executive 
behaviour. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter frames the study by establishing the central problem of management 
consultancy procurement from three different perspectives: the issues for a 
practitioner; the academic problem; and the methodological challenge.  The 
following contextual background assists in this framing by describing the 
organisation within which the study took place and the recent history of its 
Procurement function. 
 
This study is based upon the following data: twenty-seven interviews with senior 
executives set out in Chapter Eight and analysed in Chapters Nine and Eleven; 
and an extended observation of a consultancy engagement set out in Chapter Ten 
and analysed in Chapter Eleven.  The totality of this research was conducted 
within a single organisation at which the researcher was employed within the 
Procurement Department.  This organisation is large and operates within the 
services sector.  It employs approximately sixty thousand people around the 
world and has evolved rapidly over the last twenty years mainly through merger 
and acquisition. 
 
The Procurement department within the UK was originally established in 1986 in 
one of the two main group companies that existed at that time.  It spread into the 
other company in 1992 and, at that time, comprised two ‘buyers’ and a manager.  
Both departments operated completely separately until 1996 when they merged.  
A further corporate merger in 1998 added a third procurement team.  Since then, 
the organisation has been striving to create a single culture and there is now (in 
2008) a global Procurement function with a remit to operate across the entire 
organisation.  The reporting line goes directly from the Chief Procurement 
Officer to the Chief Administrative Officer at Head Office giving Procurement 
very high levels of visibility.  In this context, the practical problems presented by 
management consultancy for the Procurement practitioners within the 
organisation are discussed below in greater detail. 
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The research was conceived in 1998 and 1999 when the department was still in 
the early stages of working together.  Departmental visibility was not as high as 
it is now and the ability to act globally was still some years away.  The extremely 
large amounts of money being spent on consultancy, together with the apparently 
uncontrolled nature of such spend, had long been an issue for Procurement.  
Virtually all attempts at becoming involved in such projects and influencing the 
outcomes had, however, been unsuccessful.  Procurement was consistently 
excluded from consultancy engagements because executives preferred to manage 
them alone.  There was no such difficulty in becoming involved in the ‘routine’ 
projects around buying stationery or office cleaning, but management 
consultancy projects were notoriously sensitive.  The situation was little 
improved in 2004 when the extended observation was undertaken. 
 
Executives simply did not tell the Procurement department that they intended to 
use consultancy services.  On the very rare occasions when Procurement secured 
its own involvement, it was often specifically told not to ‘upset’ the consultants.  
In any case, the consultants knew they had secured the business and in most 
cases had actually started work.  The little negotiation that took place was 
therefore with an incumbent supplier and not in a competitive situation making it 
even harder to effect change.  There was limited, if any, success in lowering fees 
and Procurement’s role was usually restricted to negotiation over contractual 
terms, usually with a small return for extensive effort. 
 
Management consultancy services were therefore extremely problematic for the 
Procurement department within the chosen organisation.  The objectives by 
which Procurement performance was measured were largely based around cost 
savings and achieving greater value through negotiation.  These objectives were 
agreed by the business and Procurement was therefore very clear about the 
benefits it needed to deliver.  These were to either reduce the cost of the services 
or secure more services for the same amount of money.  At the same time the 
commercial position of the organisation had to be protected by robust contractual 
terms.  Very few of these benefits, however, were being achieved in the category 
of management consultancy. 
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The scale of the expenditure was extremely significant and this magnified the 
problem.  Of even more concern was the inability of Procurement to see the 
value that these services delivered to the organisation, coupled with a degree of 
cynicism about the motivation of consultants themselves and their relationships 
with executives.  There was a belief that consultants have a vested interest in 
preserving a one-to-one relationship with individual executives that excludes the 
Procurement department.  In this situation they have a much greater opportunity 
to manipulate the definition of value because it is based on one individual’s 
subjective value choices.  This individual – the executive – is then able to define 
value for an entire organisation.  While the consultant retains access to a full 
range of support functions, the executive client remains isolated from the rest of 
his or her own organisation – in particular, the Procurement department.  The 
organisation is therefore never able to formulate an appropriate response to 
consultancy procurement.   
 
This perception of the situation fuelled the concern of Procurement that the 
organisation was vulnerable.  Conducting this research was an opportunity for 
Procurement to gain a greater understanding of these services and, in particular, 
study executive motivation for engaging consultants.  In this way, it was hoped 
that improvements could be made to the way that consultancy was managed by 
Procurement.   
 
These, then, were the difficulties facing practitioners.  Procurement of 
management consultancy is also, however, problematic in an academic context. 
 
Reck and Long (1988) describe the development of Procurement functions 
through four stages: Passive; Independent; Supportive; and Integrative.  Within 
this typology, the pinnacle of development for procurement is the Integrative 
stage because at this stage, Procurement has become truly strategic.  Reaching 
this stage means that Procurement’s role within the organisation has the 
following features. 
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Stage Variable Integrative 
Nature of long-range planning Integral part of strategy 
Impetus for change Integrative management 
Career advancement Unlimited 
Evaluation based on Strategic contribution 
Organisational visibility High 
Computer system focus Needs of decision-makers 
Source of new ideas 
Cross-functional information 
exchange 
Basis of supplier evaluation Strategic contributions 
Attitude towards supplier Mutual independence 
Professional development focus Cross-functional understanding 
Overall characterisation Strategic behaviour 
 
TABLE 1.1 
FEATURES OF PROCUREMENT AT INTEGRATIVE STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT 
Source: Reck & Long (1988) ‘Purchasing: A competitive Weapon’ Journal of Purchasing 
and Materials Management (24) 3: 2-8 
 
The full integration of Procurement within the organisation at a strategic level is 
also viewed as an ideal by other writers.  Christopher (1992) stresses the 
importance of the integration of procurement strategy within the organisation in 
the context of logistics.   
 
These approaches, however, make fundamental assumptions about integration 
and collaboration that draw on a rich heritage of research in the manufacturing 
sector.  The goals of integration that are being studied in such research provide 
value to the organisation in ways that can be objectively quantified.  For 
example, value transparency (Lamming et al 2001a, Hultman and Axelsson 
2004) as discussed in Chapter Four focuses on the development of close buyer-
supplier relationships.  Such long-term supplier relationships aim to improve risk 
management and utilise suppliers as sources of knowledge, skills, expertise and 
innovation.  These are ways to manage trading relationships in a context where 
uninterrupted supply of physical materials and investment in new technology are 
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vitally important considerations.  The full integration of Procurement at a 
strategic level in order to achieve these goals seems a logical and natural goal.  
 
These approaches therefore assume that executives will actively support the full 
integration of Procurement within the organisation to influence all categories of 
expenditure.  This may not, necessarily, always be the case because different 
considerations apply to the purchase of management consultancy.  The 
subjectivity that underpins the decision to use consultants initially, the 
subsequent selection criteria employed and assessments of value, do not motivate 
executives to develop an integrative approach towards Procurement for this 
category of services.  Integration may be welcomed by executives for every other 
category of spend but, for management consultancy, executives often prefer to 
act alone without support from Procurement.   
 
The tendency of the literature in Chapter Four to draw on manufacturing-based 
data may explain why it makes a fundamental assumption that integration and 
collaboration is a common goal in all categories of corporate expenditure.  It 
does, however, also raise the question whether Procurement can ever be fully 
involved in all categories of spend and therefore whether it can ever be a truly 
strategic function.  Executives tend to procure management consultancy in a 
different way to procurement professionals because of a fundamental variance in 
their underlying value constructs.  The roots of the differences in these 
procurement methodologies run deep because executives and Procurement 
departments play to different audiences: executives interact on a personal level 
with other executives and this is a hinterland that Procurement does not enter.  
The concept of a hinterland is used here to mean the different accountabilities of 
executives and the intensely political context within which they operate.  It is 
referred to again in Chapter Twelve, Conclusions. 
 
Variances in underlying value constructs are reflected in the different criteria that 
Procurement professionals and executives tend to use when engaging 
management consultants.  In any purchase, decision-making will be influenced 
by a mix of subjective and objective criteria and no instance will ever be 
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completely one or the other.  When management consultants are engaged, 
however, the criteria are skewed in subtle ways.  Executives may tend toward 
more subjective criteria while Procurement professionals may tend towards more 
objective criteria.  Examples of these different types of criteria are set out in 
Table 1.2 below. 
 
SUBJECTIVE CRITERIA OBJECTIVE CRITERIA 
‘Chemistry’ Cost 
Reassurance Skills transfer 
Validation Lack of resource 
Managing internal politics Time constraints 
 
TABLE 1.2 
EXAMPLES OF OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE VALUE CONSTRUCTS  
 
Procurement methodologies tend to be objective in the sense that their goals can 
be clearly linked to rational benefits for the organisation, such as lower costs or 
contracts that manage commercial risk.  This is reflected in the cost-reduction 
objectives by which the procurement function in the subject company was 
measured.  Although executive decision-making may also include these 
elements, for particular categories of management consultancy they may be 
overshadowed by subjective criteria that are personal to individual executives.  
Subjective value choice therefore becomes extremely important.  In particular, 
the political motivation underlying consultancy use is discussed in Chapter Two. 
 
Because of its central importance to this study, the nature of subjective value 
choice is discussed in Chapter Three and this chapter develops a pluralistic view 
of subjective decision-making that encapsulates the contingency of individual 
selves.  The importance of this contingency lies in the way it influences the 
procurement of management consultancy by executives.  It is pivotal to drawing 
out the differences in the way executives and procurement professionals 
approach consultancy.  Whereas Procurement professionals develop relationships 
with suppliers that are on an organisational level, executives can, and sometimes 
do, develop relationships with consultants that are on an individual one-to-one 
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basis.  This has an effect on the way that value is assessed and the nature of 
subjectivity must be considered to fully understand the implications of such 
relationships. 
 
Research into management consultancy also presents considerable 
methodological challenges for reasons of access and sensitivity of the data.  
These challenges are discussed in Chapter Seven where the text changes to first 
person to reflect the close involvement of the researcher in data gathering. 
 
Executives work under a great deal of pressure and securing time with them 
individually is very difficult.  This situation immediately makes some research 
techniques, such as focus groups, impossible to implement simply because of the 
practical difficulties.  It would be extremely difficult to obtain commitment from 
a group of executives to the same time and location purely for the purpose of 
research that may not directly benefit them.  Interviews are therefore a good data-
collection technique in this situation, although the length of the time commitment 
can also be problematic.  Thirty to forty minute appointments were possible for 
this study, but requests for any longer than this would have been difficult because 
of the pressure on executives from other commitments. 
 
The interview data is supplemented by an extended observation of a project to 
engage a consultancy firm to perform an extremely important piece of 
organisational design work.  The researcher was part of the project team and this 
data provides insights into the way that procurement processes function in the 
context of management consultancy.  The interview data represents an executive 
viewpoint and the observation therefore provides a different perspective.  In this 
sense, it acts to triangulate the data. 
 
The topic of management consultancy is extremely sensitive because of its cost, 
the relationships that are seen to develop and, sometimes, the intangible nature of 
the value it delivers.  Indeed the sensitive nature of the data caused considerable 
concern to the researcher who felt compelled to take great care in concealing the 
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identity of the subject company as well as restricting access for three years from 
completion. 
 
The problems of access and sensitivity would have made it difficult for an 
outsider to gather the research data.  These problems were overcome in the case 
of this study by the status of the researcher as an insider, that is, an employee of 
the organisation who was known personally to some of the executives who 
participated.  This meant that executives were more willing to allocate time and 
discuss sensitive issues.  The research would not have benefited them personally 
and so it was a ‘favour’ to the researcher to commit valuable time and share their 
thoughts and experiences.  The candid nature of some of the disclosures were 
astonishing and it is difficult to imagine this level of comfort with an outsider 
and, therefore, the same level of disclosure. 
 
In summary, then, management consultancy is a complex and problematic 
category of services using three perspectives: that of the practitioner and the 
academic, as well as the methodological.  These difficulties provoke differing 
responses from within the organisation, both on an organisational and an 
individual level, which has implications for the strategic ambitions of the 
procurement function. 
 
Firstly, the research was prompted by the problems encountered by the 
researcher as a procurement practitioner.  These problems were low levels of 
involvement in the procurement process and difficulty understanding the value 
that such services were delivering to the organisation.   
 
Secondly, from an academic perspective, the unwillingness of executives to fully 
involve Procurement in strategic decisions surrounding the use, selection and 
management of some classes of consultants has profound implications.  It casts 
doubt on the possibility that Procurement can ever become a truly strategic 
function using the integrative definitions derived from research based in the 
manufacturing sector. 
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Thirdly, the difficulty in gaining access to executives for data gathering purposes 
would normally make it problematic to conduct this kind of research.  The 
researcher’s insider status was a rare opportunity to gain access to such data. 
 
This study addresses these issues by examining literature relating to services, 
management consultancy, subjective value choice and sourcing.  It then uses 
interview and observation techniques to directly confront executive procurement 
of management consultancy.  This is set out below in more detail. 
 
In Chapter Two, services marketing literature based on research in a mass market 
consumer context is examined.  Literature that specifically addresses 
management consultancy is also discussed.  Both these areas concentrate on the 
subjective value choices of individuals.  The literature relating to sourcing in 
Chapter Four, however, assumes a high-level relationship between organisations 
and decision-making that is based on objective considerations of the best 
commercial benefits for the organisation.  This distinction between objective and 
subjective is applied to the procurement of management consultancy to expose 
the different levels of value judgements that tend to be used by executives and 
Procurement professionals. 
 
The mix of subjectivity and objectivity seen in both procurement methodology 
and executive use of consultancy implies differing internal responses to the 
procurement of management consultancy.  The Procurement department of the 
subject company wished to become involved in such activity but was excluded 
by executives.  This central dilemma gives rise to the research questions in 
Chapter Six.  These address the way that executives buy management 
consultancy, the role of objective procurement processes in such procurement, 
and whether there is any compatibility between the two.  The research questions 
also address the wider implications of the research for the status of procurement 
as a strategic function. 
 
The data was collected using twenty-seven semi-structured interviews with 
individual executives that concentrate on isolating the reasons they engage 
 15 
consultants and the methods they use to engage them.  This is triangulated by an 
extended observation of a consultancy engagement in which the researcher was a 
participant.  This methodology was highly dependent on the insider status of the 
researcher to overcome the problems of access to senior executives. 
 
Throughout the study the terms ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ are used.  Uncertainty 
refers to the situation created by external factors and risk refers to the degree of 
severity with which such uncertainty is viewed by those within the organisation. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
SERVICE CHARACTERISTICS AND CONSULTANCY LITERATURE 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the services marketing literature.  
This is intended to establish its utility in revealing the nature of complex services 
such as management consultancy and the way that clients evaluate such services.  
In particular it seeks to address the question of how identified characteristics of 
services might affect the procurement of management consultancy. 
 
The services marketing section therefore briefly outlines those characteristics of 
services that distinguish them from goods and which are firmly established in the 
literature.  The current challenge to the dominant paradigm in the form of a 
‘Service-Dominant Logic’ is also highlighted.  This generalised discussion of 
services leads to a more focussed examination of professional services and 
consultancy. 
 
The fluidity of service processes, and the difficulty of assessing quality in 
professional services, has profound implications for the procurement of 
management consultancy because, in theory, it forces clients to rely on a mixture 
of dramaturgy and personal relationships.  To explore this in greater depth, 
literature that views consultancy as the art of impression management is then 
discussed and this then leads to a wider review of consultancy literature. 
 
This literature can be divided into two schools of thought: those writers who are 
critical of consultants and, conversely, those who regard them as positive agents.  
Firstly, the way that the critical literature constructs the notion of managerial 
passivity is developed.  This is exacerbated by the imperfect market and the 
associated asymmetry of information that characterises the procurement of 
management consultancy.  Such an imperfect market presents significant risk to 
clients and, in particular, the ambiguous nature of claims to professionalism 
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made by management consultants is assessed.  Faced with this situation, the 
reliance placed by clients on the strong brand of a consultancy firm to signal 
legitimacy becomes particularly important. 
 
Finally, literature that opposes the critical view of consultancy is discussed.  In 
this view, managers are not seen as passive and the political role of consultants 
within organisations is stressed.  Clients are seen as pro-active users of 
consultants who manipulate the values of objectivity and rationality associated 
with consultants to suit their own purposes. 
 
(i) Characteristics and Classifications of Services 
 
By stressing the differences between services and manufacturing, some writers 
have identified distinctive characteristics of services.  These characteristics are 
defined in negative terms of what manufacturing is not (Araujo and Spring 2006) 
and their relevance is currently being challenged.  Within the service category 
itself, however, professional services are identified as having unique 
characteristics that are distinct from those of ‘mass’ services.  This distinction is 
made explicit now for two reasons: firstly, so that the discussion can more 
usefully focus on the category of professional services that includes consultancy, 
and secondly so that the distinctive characteristics of professional services can be 
identified. 
 
Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry (1990) draw the following general distinctions 
between goods and services based on their research within mass consumer 
services. 
 
• Firstly, services are basically intangible so uniform quality standards 
cannot easily be set.   
• Secondly, services, especially those with a high labour content, are 
heterogeneous.   
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• Thirdly, the production and consumption of many services are 
inseparable.   
 
These distinctions together with a fourth, perishability, have been abbreviated to 
the ‘IHIP’ characteristics of services (Araujo and Spring 2006, Lovelock and 
Gummesson 2004, Vargo and Lusch 2004): 
 
Intangible 
Heterogeneous 
Inseperable 
Perishable 
 
Earlier writers had already noted a blurring of the distinction between goods and 
services.  Wikstrom et al (1994) for example observed that there had been a 
move away from value chains to ‘value stars’ and that ‘today it is offerings rather 
than companies which compete with one another on the market’ (Wikstrom et al 
1994 p.33).  Dissatisfaction with the static boundary between goods and services 
has recently been voiced by a number of others specifically in relation to the 
IHIP characteristics and with more fundamental implications.   
 
By examining the content of widely used marketing textbooks, Lovelock and 
Gummesson (2004) conclude that the IHIP characteristics have become the 
paradigm (Kuhn 1962) for distinguishing goods from services.  They argue, 
however, that this is a paradigm in crisis because major changes in the service 
sector, coupled with the use of technology, result in IHIP no longer being an 
efficient differentiator between goods and services.  For example, performances 
may be recorded in media capable of replay thereby becoming durable and 
replicable.  Instead, Lovelock and Gummesson (2004) offer non-ownership as 
the potential basis for a new paradigm, calling it the ‘rental/access paradigm’.   
 
Araujo and Spring (2006) also regard the search for essentialist differences 
between goods and services as ‘misguided’ and, instead, identify producer-user 
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interactions and the institutional nature of production as being the significant 
indicators of either products or services. 
 
Vargo and Lusch (2004) add that the IHIP characteristics are built on a 
manufacturing-based model that is inappropriate for services.  They define 
service as ‘the application of specialised competences (skills and knowledge), 
through deeds, processes, and performances for the benefit of another entity or 
the entity itself (self service)’ (Vargo and Lusch 2004 p.326).  This definition 
seems very logical and fitting for most services including consultancy but, more 
controversially, they advocate searching for the relationship between goods and 
services rather than the differentiators.  They broadly call this effort a ‘service-
dominant logic’ for marketing (Lusch and Vargo 2006) 
 
‘Manufacturing is a service, and its output is part of the service-
provision process.  Goods therefore are best thought of as appliances, 
which derive their value from their ability to provide service….’  
(Vargo and Lusch 2004 p. 334) 
 
Araujo and Spring (2006) also argue that services are becoming increasingly 
important within manufacturing.  This call for a new definition of services 
implies, however, a greater degree of change for manufacturing than it does for 
services themselves.  Also, its importance lies in accurately defining the service 
firm and therefore ensuring that its operations are managed appropriately.  The 
concern of this section of the chapter is to establish the characteristics that will 
aid an understanding of professional services and, in particular, consultancy.  
Other areas of literature provide greater assistance in this regard and these are 
discussed below.  In addition, literature specifically addressing consultancy and 
knowledge services specifically refers to its intangibility and heterogeneity 
(Alvesson 1993; Clark 1995; Mitchell et al 2003; Gluckler and Armbruster 
2003).  These are therefore still treated as valid characteristics of such services. 
 
Axelsson and Wynstra (2002) also stress the similarities between goods and 
services and stress that both can be seen as ‘products’ comprising core product, 
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basic product and augmented product.  The core product is the core benefit of the 
good or service.  The basic product comprises all the elements surrounding the 
core product, such as design, customer service, installation, quality and 
packaging.  Most importantly, augmented product consists of ‘meta-value’ which 
has significant implications for the examination of management consultancy. 
 
‘(Meta value)..ie the values that go with a brand or company name 
without being specifically connected to a tangible function.  The brand 
and the “promise” it makes are also part of the product.  This has to do 
with image and reliability’ (Axelsson and Wynstra 2002 p. 12) 
 
This is illustrated by the example of the management consultancy, McKinsey & 
Co.  McKinsey, according to Axelsson and Wynstra, charges for its meta-value. 
 
‘In a truly uncertain situation, the customer can rely on “this is what 
McKinsey has come up with” which is definitely a stronger argument 
(or signal) that “this is what consultancy x has found”’.  (Axelsson and 
Wynstra 2002 p13) 
 
The implications of meta value has profound importance for the purchase of 
management consultancy and this is discussed in the last section of this chapter 
in the context of the political use of consultants by managers. 
 
Most products, according to Axelsson and Wynstra, contain elements of both 
goods and services and they illustrate this as a continuum which, usefully, allows 
a distinction to be made between pure goods and pure services.   
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Figure 2.1 
GOODS, SERVICES AND INTERMEDIATE FORMS 
Axelsson, B and Wynstra, F (2002) Buying Business Services Chichester: John Wiley p.13 
 
The product that a McKinsey customer buys for example is likely to be 
intangible advice, analysis and recommendations and can therefore be placed at 
the ‘pure services’ end of the continuum.   
 
Axelsson and Wynstra (2002) also develop classifications based on type of 
service provider.  They identify Routine Service Providers (RSP’s) and 
Professional Service Providers (PSP’s).  Normann and Ramirez (1993) use the 
terminology ‘relieving’ and ‘enabling’ services for a similar classification.   
 
RSP’s are characterised by the ability to solve relatively simple problems.  The 
buying firm knows its needs and what it takes to fulfil them.  It could perform the 
service itself but chooses to use a third party supplier.  PSP’s, by contrast, are 
characterised by the ability to solve complex problems.  Each separate 
transaction is substantial and involves considerable creativity in direct contacts 
with the supplier.  Co-production of value is therefore a significant factor. 
 
Classifications of services that usefully identify characteristics of professional 
services have also been made by other writers.  Wemmerlov (1990) describes 
service in terms of process and identifies rigid and fluid service processes.  These 
have the following characteristics. 
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Rigid service processes 
Low level of task variety 
Requires low level of technical skills 
Low level of information exchange 
Service worker makes few judgmental 
decisions 
Volume is usually high 
Workflow uncertainty usually low 
Process can involve several 
customers/objects simultaneously 
Response time to customer initiated 
service response is low 
Fluid service processes 
Requires high level of technical skills 
Large amount of information needs to be 
exchanged 
Process is not well defined and service 
worker usually makes judgmental 
decisions 
Volume is low 
Workflow uncertainty can be high 
Process only involves one customer at a 
time 
Response time is usually long 
 
TABLE 2.1 
CHARACTERISTICS OF FLUID AND RIGID PROCESSES 
Wemmerlov, U. (1990) ‘A Taxonomy for Service Processes and its Implications for System 
Design’ International Journal of Service Industry Management Vol. 1 No. 3 pp. 20 – 40. 
 
 
Rigid processes dominate in routine customer service organisations and tend to 
produce standardised services. 
 
Fluid processes dominate professional services.  They tend to produce 
customised services and are much less amenable to mechanisation or automation.  
According to Hausman (2003), professional services differ from other services 
due to firstly the extended and intimate exchange involvement and secondly 
client involvement in producing successful outcomes.  In addition, professional 
services are complex and each client situation may lead to a degree of 
customisation.  As already highlighted by Axelsson and Wynstra (2002) this 
indicates an important role for the customer in services that has also been 
addressed earlier in the services literature (LaPierre 1997; Edvardsson 1998; 
Normann and Ramirez 1993).   
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Silvestro et al (1992) and Silvestro (1999) develop a classification of service 
processes based on volume of customers processed.  They observed that, as the 
number of customers processed by a typical unit per day increases, the general 
trend seems to be: 
 
• The focus moves from a people to an equipment orientation; 
• The length of contract time moves from high to low; 
• The degree of customisation moves from high to low; 
• The level of employee discretion moves from high to low; 
• Value-added moves from front office to back office; 
• The focus moves from a process to a product orientation. 
 
This leads to the conclusion that there are three service types: professional, 
service shop and mass services. 
 
Professional Services 
Organisations with relatively few 
transactions.  Services are highly 
customised, process-oriented, with 
relatively long contact time.  Most value is 
added in the front office where 
considerable judgement is applied in 
meeting customer needs. 
Mass services 
Organisations where there are many 
customer transactions, involving limited 
contact time and little customisation.  The 
offering is predominantly product-oriented 
with most value being added in the back 
office and little judgement applied by the 
front office staff. 
Service shops 
A categorisation which falls between 
professional and mass services with the 
levels of the classification dimensions 
falling between the other two extremes. 
 
TABLE 2.2 
SERVICE TYPES 
Silvestro, R., Fitzgerald, L., Johnston, R., Voss, C. (1992) ‘Towards a Classification of 
Service Processes’ International Journal of Service Industry Management Vol. 3 No. 3 pp.62-
75 
Silvestro, R., Johnston, R., Fitzgerald, L., Voss, C. (1990) ‘Quality Measurement in Service 
Industries’ International Journal of Service Industry Management Vol. 1 No. 2 pp. 54-66 
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Johnston and Clark (2001) also use volume of transactions as the basis for a 
typology.  They identify High Volume/Low Variety service operations and Low 
Volume/High Variety service operations. 
 
An example of High Volume/Low Variety would be call centres.  Professional 
services, however, are typified by Low Volume/High Variety services. 
 
‘These organisations are generally selling their capability to meet a 
wide range of customer needs through skills, expertise and knowledge.  
A characteristic of professional services is that the individual 
professional is frequently both “designer” and “deliverer” of the service.  
In fact, the client may be “buying” the individual professional, rather 
than the firm itself.’ (Johnston and Clark, 2001, p.13) 
 
From this brief examination of service-based literature, it is possible to derive a 
number of features, common to all the previous five writers, which characterise 
professional services. 
 
• Professional service firms solve highly complex, technical problems. 
• They have low volumes comprising a small number of substantial 
transactions. 
• Solutions are customised. 
• There is a high degree of client involvement in producing a solution.  
Co-production of value is therefore an important factor. 
• Service workers have a high degree of discretion in designing an 
appropriate solution. 
• Contact time is extended and deep. 
 
Augmented product in the form of ‘meta value’ (Axelsson and Wynstra 2002) is 
also an important feature of professional service firms. 
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The following section examines literature that addresses how clients assess the 
quality they derive from services with particular reference to professional 
services.  It seeks to establish how such assessments are affected, or made 
problematic, by the factors identified above. 
 
(ii) Customer Assessments of Services 
 
Research on customer assessments of service quality (Normann 2000; Gronroos 
1983) has been carried out in the area of ‘mass’ consumer services.   This is 
outlined below leading to discussion of the importance of dramaturgy in services. 
 
Normann (2000) draws a distinction between ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ elements of 
the service package.  So, for example, in an airline service, transportation from 
one point to another is more important than the cleanliness of the airport, much as 
the passenger may appreciate the latter.  For Normann (2000), the customer’s 
experience and evaluation of the total service received is determined by two 
factors: 
 
• Whether the service package includes all the elements (core and 
peripheral) that he expects 
• The extent to which each of these elements meets the various standards 
and quality criteria that he expects.  
(Normann 2000 p.76) 
 
Gronroos (1983) also believes that service needs to be sub-divided to better 
understand the customer’s assessment of its quality.  The division he makes, 
however, is between two quality dimensions: technical quality is concerned with 
outcomes and functional quality is concerned with process.  Both dimensions are 
important to the customer, states Gronroos (1983), but functional quality is 
highlighted as being more influential: 
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‘…a bank’s customer expects that invoices are paid promptly, that 
money is transferred from one account to another, but on the other hand 
any bank can do this.  The bank that is chosen by the customer is the 
one that has good functional quality, too…the functional quality of a 
service is influenced by the accessibility and appearance of the bank 
office, of long-run customer contacts, internal relations in the firm, and 
the attitudes, behaviour and service-mindedness of the contact 
personnel.  The image of the firm, or of a branch office in some cases, is 
a result of how the customers perceive the technical and the functional 
quality dimensions.’  (Gronroos 1983 p.434) 
 
Taking Gronroos’ (1983) concept of functional and technical quality, Hausman 
(2003) observes that customer evaluations of core services highlight the essential 
differences between professional services and other services.  Any encounter 
with professional services that fails to provide favourable results in respect of the 
core component is unlikely to be deemed satisfactory by the client.  However, in 
many of the services where technical quality and functional quality has been 
studied, failure of the core service is relatively rare. 
 
‘…there are few instances where banks fail to properly credit 
customer’s accounts.  This may explain why customers weight 
functional components more heavily, since technical quality is 
assumed.’  (Hausman 2003 p.227) 
 
The technical quality element of professional services is problematic because, as 
Maister et al (2000) also pointed out, many clients do not have the expertise to 
judge technical quality.  For clients of complex professional services such as 
legal, medical or management consultancy services, this is a pressing problem 
because the quality of the service cannot simply be judged on the outcome.  
Skilful advocacy in a courtroom, for example, could still result in a client losing 
his or her case.  Clients of such services are therefore forced to rely more heavily 
on their assessment of functional quality to judge technical quality than would be 
the case in mass services such as banking. 
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When a customer assesses functional quality, there is a strong link with 
dramaturgy.  This link was identified by Grove and Fisk (1983) using, inter alia, 
the work of Goffman (1959).  Services can be seen as a performance during 
which, due to the inherent intangibility of the product being provided, customers 
look for cues and symbols in order to judge quality.  By understanding the 
symbolic meaning that consumers attach to the social and physical context of the 
marketing exchange, strategies may be developed to create a more favourable 
impression of the service.   
 
The importance of dramaturgy can also be seen in the work of Deighton (1994) 
where action becomes performance when the audience believes that it can hold 
the ‘actor’ to a standard.  This is described as a ‘contractual performance’.  A 
contractual performance becomes a ‘staged performance’ when the consumer 
perceives a motive on the actor’s part to produce a calculated effect by his or her 
actions.  Motives could be the desire to create ‘skill’, ‘show’, ‘thrill’ or ‘festive’ 
performances.  The customer’s attribution of motive is crucial to his or her 
judgement of quality: 
 
‘If I imply to you that my motive is to perform skilfully, you will hold 
me to standards of honesty that you would not have used if I had 
suggested that my motive was to perform entertainingly’. (Deighton in 
Rust and Oliver, 1994, p.128) 
 
Performances can fail if they appear to be incompetent or if they are discovered 
to be deceptive.  A performance can be thought successful when the audience is 
persuaded to live for a while within the constructed drama.  Deighton identifies 
five degrees of involvement ranging from a detached role taking in a mundane 
experience to a trance state in a transcendent experience. 
 
Managing a staged performance requires framing the meaning and then 
amplifying this by ‘permeating the boundaries between realism and fantasy, 
observation and participation, so that the event takes on a more varied, rich and 
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complex significance.’  (Deighton in Rust and Oliver 1994 p.133)  Management 
also requires that audience involvement is intensified so that they have a tighter 
sense of identification with the action. 
 
Deighton concludes that, for contractual performance, the expectancy 
confirmation/disconfirmation paradigm guides service managers well.  However, 
for staged performances customer satisfaction is not simply a question of 
ensuring that the event conforms to expectations.   
 
‘Viewing services as staged performances is not metaphorical.  It is of 
the essence of service management that the customers and all the actors 
who are involved in delivering the service share and sustain “a single 
definition of the situation in the face of a multitude of potential 
disruptions”’. (Deighton in Rust and Oliver 1994 p.137) 
 
As noted earlier, the importance of dramaturgy in assessing quality in 
professional services is particularly relevant because customers often do not 
possess the expertise to adequately judge the technical elements of the service.  
Indeed, lack of technical knowledge is usually the main reason for engaging 
them.  Dramaturgy could therefore be considered particularly relevant to 
management consultancy and has certainly been very influential in its study.  The 
literature on dramaturgy as it has been applied specifically to management 
consultancy is discussed in some detail in the next section. 
 
It will be useful at this point to reflect back on the features of professional 
services that were extracted from the first section of this chapter.  Professional 
service firms were characterised as providing solutions to highly complex 
problems.  This fits neatly with the assertion outlined above that clients have 
difficulty judging technical quality and therefore rely on dramaturgy.  Typically 
there was also an extended and deep level of contact time expended in providing 
customised solutions.  The particularly interesting feature in this context is the 
high degree of client involvement and therefore the strong element of co-
production of value that was identified as a characteristic of professional 
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services.  This raises interesting questions about the influence of dramaturgy in 
the situation, typical of management consultancy engagements, where client and 
consultant work extremely closely together to jointly produce a solution.  This is 
a feature of professional services but not ‘mass’ services.  Before the relationship 
between co-production of value and dramaturgy can be explored in greater detail, 
however, it is necessary to examine the consultancy literature in more depth. 
 
The consultancy literature can be classified as functional or critical (Werr, 2002).  
The functional perspective describes management consultancy as a knowledge 
industry and depicts consultants as important sources of expertise and 
‘professional helpers’ (eg Maister et al 2000).  Conversely, the critical 
perspective denies the existence of functional knowledge and asserts that the 
outcomes of management consultancy are highly uncertain.  In this view, the 
need for consultancy is driven by the anguish and uncertainty that managers feel 
in their role and this leaves them vulnerable to manipulation.  Success is 
dependent upon the ability of the consultant to manage the perception of value.  
Within this perspective, the knowledge that management consultants possess is 
viewed as a fad or a fashion that is closely linked to impression management.  
The critical literature is reviewed below with particular emphasis on dramaturgy. 
 
(iii) Consultancy as impression management and the construction of 
managerial passivity. 
 
Sorge and Witteloostuijn (2004) write about ‘sick consultancy metaphors’ that 
poison business. 
 
‘The global business world is infected by a virus that induces a 
permanent need for organisational change, which is fed by the 
management consultancy industry.’ (Sorge and Witteloostuijn 2004 
p.1205) 
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In addition, Lundberg and Young (2001) believe that the client’s request for help 
are ‘almost always implicit calls for emotional help’ while for Mickelthwait and 
Wooldridge (1996), consultants are ‘witch doctors’. 
 
Such views are common within the critical literature and are addressed in more 
detail below.  According to this literature, the difficulties faced by managers stem 
from the intangibility of the services being purchased and the difficulty in 
assessing technical quality discussed above.  In the process of discussing the 
interaction between consultants and their clients, the critical literature creates a 
view of managers as passive victims of manipulative consultants. 
 
Alvesson (1993) examines knowledge-intensive firms (KIF’s) and much of what 
he writes is clearly relevant to management consultancy.  Alvesson proposes a 
‘perspective on knowledge as institutionalised myth and rationality surrogate’ 
(Alvesson, 1993, p.997) and stresses that the ‘struggle’ with ambiguity is a 
‘crucial dimension’ of KIF’s.   
 
Despite the difficulties associated with defining knowledge, it is nevertheless 
treated by many writers as a robust category that is capable of producing ‘good’ 
results.  Indeed, studies of psychologists, architects, and social workers are used 
by Alvesson (1993) to demonstrate the conclusion that formal knowledge 
actually plays a limited part in their work.  This initiates a complex response in 
organisations leading to knowledge becoming an institutionalised myth.  
Interaction with KIF’s then takes on a new meaning. 
 
‘To use or be connected to agents which are highly visible and 
sanctioned in terms of knowledge and expertise is important in adapting 
to the institutional environment in the contemporary Western world.  
Knowledge-intensive service organisations thus become vital symbols 
for client organisations’ elaboration of rules and requirements for 
rationality…External as well as internal faith is thereby created.’  
(Alvesson, 1993, p.1004) 
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The difficulties in assessing the work results of KIF’s is also stressed.  For 
example, a skilfully performed operation will not necessarily guarantee the 
survival of the patient.  For Alvesson (1993), the result of this ambiguity is that 
the focus changes from stressing formal knowledge to ‘persuasive strategies in 
convincing all concerned about expertise and superior rationality…the persuasive 
or rhetorical element then is vital’.  (Alvesson, 1993, p.1004)  The implication is 
then that consultants require not so much formal knowledge as personal skills 
such as commitment, persistence, strong interpersonal and communication skills, 
as well as the ability to cope with uncertainty and strain. 
 
‘Institutionalised assumptions, expectations, recognitions, reputation, 
images, etc, are important to how the product of KIF’s are perceived’  
(Alvesson, 1993, p.1006/7) 
 
Management of perceptions and the use of rhetoric then becomes of central 
importance and the implication is that the ambiguity surrounding knowledge will 
make it difficult to assess value.  It is here that the link with dramaturgy can be 
most clearly seen. 
 
Alvesson’s article has many resonances with the work of Clark (1995).  Clark, 
like Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry (1990), stresses the difficulties in buying 
services rather than goods.  He identifies four distinct characteristics of services. 
 
• Intangibility 
• The fact that service delivery ‘is primarily a process of 
interaction between buyer and seller’  
• Heterogeneity: services cannot be standardised in the same way 
as goods because they are so dependent upon individuals 
• Services are perishable and are destroyed in the process of 
consumption. 
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For Clark (1995) and Clark and Salaman (1998) the overall implications allow a 
similar conclusion to that of Alvesson (1993): 
 
‘Because clients do not know what they are getting until they get it, 
consultants are able to take control of the process by which impressions 
and perceptions of their service are created.  By managing the creation 
of these images consultants are able to persuade clients of their value.’ 
(Clark and Salaman, 1998 p.35) 
 
Consultants must, therefore, manage their client’s expectations and overall 
experience to ensure satisfaction and, of course, repeat business.  Clark’s (1995) 
contention is that, at the core of management consultancy is ‘the creation and 
management of impressions’.  (Clark 1995 p.62)  This is exacerbated by the fact 
that management consultancy is highly heterogeneous and, because the 
consultants themselves have greater freedom to manage the interaction process, 
clients may perceive that they are unable to receive the same level of service 
elsewhere.  Clark (1995) suggests that each assignment provides consultants with 
an opportunity to ‘project their special and distinctive competencies to clients..’ 
(Clark 1995 p.84).  This emphasises the unique nature of management 
consultancy as a professional service: it is bought by executives within a 
corporate environment and is quite distinct from the mass-market situation. 
 
To understand the relationship between consultants and their clients, Clark 
(1995) uses the dramaturgical metaphor.   
 
‘…consultancy work can usefully be understood in terms of the general 
rubric of the theatre.  Consultants seek to create and sustain a reality 
that persuades clients of their value in the same way that actors seek to 
create a “theatrical reality”.’ (Clark, 1995, p.87) 
 
Clark (1995) is sceptical of writing which approaches the consultant as a 
professional helper.  To begin with, many such writers have been consultants 
themselves so have a vested interest in reinforcing professional status.  More 
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fundamentally, consultants have no accepted and authoritative knowledge base in 
which to ground a claim to professionalism: 
 
‘This fluidity in the knowledge base of management consultancy is 
demonstrated by the consultant-driven, package-led, orientation of 
certain types of consultancy work.’  (Clark, 1995, p.90) 
 
In the absence of such a formalised knowledge base, consultants must appear to 
be authoritative by manipulating the interaction between themselves and their 
clients so that the client is convinced of the value and quality they have provided.  
This implies a lack of critical judgement on the part of the client. 
 
There appears to be a connection between the work of Clark (1995) and 
Alvesson (1993) and that of Bloomfield (1995).  Bloomfield and Danieli (1995) 
look specifically at IT consultants who are part of general management 
consultancy firms and argues that it is not possible to separate the technical skills 
of such consultants from their socio-political skills. 
 
‘We suggest that the role of consultants can be understood in relation to 
the use of stratagems first for making themselves indispensable to 
clients, and second for maintaining that identity during the lifespan of a 
consultancy engagement.’ (Bloomfield and Danieli, 1995, p.28) 
 
Bloomfield and Danieli (1995) argue that consultants set themselves up as 
‘obligatory passage points’, that is, as intermediaries between the client and 
technology.  To maintain this identity, consultants re-define themselves and their 
clients so that they fit a particular niche created by themselves.  In order that they 
can establish and maintain such an identity, management consultants ‘must 
mobilise various arguments, reports and techniques (such as project management 
or systems analysis methodologies), or specific ideas or ways of thinking and 
speaking about the world of organisations (eg excellence or TQM), business and 
IT, which help construct and reproduce the relationship between the 
indispensable and the dependent.’ (Bloomfield and Danieli, 1995, p.29)  The 
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central pillar of Bloomfield and Danieli’s (1995) analysis concerns the 
reproduction by consultants of the dualism between the technical and the social 
in order to sell themselves as experts. 
 
The position adopted by Bloomfield and Danieli (1995) is that problems have no 
independent existence, and it is fundamentally important to understand how they 
are constituted.  Bloomfield and Danieli (1995) use a case study of consultants in 
the NHS to illustrate this point.  To maintain their position as technical experts 
they had to deploy their socio-political skills, which, as Bloomfield and Danieli 
(1995) argue, are inseparable from their technical skills.  Other writers have 
identified the political element of consultancy services but see it as a source of 
value to the client.  These are discussed below. 
 
Bloomfield and Danieli (1995), like Clark (1995), create the impression of a 
client who is manipulated by consultants.  The view of client managers as 
victims can also be seen in the work of writers who focus on the ‘fads’ that many 
consultants are involved in marketing to clients.  Gill and Whittle (1992) 
concentrate upon what they have called ‘management by panacea’.  They 
observe that the preoccupation with Total Quality Management (TQM) that was 
prevalent at the time of writing, was reminiscent of previous ‘obsessions’ with 
Management By Objectives (MBO) and Organisational Development (OD).  It is 
further observed that management ‘fads’ have a cyclical nature. 
 
The pervasiveness of these ideas and their cyclical nature seems anomalous 
given the fact that they seem to have little substance.  For example, Gill and 
Whittle (1992) write of TQM: 
 
‘The literature was found to comprise a mass of best practice statements 
and lists of requirements “essential” to the successful implementation of 
TQM’.  (Gill and Whittle, 1992, p.285) 
 
Gill and Whittle (1992) point to ‘idealised’ literature that lacks concepts and 
theory to make it coherent, and they refer to ‘consultant-led, packaged, 
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managerial panaceas and quackery’ (Gill and Whittle, 1992, p.286).  In the 
process of being sold by consultants, TQM gets simplified in order to make it 
more attractive and easily grasped.  This approach obscures the subtleties and 
complications so that it should not be surprising when ‘this appears to managers 
to boil down to the installation of techniques in a mechanistic, step-by-step way 
much as was also advocated by MBO and OD’ (Gill and Whittle, 1992, p.286).   
 
The manager is presented as a victim of his or her environment, unable to resist 
the holy grail promised by successive managerial panaceas, a view that appears 
to have much in common with Kieser (2002).  Using fashion theory to analyse 
the nature of consulting, Kieser (2002) observes that the rapid expansion of the 
management consulting industry is related to the equally rapid expansion in the 
market for management books, seminars, conferences and magazines. 
 
‘It is shown that by producing management concepts, some of which 
succeed in becoming management fashions, consultancies are able to 
create a demand for their services.’ (Kieser in Kipping and Engwall 
2002 p.167) 
 
To make their service more attractive, consultants make their ideas easy to 
comprehend and managers find this appealing: 
 
‘Managers find the simplicity of management concepts attractive 
because, in combination with the cases of successful implementations, it 
furnishes them with a powerful line of argumentation….simplicity 
enhances perceived control.’  (Kieser in Kipping and Engwall 2002 
p.178) 
 
Clark and Fincham (2002) also stress the vulnerability of managers, believing 
that the dramatic growth in management consultancy is linked to perceived skills 
shortages: 
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‘By virtue of the nature of actual or planned changes, managers came to 
believe that new skills, values and qualities lacking in their own 
organisations were needed……the growth of management consulting 
was seen as being primarily linked to knowledge deficiencies on the 
part of clients and a need to supplement in-house skills’ (Clark and 
Fincham 2002 p.4) 
 
Bloomfield and Vurdubakis (2002) corroborate this by examining the 
construction of this knowledge deficit prior to a consultancy engagement.  They 
argue that uncertainty is created by consultants in order to provide a context for 
the provision of a solution: 
 
‘…the very experts sensitising management to the (now) permanent flux 
around us are those who claim to have the ability to plot a safe 
course…’ (Bloomfield and Vurdubakis in Clark and Fincham 2002 
p.115) 
 
Bloomfield and Vurdubakis (2002) stress the importance of specific objects in 
the process of creating uncertainty.  Making the future seem tangible is centred 
around the ‘artefact’, in the case of their study, a self-stocking fridge. 
 
‘..the invitation to “imagine”, to envision the future of their own 
organisation as a world of knowledge, prediction and control, is also an 
incitement to view the present as a state of ignorance and impotence’. 
(Bloomfield and Vurdubakis in Clark and Fincham 2002 p.123) 
 
Impression management is dependent upon the creation of distinct identities.  
Alvesson and Robertson (2006) observe that socially constructed elite identities 
are willingly incorporated by consultants into their sense of self.  Issues of 
identity are important to consultancy firms because, inter alia, they communicate 
to the client the aspired image.  Also, a distinctive organisational identity 
mediates the inherent ambiguity of knowledge-intensive work. 
 
 37 
‘The importance of establishing oneself as a sophisticated “expert” in 
relation to other professionals in client firms calls for the development 
of a robust, distinctive identity that will facilitate impression 
management and the development of social relations.’  (Alvesson and 
Robertson, 2006 p.220) 
 
Backlund and Werr (2004) examine the social construction of management 
consulting through an examination of the web presentations of four major global 
consultancy firms: McKinsey, Boston Consulting Group, Andersen (now 
Accenture) and KPMG (now Bearing Point).  They observe that the growth of 
global consulting rests on the assumption that management is an increasingly 
standardised activity and that knowledge developed in one part of the globe will 
be equally applicable elsewhere.  However, contrary to this assumption, they 
point out that management consultancy can have significant local variations. 
 
Against this background, global consultancy firms attempt to legitimise their 
services.  Backlund and Werr base their study on the sociology of translation, the 
central aspect of which is the process of problematisation.  Actors become 
involved in a growing network established around a created problem.  One actor 
sets him or herself up as an ‘obligatory passage point’ (also seen in Bloomfield 
and Danieli, 1995).  In terms of global consulting, this means creating a problem 
that can only be solved by a global consulting firm.   
 
Implicit in the consultancy firm’s web presentations is the assumption that global 
reach increases the stock of knowledge that the firms accrue.  The applicability 
of this knowledge across the globe is taken for granted because competency is 
seen as more important than geography. 
 
Whilst client shortcomings are stressed, the firms are careful to portray the client 
as ‘legitimate help-taker’.  They stress that they help ‘leading’ organisations so 
that seeking their intervention is not a sign of weakness but a prerequisite for 
success.  At the same time, they seek to establish themselves as ‘legitimate 
experts’.  Likewise, in reproducing the image of management as a rational 
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knowledge-based activity, they draw on the strong support of myths of 
rationality, globalisation and universality. 
 
In these circumstances, clients are likely to be more vulnerable to the effects of 
personal relationships.  Kipping (1999) shows how American consultancy firms 
expanded in Europe using the personal relationships they developed with clients.  
Indeed, individuals were recruited specifically for their connections.  McGivern 
(1983) examines specific cases of relationships between consultants and clients 
and noted a lack of emphasis on results.  In one case, while project objectives 
were achieved, this was expressed as being the result of qualitative factors in the 
relationship rather than the consultant’s technical expertise. 
 
Maister (1993) notes that the client comes to rely on a mixture of dramaturgy, 
functional quality and personal relationship to indicate quality. 
 
‘Because of the ambiguity that surrounds technical excellence (and the 
difficulty the client has in appraising it), the personal relationship 
between the client and the provider takes on great significance in all of 
the professions.’ (Maister 1993 p.71) 
 
Managing the client’s expectation and experience is therefore as important as 
delivering work of a high technical standard.  Maister points out that clients 
rarely engage firms based purely on their technical skills.  Writing from a buyer’s 
perspective, Maister says that he will be ‘forced to rely on clues obtained through 
the interview process in order to guess at what kind of person you (the 
professional) are.  My impressions and perceptions are created by small actions 
that are meaningful for their symbolism….Unlike the process of qualification, 
which is predominantly rational, logical, and based on facts, the selection stage is 
mostly intuitive, personal, and based on impressions.’ (Maister 1993 p.114) 
 
These are also the findings of Hausman (2003) who concluded that the unique 
nature of professional services may increase the customer’s reliance on the social 
aspects of the relationship as a means to increase satisfaction with the service.  
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Hausman’s research results support the notion that the social aspects of 
professional service relationships positively affect the satisfaction of clients of 
physicians, social workers, ministers and hairstylists, but the strength of the 
relationship varies with the context.  The more classically ‘professional’ 
occupations, like medicine, show a stronger link between social aspects of the 
relationship and satisfaction than less ‘professional’ occupations such as 
hairstyling.   
 
This section has built on the previous sections by showing how the general 
characteristics of services, and professional services in particular, increase the 
risks faced by clients of management consultancy firms.  Clients are rendered 
vulnerable to manipulation by the difficulty in assessing quality prior to 
consumption, as well as the intangibility and heterogeneity of the services they 
seek to procure.  Consultants exploit this situation by manipulating the 
relationship with clients and establishing an identity as ‘professional’ and expert 
and, therefore, ‘obligatory passage points’.  In the process, client managers are 
seen as passive victims. 
 
The next section discusses in more detail the risk faced by clients of consultancy 
firms and the ways that they may seek to minimise such risk. 
 
(iv) Risk and ambiguity 
 
Due to the intangibility of the service and the difficulty in judging outcomes, 
there is a high degree of risk involved in purchasing professional services 
(Mitchell et al 2003) and this often leads to a high degree of brand loyalty if 
experience of the service is good (Mitchell 1994).  The factors leading to such a 
high degree of risk, and some of the strategies used by clients to reduce such risk, 
are discussed below. 
 
Consultants are anxious to establish ‘professional’ status for themselves (Maister 
1993, Maister et al 2000).  The use of the term ‘professional’ is problematic, 
however, when applied to consultancy because it implies a legitimacy that is not 
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present.  This is discussed in detail by Gluckler and Armbruster (2003) who 
observe that the market for management consultancy services is imperfect and 
characterised by uncertainty.  This uncertainty stems from various sources that 
they discuss as follows. 
 
Management consultancy is an ‘unbounded’ industry.  There are no 
‘professional’ standards and no professional bodies with statutory authority to 
regulate standards.  In addition, consulting has none of the typical features of a 
profession, such as: 
 
• A common stock of knowledge; 
• Specific educational courses or qualification; 
• Legal protective designation 
 
The consequently low market entry barriers mean that anyone can label their 
services ‘consulting’.  A prospective buyer of such services has no way of 
judging expertise and this leads to considerable information asymmetry, much 
more so than in other ‘classic’ professions where formal institutions absorb some 
of this risk.  ‘Membership of a professional organisation is a market signal 
ensuring the quality of service supplied.  It legitimises the right to practice in 
professional markets and serves a symbolic purpose in indicating and 
institutionalising the possession of knowledge.’ (Kam, 2004) 
 
As Gluckler and Armbruster (2003) point out, the absence of any licensing 
standards, qualification requirements or codes of conduct mean that malpractice 
cannot be defined against a set of standards and, in any case, there is no 
institutional means of responding to malpractice.   
 
In addition, as with most knowledge-intensive services, there are issues of 
confidentiality, intangibility and interdependency.  Access to confidential 
information in particular, makes the client vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour 
on the part of the consultant. 
 41 
 
Lastly, product intangibility renders ineffective the standard competitive market 
mechanisms of quality and price (Porter 1980, 1985).  This is because quality of 
service is so difficult to measure.  Therefore, if the quality of a contracted 
performance is not objectively assessable, then price cannot be used as an 
indication of quality. 
 
‘Project results are unique and hard to compare with other projects, thus 
the intangibility of consulting services inhibits any objective price 
building.  Consequently, prices do not resolve the uncertainty clients 
face when screening the consultancy market for the best providers.’  
(Gluckler and Armbruster, 2003) 
 
The absence of standards opens the way to performance surrogates such as 
impression management.  Using the embeddedness perspective (Granovetter, 
1985), however, Gluckler and Armbruster explore alternative informal social 
institutions used by clients to reduce uncertainty.  Among these are public 
reputation and experience-based trust.   
 
The use of ‘networked reputation’ is, however, identified as extremely important.  
Channelled through socially embedded networks, such information is ‘thick’, 
credible and trustworthy.  It operates as a social substitute for service quality and, 
as an indicator of competence, has the effect of raising the entry barriers for new 
entrants. 
 
This gives consultancy firms with a high degree of reputation the opportunity to 
charge high fees because they have a brand that signals legitimacy.  Kam (2004) 
also studies the implications of claims to professionalism by consultants and 
concludes that strong brands compensate for difficulties in establishing quality.  
Essentially, strong brands become a substitute for professionalism and the status 
that it bestows.  Consultants from branded firms are, therefore, presumed to be 
competent and professional.  Kam also concludes, however, that because client 
satisfaction is of paramount importance to consultants, where there is any 
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conflict between the two, ‘professionalism’ will always be sacrificed.  Indeed, 
she goes so far as to suggest that ‘professionalism’ may hamper the consultant’s 
ability to operate in political situations. 
 
This section has discussed the difficulty associated with claims by consultants to 
the status of professionals.  Such claims appear insubstantial when compared to 
the ‘classical’ professions such as law and medicine.  This, in theory, increases 
the risk to the client when purchasing consultancy and the resulting reliance on a 
strong brand to convey legitimacy has also been noted.  Significantly, both this 
section and the previous section made an assumption that the client of 
professional services has difficulty assessing the technical quality of the services 
he or she is procuring.  This may appear to make the client weak, vulnerable and 
heavily reliant on functional quality and dramaturgy as an indicator of technical 
quality.  The next section, however, implies that this is not the case.  It discusses 
the use of brand and its ‘meta value’ (Axelsson and Wynstra 2002), by the client 
as a political weapon.  In this view, clients are not passive and consultancy is 
seen to have significant value to its clients.  It also suggests that clients have a 
much clearer insight into the technical aspects of consultancy services than 
literature previously discussed had implied. 
 
(v) Consultancy as value and political weapon 
 
The critical view of consultancy has detractors and some observers believe that 
clients use consultancy services to address specific political objectives.  For 
example, Saint Martin (2005) suggests that in the public sector, consultants are 
deliberately used to diffuse blame and provide some protection from political 
opponents.  This section examines the views of those opposed to the critical view 
of consultancy who see clients as using consultancy to deliver value and, in 
particular, for political reasons. 
 
Neumann (2003) observes: 
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‘Incorporating popular cynicism under a banner of applying “critical 
theory”, this emerging research intends to subject management 
consultancy to scrutiny as an industry (Clark and Fincham 2002).  
While certainly valid, such a critique does little to clarify those 
contemporary approaches to substantial organisational change, which 
may result in outcomes judged positively by a range of stakeholders.’ 
(Neumann, 2003, p.2) 
 
Salaman (2002) is critical of the concentration on the truth or untruth of 
consultancy ideas:  
 
‘It assumes that management thinking and decision-making is 
“normally” or inherently rational and systematic and that therefore this 
apparent deviance requires explanation….Yet there is little in our 
knowledge of organisation process, functioning decision-making at the 
theoretical or empirical levels that makes this “irrationality” striking or 
unusual.  Quite the reverse is normal’.  (Salaman in Clark and Fincham 
2002 p.252) 
 
Whatever the quality of these ideas, Salaman (2002) observes, they appeal to 
managers and therefore play an important part in restructuring programmes. 
 
Heller (2002) also points out that there may be other reasons why managers use 
consultants that the current emphasis has missed: 
 
‘…it may not always be safe to assume consultant-guru dominance and 
managerial subordination.  The alternative possibility also has to be 
considered, namely that managers exploit the reputation of consultant-
gurus for their own purposes and are prepared to pay substantial fees in 
order to indulge their own strong ego needs’.  (Heller in Clark and 
Fincham 2002 p.268) 
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There are other writers who take a more positive view of consultancy services.  
For example, Fincham (1999) also disagrees with the view of passive managers 
and illustrates the point using case studies which show managers who are far 
from being passive recipients of consultancy. 
 
“… internal managements not only contested the legitimacy of 
consultant and guru claims but constructed their own versions of reality 
– versions of their own solutions and counter-versions of consultants’ 
solutions.  There was very little belief in the impartiality of external 
experts.  No willingness to allow them free rein in defining their skills, 
nor unfettered freedom to build saleable images of themselves.  Instead, 
there was an awareness of consultants’ and guru’s “special talent” for 
self promotion”  (Fincham, 1999, p344). 
 
There is, according to this, an active engagement by managers with the ideas put 
forward by consultants and it is far from passive.  Werr and Linnarsson (2002) 
argue that consultants have become an integral part of the client’s knowledge 
system and provide access to information that would not otherwise be available 
to managers. 
 
Collins (2004) argues that understanding of consultancy has been coloured by a 
failure to acknowledge the processes that facilitate the translation of advice.  The 
consumption of management knowledge is a ‘complex, mediated and social 
process, which turns upon the capabilities of actors and actions hitherto written 
out of attempts to debunk/resituate debates on the advice industry’. (Collins, 
2004, p.564)  Collins concludes that managers are not passive recipients but 
amend organisational ‘recipes’ to suit the local situation. 
 
There is also empirical evidence to suggest that clients of consultancy firms have 
clear motives of their own for using consultants.  Research carried out by 
Poulfelt and Payne (1994) named five such motives.  These were as follows.  
Percentages refer to proportion of client responses to the survey used. 
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To provide expertise, knowledge and new methodologies 21% 
To provide additional resources 13% 
To present new solutions to the organisation’s problems 21% 
To act as an external catalyst and moderator 24% 
To bring an independent and neutral perspective to the 
organisation 
18% 
 
TABLE 2.3 
MOTIVATION FOR CONSULTANCY USE 
Poulfelt, F., Payne, A. (1994) ‘Management Consultants: Client and Consultant 
Perspectives’ Scandinavian Journal of Management Vol. 10, No. 4 pp 421-436 
 
 
Again, this does not suggest total passivity on the part of client managers, but 
rather some conscious application of consultancy resource to existing problems 
 
Like Alvesson, Werr (2002) focuses on the knowledge base of consulting 
services but comes to a different conclusion.  Writing of his research in two 
Swedish companies, he concluded: 
 
‘….this study of consultant’s work….shows that the consultant’s 
actions were to a large extent based on detailed functional knowledge 
aimed at improving the operations of the client organisation (rather than 
creating an impression of such improvements).  (Werr in Kipping and 
Engwall 2002 p105 – 106) 
 
Also contrary to the view of passive managers and confident consultants, Sturdy 
(1997) develops an alternative interactive model ‘based on reciprocal and self-
defeating concerns of clients and consultants to secure a sense of identity and 
control’ (Sturdy, 1997, p.390).  It is his contention that the interactive nature of 
the relationship between consultants and clients is often missed: 
 
‘For example, managers are often critical of, and resist, consultants and 
new ideas and, in turn, consultants respond to and seek to anticipate 
such concerns’.  (Sturdy, 1997, p.390) 
 46 
 
Sturdy (1997) does not deny that consultants ‘actively contribute to the 
conditions of their demand’ (Sturdy, 1997, p.398).  There is, however, a dual 
aspect to such services.  Ideas and techniques are ‘rendered attractive by 
consultants simultaneously offering to reassure clients while reinforcing their 
insecurities’.  (Sturdy, 1997 p.398) 
 
Clients want to conform to the ‘norm’ and consultants play a major role in 
normalising problems by relating back to other clients and providing reassurance 
and the comfort of ‘technical rationality’. 
 
‘The appeal and political utility of technical rationality is that it offers 
both the prospect of controlling uncertainty and legitimation through 
being seen as objective and politically neutral.’ (Sturdy, 1997, p399) 
 
There is therefore a political dimension to their services which clients find 
valuable.  However, in providing them, consultants also reinforce uncertainty: 
 
‘… through their research of different sectors and technologies and their 
marketing and early sales presentations, they not only normalise 
problems, but elaborate them, and direct attention to new ones’.  
(Sturdy, 1997, p401 
 
This continues during projects as they search for new problems and, therefore, 
new engagements. 
 
However, the portrayal of vulnerable managers in these situations is, believes 
Sturdy, inaccurate because of the possibility of political objectives: 
 
‘(Such a portrayal) might not seem wholly appropriate to manager’s 
tactical use of consultants to legitimate prior decisions and/or pursue 
career objectives…..And should perhaps be restricted to those who 
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seem attracted to or who adopt new management ideas or fads in “good 
faith”’.  (Sturdy, 1997, p402) 
 
The difficulty in assessing value in the context of consultancy is highlighted by 
other writers.  Kipping and Armbruster (2002) stress the difficulty associated 
with the ‘otherness’ of consultants and contend that it is this which contributes to 
the ambiguous picture of the value derived from consultancy.  They argue that 
consultancy interventions are difficult to assess because of their intangibility and 
the difficulty of comparison outside of a controlled environment.  However, one 
of the benefits of otherness is legitimacy: 
 
‘This legitimisation is based on the values of rationality and scientificity 
that consultants are associated with, and organisational decision-makers 
can refer to “scientifically valid” standards and progressiveness if they 
employ them’.  (Kipping and Armbruster in Kipping and Engwall, 2002 
p.205) 
 
Kipping and Armbruster (2002) also point out that this does not produce 
quantifiable results and is thus not measurable.  Despite this difficulty, however, 
legitimisation still represents a potential source of value because it can be used to 
reinforce management decisions. 
 
Gammelsaeter (2002) also looks at the political role of consultants.  He argues 
that because consultants are embedded in contexts outside the organisation, they 
are limited in the extent to which they can influence changes in the client 
organisation.  However, despite the increasing commodification of consultancy 
and decreasing efficiency, consultancy continues to grow: 
 
‘This paradox is explained by the political function that consultancy 
play in serving the dominant coalition in the client organisation.’  
(Gammelsaeter in Kipping and Engwall 2002 p.224) 
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The more unstable the management structure within a client organisation, the 
greater the influence of consultants. 
 
‘…consultants may sometimes find themselves interacting most 
intensely not with the dominant coalition but with groups of managers 
who patiently try to exploit the (sometimes) restricted scope for action 
that is to be found in the inner context.  In this sense consultants are 
used in a power game between groups of managers, and their influence 
therefore depends not merely on the advice they convey or their 
pedagogical and rhetorical qualities, but also on the outcomes of these 
games in the long run’. (Gammelsaeter in Kipping and Engwall 2002 
p.236) 
 
Alvesson and Johansson (2002) discuss the use of consultancy in a political 
context by discussing the use of professionalism.  The claims to professionalism 
made by consultants can be selectively used by clients to their advantage.  
 
They identify different types of consultants: 
 
• Esoteric experts 
• Brokers of meaning 
• Traders in trouble 
• Agents of anxiety and sellers of security 
 
However, they point out that consultancy work typically involves a blend of 
these types and that sometimes one or two of the types will dominate a particular 
assignment.  Where ‘political’ services are required, it suits the client to have a 
strong image of professionalism.  
 
‘..consultancy work frequently means mingling professionalism with 
anti-professionalism.  Consultants and clients continually negotiate 
where the focus should be.  The more adaptive the consultant is to 
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change behaviour that fits the context the better the possibilities for 
consultancy work.’.  (Alvesson and Johansson in Clark and Fincham 
2002 p.240) 
 
So, the political environment within which the client operates has a direct effect 
on the use of consultancy services. 
 
Kaarst-Brown (1999), however, suggests that the use of consultants has strong 
symbolic value that may or may not be used consciously by clients.  The external 
consultant could be seen as any of the following. 
 
• A symbol of change-to-come; 
• A symbol of changing norms and values; 
• A symbol of power redistribution; 
• A symbolic wishing well; 
• A symbol of organisational empowerment. 
 
So, the use of consultants may have a value that cannot be demonstrated using 
purely tangible project objectives.  Value may be associated more with the 
achievement of political objectives or creating the right climate for organisational 
change. 
 
Conversely, Poulfelt and Payne (1994) examined client motives for using 
consultants and found that only 3% of survey respondents used consultants for 
political purposes.  However, they also observed: 
 
‘Political Motives are…….highly sensitive and are difficult to elicit in 
written questionnaires.  Further, consultants may be unaware of the 
“real” motives and clients may be unwilling to reveal them.  Thus their 
importance may be under-represented in this study.’  (Poulfelt and 
Payne, 1994, p426) 
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More recently however, Schwarz (2003) studied the use of consultants in the 
context of the strategic review process within a manufacturing company.  The 
research showed that consultants influenced the strategy process at different 
stages and also influenced management in their decisions.  Five main categories 
of consultant’s contribution were identified and these are set out below with 
some relevant detail. 
 
1. Prioritising Strategic Issues: The consultants identified a requirement for 
fundamental change.  Significantly, it seems they were able to raise this in a 
way that may have been difficult for an employee or director. 
 
2. Analyzing Strategic Issues: In a strategy development process that was 
described as ‘autocratic’, consultants were able to question established 
practice. 
 
3. Knowledge Carrier: As well as disseminating information about their 
proposed solution, the consultants also had the role of securing its 
acceptance.  
 
4. Promoting Strategic Decisions: The role of securing acceptance went 
beyond mere persuasion, however, when handling issues with senior 
managers.  When dealing with dissent at board level, the senior consultant 
‘started to raise his voice and made personal attacks on a certain senior 
manager whose department was not doing well’. (Schwarz, 2003, p.21).   
 
5. Facilitating Implemented Changes: The role of the consultants continued 
well into the implementation process.  The CEO commented:  
 
‘..he is the best person for this job…….he is able to fight, in particular, the 
senior management board……….I sometimes trust him more than my 
colleagues on the board.’ (Schwarz, 2003, p.24) 
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Schwarz (2003) concluded that the relationship between client and consultant 
directly affected the degree of influence which consultants were able to use.  It is 
also interesting to note that much of the effectiveness of the consultants seemed 
to lie in the very fact that they were external.  This appeared to give them a 
political advantage and objectivity that they used to push their agenda of change.  
It is interesting to note that the CEO of the company being studied seemed to be 
consciously using consultants as catalysts for change.  This strongly suggests that 
the political role of consultants provided a rich source of value in this instance 
that could not have been achieved by an internal employee. 
 
Such use of external consultants to effect change has strong resonance in Nippa 
and Petzold (2002) who also specifically note the conscious use of brand name as 
a signal.  They observe that the functions of a consultant comprise knowledge 
transfer; provision of objectivity, and obtaining legitimacy.  Dominant decision 
frames can be difficult to overcome so ‘management consultants can be viewed 
as a means to enforce the favoured alternative by providing an accepted, 
sometimes unquestionable reference’ (Nippa and Petzold 2002 p.224).  This 
reference power is based on the consultant’s independence and reputation.  
‘From the perspective of the client, the consultant’s value is not based on the 
intensity of work, the knowledge embedded in argumentation, or the quality of 
the product, but rather on the brand name signalling quality and ensuring 
acceptance.  Clients are willing to pay more for a higher signal quality providing 
them with the superiority needed to reinforce their interests.’(Nippa and Petzold 
2002 p225) 
 
Looking particularly at corporate mergers, Hellgren et al (2004) observe that 
consultants act as agents of homogenisation.  These contexts often involve a 
redistribution of power and are therefore highly political.  Their ‘self-claimed’ 
status as neutral and objective experts, makes them central enablers in this 
process.  Consultants can be simultaneously or sequentially engaged in expert or 
political/persuasive roles.  Hellgren et al identified four different homogenisation 
processes in which consultants played different roles: 
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• Externally driven in which consultants act as agents of 
homogenisation 
• Compromisingly driven in which consultants act as agents of 
negotiation 
• Procedurally driven in which consultants act as facilitators 
• Assymetrically driven in which consultants act as agents of 
colonisation 
 
In all cases, consultants are being used by their clients to achieve the goals that 
they have set and, in this way, deliver value.  Clients are not seen either as 
passive or as victims of manipulative consultants. 
 
Kam (2004) goes as far as suggesting that the political utility of having 
consultants who support their client’s decisions and uphold their authority 
actually overcomes the intangibility and ambiguity that is inherent in 
management consultancy.  Although content and knowledge remain vital, the 
consultant’s skills in performing social interactions are more important.  Kam 
also observes: 
 
‘Given the emphasis placed on client-consultant relationships, it should 
be little wonder that so little effort has been put into the evaluation and 
measurement of consulting performance or even into devising criteria 
for such evaluation and measurement.’ (Kam 2004 p.63) 
 
Measurement is important but subjectivity becomes the norm while objectivity is 
impossible. 
 
‘Managers often use consulting services for their own political 
purposes, and as such, are not in a position to critically evaluate what 
they have used.’ (Kam 2004 p.63) 
 
For consultants, this means that satisfying the client is vital. 
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‘The sole and utmost important criterion for management consulting 
thus appears to lie in client satisfaction.  Any other ethos of 
professionalism, if it does not directly contribute to satisfying clients, is 
simply forgotten.’ (Kam 2004 p.64) 
 
This means that consultants are, potentially, of great importance to clients 
because of their political utility and willingness to do anything that is required to 
fulfil the client’s expectations. 
 
Summary 
 
Writers on services identify characteristics of professional services that include 
the complex and often customised nature of the services themselves; the 
extended and deep level of contact time between client and provider; the high 
degree of discretion given to service workers; and the high level of client 
involvement in the service itself.  The complexity of professional services affects 
the way that clients judge quality. 
 
Clients of ‘mass’ services such as banking, can judge technical quality simply by 
a successful outcome, for example, correct and timely payment of cheques.  
Clients of complex professional services, however, have a more challenging task 
when attempting to judge technical quality due to the intricate nature of the 
service itself.  Legal advocacy and surgery, for example, may be skilfully 
performed but still have an unsuccessful outcome.  This results in a heavy 
reliance on functional quality as an indicator of technical quality.  The 
application of these assertions to the procurement and use of management 
consultancy results in two distinct views of consultancy outlined below. 
 
Knowledge services are, by their nature, ambiguous and the market for 
management consultancy services is characterised by considerable information 
asymmetry.  Consequently the client has difficulty in assessing quality prior to 
purchase.  This may be exacerbated by the technical nature of the service and its 
 54 
unfamiliarity to the client who cannot, in such circumstances, rely upon the 
regulatory governance of the professional institutions that are found in, for 
example, the fields of law or medicine.  It is suggested that the brand of a 
consultancy firm then becomes a substitute for professionalism and a signal for 
the quality of its consultants.  The purchase of consultancy services therefore 
represents a significant risk for the client and this leads to reliance on subjective 
responses to personal relationships, previous experience, brand and networked 
reputation as ways of assessing technical quality and minimising risk.   
 
Client vulnerability is exacerbated by the use of ‘impression management’ by 
consultants.  This creates the image of a client who is passive and can be 
persuaded of the value of the ‘fads’ sold by consultancy firms at various times.  
Consultants are thereby given the opportunity to establish themselves as 
‘obligatory passage points’ (Bloomfield and Danieli 1995; Backlund and Werr 
2004). 
 
Conversely there are strong arguments and empirical evidence to suggest that 
executive clients themselves consciously use the professional status and 
objectivity claimed by consultants, as well as the selection of strong consultancy 
brands, to further their own agendas.  For example, consultants can give 
legitimacy to an executive’s own decisions, add momentum to change initiatives 
or affect the balance of power within an organisation.  This indicates that 
consultants play a major role in the internal politics of organisations but are 
controlled by clients.  Furthermore the strong element of co-production of value, 
combined with the extended and deep level of contact that are characteristics of 
professional services, suggest that the client has a more sophisticated 
understanding of technical quality than has previously been suggested.  This 
would, in turn, be a significant impediment to the consultants’ ability to establish 
themselves as the sole repository of knowledge to whom reference must 
necessarily be made. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
SUBJECTIVE VALUE CHOICE 
 
Introduction 
 
The subjective value choices of individuals are of central importance to this 
study because of the fundamental role they play in the procurement of 
management consultancy by executives.  Chapter Two has provided strong 
indications that clients manipulate consultants for their own purposes.  For 
example, they may need to add external validation to their own decisions, or help 
in managing internal politics.  This is value that is personal to individuals.  In the 
two examples given, it is the individual’s authority that is enhanced and the 
balance of power that is manipulated in favour of the individual.  Executives 
instigate these engagements themselves and then assess the value that they, 
personally, have derived from it.   
 
Understanding the nature of subjectivity and the way it influences individuals 
and their value choices also greatly assists in developing a distinction between 
the subjectivity of individuals and the objectivity which pervades relationships 
between organisations.  Such organisational relationships are merely facilitated 
by individuals and operate at several levels of engagement.  Such relational 
approaches to business transactions are developed in greater detail in Chapter 
Four.  The distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is, however, pivotal to 
this study because it provides the basis for a difference in approach between 
executive procurement of management consultancy and professional 
procurement methodologies. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to focus upon the treatment of individual value 
choice, firstly as it is discussed in the economics literature and then, more 
broadly, in philosophy.  The difference in approach between the two disciplines 
is developed in the following ways. 
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Although the history of writing on value started with Aristotle, discussion of this 
early work has not been undertaken.  Labour theories of value developed by 
Ricardo (1817) and Marx (1867) have also been omitted because they 
concentrate on deriving value from supply rather than demand.  Smith (1776) has 
been omitted for the same reason.  The following analysis begins with a 
discussion of utilitarianism and subjectivism that concentrates on the behaviour 
and preferences of consumers as a means of assessing value.  It is argued firstly 
that utilitarianism is fundamentally flawed for the purposes of this study because 
it is based upon an unsuitable theory of human behaviour.  Secondly, and most 
fundamentally, the discussion questions the validity of monistic theories of value 
and puts forward a compelling pluralistic alternative.  
 
(i) Utilitarianism and Subjectivism 
 
The following discussion sets out the main tenets of utilitarianism and 
subjectivism.  It stresses the mathematical nature of marginalism and the attempt 
to measure subjective preferences using price.  It argues, however, that such 
theories are based on an inadequate theory of human behaviour.  This section 
then opens into a further discussion that questions the use of price as an adequate 
measure of value. 
 
The classical theorists had believed that the source of value lay in the production 
process.  Utility was always acknowledged as an important aspect of value 
theory but not as a unit of measurement.  The advent of neo-classicism, however, 
saw a shift of emphasis away from production and towards demand and 
consumption as the source of value.  This, as Dobb observes, placed ‘the stress 
on the capacity of what emerged from the production-line to contribute to the 
satisfaction of the desires, wants, needs of consumers.’ (Dobb, 1973, p.167)  In 
this way, individual preferences were stressed in a way that was completely alien 
to Smith, Ricardo and Marx. 
 
Bentham (1789) is notable as a precursor to neo-classicism because he applied 
utility theory more widely than had previously been the case and set it at the 
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centre of a coherent theory of human behaviour.  Writing primarily on 
government, Bentham developed a principle of utility that reduced the 
motivation of all individuals to the maximisation of pleasure with the minimal 
amount of pain: 
 
‘Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign 
masters, pain and pleasure.  It is for them alone to point out what we 
ought to do, as well as determine what we shall do.’  (Bentham, 1789, 
p.1) 
 
Utility was defined as the ability of an object to either supplement or diminish 
the happiness of the individual.   
 
‘By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to 
produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness…or…to 
prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil or unhappiness to the party 
whose interest is considered..’  (Bentham, 1789, p.2) 
 
These ideas were applied to economic theory by a number of writers but the 
contributions of Jevons (1866), Menger (1871) and Walras (1874) are unique 
because by using marginal utility, subjective value could actually be measured.   
 
‘Their marginalism gave credit to a special version of utilitarian 
philosophy, one for which human behaviour is exclusively reducible to 
rational calculation aimed at the maximisation of utility.  They 
considered this principle to be universally valid: alone, it would have 
allowed the understanding of the entire economic reality’.  (Screpanti et 
al, 1993, p.148) 
 
This raises two important features of utilitarianism: firstly, subjectivism and 
secondly, the use of a mathematical method for rational calculation of choice.  
To understand these points, however, marginalism must be explored in more 
detail. 
 58 
 
(ii) (a)  Marginalism 
 
The problem faced by those wishing to develop Smith’s concept of use-value 
was the paradox of why the most useful things, like water and clothing, often had 
a relatively low price.  Smith had overcome the problem by distinguishing 
between a use-value and an exchange-value, but this was not a satisfactory 
solution.  As Galbraith has noted: 
 
‘This distinction was arbitrary and superficial and too obviously ignored 
the myriad of shadings between the two.  Clothing, at least in a cold 
climate, has a clear value in use.  But at some point some of it 
surrenders its protective role and becomes mildly precious, like much 
jewellery.  Food is needed and nourishing but can also be rare and 
exotic……’ (Galbraith, 1987, p.107) 
 
The recognition by both Jevons and Menger in 1871 of the principle of marginal 
utility solved the problems associated with Smithian notions of use-value.  
Marginal utility is distinct from general utility and enables the connection 
between use-value and exchange-value to be made.  Galbraith (1987) explains 
marginal utility as follows: 
 
‘It is not the total satisfaction from the possession and use of a product 
(or service) that gives it value; it is the satisfaction or enjoyment – the 
utility – from the last and least wanted addition to one’s consumption 
that so serves.  The last available scrap of food in a famine is 
exceedingly valuable and would command a worthy price; in conditions 
of abundance it has no value at all and goes out with the garbage.’ 
(Galbraith, 1987, p.108) 
 
Marginal utility made it possible to isolate the utility which an individual, at any 
given time, attached to a given portion of a specific object.  Jevons concluded 
that ‘successive increments reduce the utility of every unit.  Total utility is thus 
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distinguished from degree of utility at any given point; and from this the concept 
of “final degree of utility” results’. (Roll, 1946, p.380)   
 
(ii)(b)  Subjectivism and the Measure of Utility 
 
As noted earlier, subjectivism is a vitally important part of utilitarianism and, 
indeed, Jevons based his value theory entirely on utility and subjectivism: 
 
‘A true theory of economy can only be attained by going back to the 
great springs of human action – the feelings of pleasure and pain.’ 
(Jevons, 1866, in Gherity, 1965, p.345) 
 
Jevons used the individual and his or her wants as the starting point for all 
analysis.  He used Bentham’s pleasure and pain calculus: 
 
‘Man is here regarded as a pleasure machine, his aim is to maximise 
pleasure. Utility is then defined as the quality possessed by an object of 
producing pleasure or preventing pain.’  (Roll, 1946, p.379) 
 
Utility was used by both Jevons and Walras in a purely psychological sense and 
is not, therefore, an objective, intrinsic quality that exists outside of an 
individual’s perception.  A commodity only has a high degree of utility if it is 
perceived to have a high degree of utility by an individual.  It expresses, as Roll 
(1946) has pointed out, the relation between an object and a subject and this 
relationship can vary with each individual.  Menger also had a subjective theory 
of value but one that was tempered with a degree of objectivity. 
 
Jevons, Menger and Walras all agreed, however, that the value of labour is 
determined by the value of the product the individual produces and the value of 
the product is, in turn, determined by the marginal utility of the product.  The 
problem remained as to how utility was to be measured and, for Jevons and 
Menger, value was expressed as price.  Consequently, he examined the exchange 
process and arrived at a ratio of exchange:   
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‘…in equilibrium, that is in a position in which neither party can obtain 
any further advantage by continuing the exchange, marginal utility for 
each participant will be proportionate to price’.  (Roll, 1946, p.380) 
 
Each individual will have a different subjective evaluation of the same good 
depending upon his or her evaluation of self-interest and this evaluation will be 
measured by price.   
 
In summary, the marginalists used price to measure subjective choices using 
marginal utility.  The question remains, however, whether such an approach 
would be appropriate for a consideration of value in management consultancy.  
Before this can be answered, consideration must be given to the theory of human 
behaviour that underlies marginalism.  The contention is that this theory is 
fundamentally flawed and makes application to the research questions highly 
problematic.  The section below discusses this point in more detail. 
 
(ii)(c)  The Economic Model of Human Behaviour and its Relation 
to Mathematical Methodology 
 
Drakopoulos points out that Menger and Jevons both viewed economic agents as 
fundamentally self-interested: 
 
‘It is clear that apart from selfishness, satisfaction maximising is the 
other important characteristic of economic agents.  Two further 
characteristics are added to complete the picture of economic man: 
infallibility and omniscience’. (Drakopoulos, 1991, p.77) 
 
They both realised that this was an imperfect model of human behaviour but 
nevertheless used it because it fitted with their methodology: 
 
‘Once more he (Menger) states that in real life other motives also exist 
(public spirit, love of one’s fellow men, custom, feeling for justice), but 
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in order to have an exact science of economics the economist assumes 
as motivations only those mentioned above.’ (Drakopoulos, 1991, p.77) 
 
This is a fundamental flaw in neo-classical theory because it is based upon a 
problematic model of human behaviour.  It does, however, fit naturally with the 
mathematical methodology used by the marginalists because a predictable theory 
of human behaviour is required as the basis of such a methodology.  Beginning 
an article entitled “A Brief Account of a General Mathematical Theory of 
Political Economy”, Jevons wrote: 
 
‘The following paper briefly describes the nature of a Theory of 
Economy which will reduce the main problem of this science to a 
mathematical form.  Economy, indeed, being concerned with quantities, 
has always of necessity been mathematical in its subject, but the strict 
and general statement, and the easy comprehension of its quantitative 
laws has been prevented by a neglect of those powerful methods of 
expression which have been applied to most other sciences with so 
much success.’  (Jevons, 1866, in Gherity, 1965, p.345) 
 
The attempt to liken economics to the natural sciences, especially physics, is 
clearly apparent and this tendency was common amongst the marginalists.  As 
Screpanti et al have commented, ‘..economic laws finally assumed that absolute 
and objective characteristic of natural laws’.  (Screpanti et al, 1993, p. 149) 
 
Drakopoulos observes that applying mathematical method to behaviour in this 
way is also typical of a hedonistic approach to value: 
 
‘The emphasis on the concept of demand and the attempt to analyse it, 
required a psychological model….Moreover, the trend towards a 
mathematical methodology demanded a well defined economic agent 
with standard and predictable behaviour.  The hedonistic framework 
was a very good model for these purposes and thus during the 
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marginalist period, hedonistic ideas became more and more influential 
in economics.’  (Drakopoulos, 1991, p.50) 
 
Such a model is not, however, necessarily an accurate one that produces reliable 
results.  Drakopoulos also stresses that using this model of behaviour reduces 
‘complex economic phenomena to simple facets (and) reduces the complexity of 
human behaviour to well-defined relatively simple hedonistic principles’. 
(Drakopoulos, 1991, p.55).  Because it does not allow for the full range of human 
motivation, such a model is not sufficient for accurately reflecting individual 
consumer behaviour.  The following brief discussion of Rorty’s (1982, 1989, 
1999) work on pragmatism illustrates a philosophical view that treats human 
nature as complex. 
 
Pragmatists reject the idea that human nature is pre-determined and does not vary 
over time.  Instead they argue that each individual is formed by his or her own 
experiences and that human nature is therefore a matter of uncertainty because it 
is subject to change.  
 
For the pragmatist, the idea of assuming any universal human attribute is alien.  
Indeed, the pursuit of absolutes such as “truth”, “knowledge” and “morality” is 
not a concern of pragmatism. 
 
“Pragmatists think that the history of attempts to isolate the True or the 
Good, or to define the word ‘true’ or ‘good’, supports their suspicion 
that there is no interesting work to be done in this area”.  (Rorty, 1982, 
p.xiv) 
 
The same can be said of the search for “human nature”.  Pragmatists do not 
believe that there is a universal quality that can be applied to every human being 
and that can be called Human Nature.  Instead, there are only individual selves. 
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“Dewey showed us how to drop the notion of ‘the true self’…….He 
taught us to call ‘true’ whatever belief results from a free and open 
encounter of opinions…” (Rorty 1999, p.119) 
 
An interesting illustration of this can be found in Rorty’s view of the educational 
process.  He views education as a two-stage process.  Firstly, there is pre-college 
education which involves basic learning and socialisation.  The object of this 
stage is to produce literate citizens.  Secondly, there is college education in 
which the student undergoes a process of individualisation through questioning 
accepted teaching.   The object of this second process is to produce “self-creating 
individuals” (Rorty 1999, p.118): 
 
“There is no such thing as human nature, in the deep sense in which 
Plato and Strauss use this term…..There is only the shaping of an 
animal into a human being by a process of socialisation, followed (with 
luck) by the self-individualisation and self-creation of that human being 
through his or her own later revolt against that very process.” (Rorty 
1999 p.118) 
 
The pragmatic view is that individuals are unique and each is formed by his or 
her own unique experiences.  As a result of these experiences, individuals 
inevitably change and develop over time.  It is unrealistic, in the pragmatic view, 
to take a trait such as opportunism and assume that it will not alter in any way 
over time. 
 
Rorty has developed the idea of “the contingent self” by referring to the tension 
within philosophy between those who seek to achieve universality by denying 
contingency, and those who believe that self creation can only be achieved by 
recognising contingency. 
 
According to Rorty, philosophers prior to Nietzsche attempted to find universal 
human traits and individual contingency was meaningless and futile beside this 
effort.  So, for example, for Kant the “common moral consciousness” was the 
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centre of the self.  Nietzsche, however, saw this approach as fundamentally 
flawed and urged, instead, that we concentrate upon describing ourselves in our 
own language in order to claim our own contingency. 
 
“….he (Nietzsche) saw self-knowledge as self-creation.  The process of 
coming to know oneself, confronting one’s contingency, tracking one’s 
causes home, is identical with the process of inventing a new language – 
that is, of thinking up some new metaphors.    (Rorty 1989, p.27) 
 
Rorty, however, turns to Freud for a more realistic view because, for Freud there 
is no such thing as the paradigm human being only “the idiosyncratic 
contingencies of our individual pasts.” (Rorty 1989 p34): 
 
“Freud spends his time exhibiting the extraordinary sophistication, 
subtlety, and wit of our unconscious strategies.  He thereby makes it 
possible for us to see science and poetry, genius and psychosis – and, 
most importantly, morality and prudence – not as products of distinct 
faculties but as alternative modes of adaptation” (Rorty 1989, p.33) 
 
Rorty has interpreted the Freudian view of human nature to be one in which each 
individual’s past experience defines and moulds the present self.  He finds this to 
be compatible with pragmatism: Nietzsche’s strong poet and Kant’s moral man 
can be seen as different selves. 
 
By contrast to this rich vision, the view of human behaviour upon which 
marginalism and utilitarianism is based appears flat and one-dimensional.  It is 
not, therefore, an appropriate perspective with which to address a complex 
service such as management consultancy.  The decision to use consultancy, and 
which firm to use, is decided using a large amount of individual discretion.  To 
be able to examine this decision and the rationale surrounding it, a less 
prescriptive approach is required. 
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(iii) Pluralism and Value 
 
As discussed above, the marginalists placed great emphasis upon price as a 
measure of utility.  The question still remains, however, whether price is an 
adequate measure for value and this is discussed below in the context of 
pluralism. 
 
The most fundamental objection to both the labour and the utilitarian theory of 
value is that by merely allowing for a monolithic, quantitative method of 
measuring value, little meaning can be attached to the results.  There are many 
ways in which consultancy might be valued but merely explaining it through 
price is insufficient because it fails to allow for a qualitative assessment of its 
contribution. 
 
There are contradictions in the assumptions that economists have made about 
value, not least that there is a single quality that can be called ‘value’ given the 
multiplicity of contexts in which it is used.  As Johnson (1999) comments: 
 
‘Every aspect of human experience is pervaded with value.  This makes 
the concept of value itself one of the most complex and difficult notions 
one could possibly undertake to analyse…In spite of all (the) 
philosophical and theoretical work, we seem to have no more than a 
superficial understanding of what value is…’ (Johnson, 1999, in 
Benedikt 1999, p.5).   
 
The call for a pluralistic conception of value has been loudest within the field of 
philosophy and is prominent in the work produced by Anderson (1993).  Her 
work strongly criticises monistic theories of value and stresses instead the 
richness of a pluralistic theory which encompasses human responses to value and 
understandings of the concept: 
 
‘To attempt to reduce the plurality of standards to a single standard, 
ground, or good-constituting property threatens to obliterate the self-
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understandings in terms of which we make sense of and differentiate 
our emotions, attitudes, and concerns.  To adopt a monistic theory of 
value as our self-understanding is to hopelessly impoverish our 
responsive capacities to a monolithic “pro” or “con” attitude or to mere 
desire or aversion.’  (Anderson, 1993, p5) 
 
This is a criticism that is also made by Blaug (1962) when he points out that 
Bentham saw ‘utility’ as a feeling of happiness that individuals and society as a 
whole should maximise.  This broad vision, however, became diluted in the 
hands of the economists where quantitative difference alone could be measured 
and qualitative difference was ignored: 
 
‘…in the course of the nineteenth century this down-to-earth definition 
of utility was purged of its older psychological connotations and 
reduced to a mere choice-indicator’.  (Blaug, 1962, p337) 
 
Anderson presents an alternative to the ‘choice-indicator’ that is compelling 
because it is based upon the much broader, and more realistic, base of human 
responses to value.  It allows for a plurality of evaluative attitudes such as 
admiration and appreciation, a plurality of values and standards, such as beauty 
and loyalty, a plurality of contestable ideals, and a plurality of different kinds of 
goods. 
 
Anderson is heavily influenced by pragmatism and so rejects the notion that 
value has a universal ‘essence’.  Value, therefore, varies with context and 
situation: 
 
‘The pluralist-expressive theory yields a pragmatic theory of 
comparative value judgements.  The theory is called pragmatic because 
it represents comparative value judgements as constructed for particular 
purposes, rather than as discovered in the intrinsic natures of the items 
being compared or in their immediate relation to some response in us, 
such as preference or pleasure.  The pragmatic character of comparative 
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value judgements follows from the fact that the goods it compares are 
extrinsically valuable.  They derive their importance or action-guiding 
relevance from the decision frame in which they appear. (Anderson, 
1993, p.47) 
 
The importance of placing a value judgement in its context is apparent from 
recent work produced by writers on management theory.  For example, Normann 
et al (1993) took Porter’s (1985) conception of a value chain and developed the 
concept of the ‘value constellation’.  The term ‘value’ is used liberally but is 
nowhere defined other than by context.   
 
‘IKEA wants its customers to understand that their role is not to 
consume value but to create it….IKEA invents value by enabling 
customers’ own value-creating activities.  As one company brochure 
puts it, “Wealth is (the ability to) realise your ideas’.  (Normann et al 
1993, p.67) 
 
In the context of IKEA, value means one thing but in the context of automatic 
teller machines at banks, it means something else: 
 
‘The reconfiguration of the cash-withdrawal transaction offered 
customers a qualitatively new kind of value.  In particular, it eliminated 
traditional constraints of space and time’.  (Normann et al,1993, p.69) 
 
Given the difficulty of defining value and allowing for the numerous ways it can 
be used, such flexibility is reasonable.  To describe value purely in terms of 
price, as the marginalists had done, would capture none of these variations.  A 
more flexible and pluralistic approach to value than that adopted in the field of 
economics would be more appropriate in the context of management 
consultancy. 
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Summary 
 
Theories of value developed in the field of economics are considered problematic 
because they do not take account of the complexity of human behaviour.  
Contrary to economics, human behaviour is seen here as complex and not, it is 
argued, always driven by ‘rational’ decisions.  A rational choice indicator that 
uses price alone does not, therefore, adequately explain decision-making about 
value.  A pluralistic conception of value is preferred because this enables the 
term ‘value’ to be given the meaning appropriate not only to its context, but also 
to the individual making the judgement.   
 
On this basis no assumptions are made about the motivations that can be ascribed 
to executives when they engage consultants or the way that they assess the value 
received from consultancy services.  Such value may not always be judged by 
executives in terms of price or motivated by opportunism.  Indeed value could be 
judged in a number of ways because the values and motivation of each executive 
will vary.  As executives become more senior within a hierarchical organisation, 
their autonomy increases and, with it, the freedom with which they are able to 
exercise personal subjectivity in pursuit of their objectives.  It is important 
therefore to acknowledge the full extent of their value choices because this will 
allow a greater understanding of the data and an appreciation of its depth. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
APPROACHES TO SOURCING  
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapter discussed the subjectivity involved in individual value 
choices because they deepened understanding of executive use of consultancy 
services.  This chapter, in contrast, examines the objective approaches to 
sourcing that are found in literature produced by Procurement professionals and 
others.  This chapter therefore establishes the viewpoint from which Procurement 
approaches the regulation of goods and services into the organisation. 
 
The procurement literature contains two approaches to engaging third party 
suppliers.  Both of these are ‘rational’ and objective methodologies that are 
designed to provide both transparency and defined benefits.  Firstly, process-
driven models of procurement drawn from two standard textbooks are examined.  
A more recent approach aimed specifically at business services is also discussed 
within this section.  Secondly, relational approaches to supply are examined.  
Within the latter section, industrial economics and supply network relationships, 
within which rational processes are embedded, are also discussed.  Other 
influences, such as power and network features are also considered.   
 
All these approaches, both process-driven and relational, aim to minimise 
subjectivity and provide objective models and methodologies that are designed to 
allow the firm to maximise the value received from its supplier relationships.  
These approaches are objective and ‘rational’ in the sense that they are designed 
to benefit the organisation rather than the individual.  Conversely Chapter Two 
highlighted the political aspects of management consultancy use.  Clients of 
consultancy services can use such services for purposes that effectively benefit 
the individual and such value is assessed from a subjective viewpoint.  This 
chapter therefore establishes a different reference point and one from which 
procurement professionals operate. 
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(i) Procurement Process Models 
 
Baily et al (1998) point out that a well-known definition of procurement 
objectives is: 
 
‘…to purchase the right quality of material, at the right time, in the right 
quantity, from the right source, at the right price.’  (Baily et al 1998 p. 
15) 
 
They further observe that although this phrase is ‘hackneyed’ it nevertheless 
provides a useful framework.  It is useful because it highlights elements 
important to the procurement process such as quality, timeliness, quantity and 
cost.   
 
Baily et al begin their discussion of quality as follows: 
 
‘Product or service quality is increasingly seen as a “qualifier” which 
must be demonstrably attainable before a supplier can merit 
consideration.  Unless specifications can be understood and consistently 
met, a potential supplier is unlikely to win business from a buying 
organisation taking a professional view of the need to do business only 
with vendors who are….able to respond to the particular needs of 
customers….Firms need to convince their customers that they can meet 
quality requirements before they can compete on price…’ (Baily et al 
1998 p.87) 
 
For Baily et al quality means ‘fitness for purpose’ or ‘suitability’.  They stress 
that a specification can be either too high or too low and illustrate this using the 
well-known analogy that there is little point paying for a Rolls Royce when a 
Ford will fulfil the requirement.  This leads them to state that the concern of 
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supplies staff is two-fold: to ensure quality of design or specification and then to 
ensure conformance quality. 
 
To ensure supplier quality, Baily et al set out a traditional approach to sourcing 
decisions in Figure 4.1.  It shows a rational decision-making framework that is 
dominated by process and founded on a specific definition of value. 
 
In assessing suppliers, they suggest that factors such as past performance, 
reputation, visit and appraisal, third party certification, and evaluation of sample 
products be considered. The objective is to find a supplier who will deliver on 
time and provide consistent quality of product and service. 
 
The assessment of value includes an important element relating to price.  The 
initial definition of procurement objectives referred to the ‘right price’ and Baily 
et al point out that this is vague.  In the context of a company operating in a 
market economy, however, there can be little doubt that this means a low price 
that will either increase bottom-line profit or allow the company to offer its 
product at a lower price than its competitors in the market.  The challenge for 
successful procurement is to balance cost and quality and this is acknowledged in 
the definition given of Value Analysis and Value Engineering: 
 
‘The same technique is referred to, with the same aim of increasing 
value for money, whether by reducing the cost of providing a part, 
product or service to satisfy given needs or by increasing the 
satisfaction resulting from a given part, product or service.’ (Baily et al 
1998 p.105) 
 
 72 
 
Figure 4.1 
SUPPLIER SELECTION 
Baily, P., Farmer D., Jessop, D., Jones, D., (1998) Purchasing Principles & Management 
eighth edition, London: Pitman Publishing.p.145  
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Similar approaches in terms of both a concentration on process and the same 
value orientations can be found in the work of other writers. 
 
For example, Van Weele (2000) describes the purchasing function in the 
following terms.  
 
‘It involves determining the need, selecting the supplier, arriving at a 
proper price, specifying terms and conditions, issuing the contract or 
order, and following up to ensure proper delivery.  In short, the 
purchasing function should obtain the proper equipment, material, 
supplies and services of the right quality, in the right quantity, at the 
right price and from the right source.’ (Van Weele, 2000, p.14) 
 
The similarity with Baily et al can be seen in the stress on process and the 
elements of value that Purchasing should deliver.  The main activities of 
purchasing departments are illustrated in the following diagram that has been 
adapted from Van Weele (2000). 
 
 
Figure 4.2 
PURCHASING PROCESS (adapted) 
Van Weele, A.J. (2000) Purchasing and Supply Chain Management.  Analysis, Planning and 
Practice.  Second Edition.  Business Press Thomson Learning p.15 
 
Using an analysis of DuPont, the importance of the purchasing contribution to 
Return on Net Assets is demonstrated in two ways. 
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• Reduction in all direct material costs leading to an improvement in sales 
margin, through for example, competitive tendering or finding substitute 
materials. 
• Reduction of the net capital employed by the company leading to a 
positive impact on the company’s capital turnover ratio.  This might be 
achieved through achieving longer payment terms, leasing instead of 
buying, or reduction of inventory through just-in-time agreements with 
suppliers. 
 
In terms of value to the company, Van Weele concludes: 
 
‘…purchasing policies fundamentally contribute to business success in 
several ways.  First, purchasing policies can significantly improve sales 
margins through realising substantial cost savings.  A dollar saved in 
purchasing is a dollar added to the bottom line.  Second, through better 
quality and logistics arrangements with suppliers, purchasing can 
contribute to a higher capital turnover ratio.  Third, suppliers may 
contribute, when addressed properly, significantly to the company’s 
innovation processes….even small improvements in the relationship 
with suppliers may have a significant impact on the company’s return 
on net assets.’ (Van Weele, 2000, p.20) 
 
Van Weele also points out that substantial indirect savings can be made through 
standardisation, stock reduction, product and process innovation, reduction of 
quality costs and production lead times.  
 
For Van Weele, then, purchasing is concerned with obtaining all the goods that 
are necessary for running and maintaining the company, which in principle 
includes contracting services.  Value is clearly seen in rational terms as a tangible 
benefit that contributes to more efficient and cost-effective operations. 
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A more sophisticated approach to value assessment is evident in Axelsson and 
Wynstra (2002).  The procurement of services is specifically addressed and, 
although a set process is prescribed, elements within it allow for more diversity 
in the assessment of value.  Axelsson and Wynstra observe that purchasing is 
usually described as a rational decision process with several consecutive steps 
and they suggest the following steps and tools to achieve a successful outcome. 
 
• Specification phase  
• Supplier selection and evaluation 
• Contracting business service providers: Pricing negotiations and 
payment 
 
For the specification phase, Axelsson and Wynstra suggest various ways that this 
could be done. 
 
• Setting service levels; 
• Specifying the input, i.e. the resources to be provided by the supplier; 
• Specifying process or throughput, i.e. how the assignment should be 
fulfilled; 
• Specifying the output, i.e. the expected results or function; 
• Specifying the outcome, i.e. the value of the service to the client in 
monetary terms. 
 
For supplier selection and evaluation, a model for data capture is suggested.  
Various evaluation models are suggested.  These could be, for example, a 
weighted point method combining quantitative and qualitative methods, or an 
assessment of the total cost of ownership.  Processes such as these are disciplined 
and rigorous.  They are designed to identify value and ensure delivery.  The 
approach outlined by Axelsson and Wynstra provides more detail than that of 
Van Weele, but has in common with it the rationality of a structured process. 
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Axelsson and Wynstra set out three starting points for determining price: 
production cost; market situation and value to the customer.  Depending on 
context, these elements will affect price to a greater or lesser extent.  The 
discussion of value is particularly interesting because it sets out a methodology 
that allows for a variety of different value elements to be included in the 
decision-making process.   
 
For example, a natural first step for a value analysis is to list all possible effects 
that the product offering will have in terms of benefits and costs.  The approach 
encourages consideration of the indirect effects of the offering, e.g. effects on the 
customer’s customer, working environment, competitive strength and long-term 
market position.  Although it is stated that the attempt to attach economic values 
to these elements should be made, allowance is also made for consideration of 
elements for which this will be extremely difficult. 
 
‘Step three is to sort out the other direct or indirect effects that are 
difficult to evaluate economically.  These may be “aesthetic” 
experiences or “peace of mind” associated with a particular (e.g. 
branded) offering, but also more tangible factors that are still difficult to 
value, such as effects on personal health and well-being.  It is important 
to list those issues that cannot be attributed with any economic value in 
a meaningful way, so that they are included in the final evaluation.’  
(Axelsson and Wynstra, 2002, p.195) 
 
Axelsson and Wynstra conclude that, although services vary greatly, ‘it is 
evident that basic purchasing management principles also apply to services’ 
(Axelsson and Wynstra, 2002 p.266).  Value therefore remains an objective 
construct that is directly related to optimising company performance. 
 
From discussion of the models above, value in procurement terms equates to 
engaging with the supplier who can provide the best quality for the least cost.  
The standard processes of setting a specification, evaluating the market, 
assessing a number of offers from suppliers and negotiating in a competitive 
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situation are all used to achieve optimum levels of value in these terms.  The 
balance between quality and cost is, however, a complex equation that will vary 
with each situation.  
 
Process driven models of procurement, however, are not the only strategies 
available to procurement professionals.  In appropriate situations, relational 
approaches to managing supply can be adopted.  These approaches are discussed 
below. 
 
(ii) Business Relationships 
 
There are a variety of ways of managing supply relationships with external firms 
depending upon the strategic nature of the supply.  The following discussion 
looks initially at approaches developed in the area of industrial economics to 
understand the best way of managing supply.  The discussion then moves to 
networks and finally to the notion of supply relationships as a continuum ranging 
from distant at one extreme to close at the other.  The development of this into 
work on partnerships and value transparency is also discussed.  Finally, 
managing a portfolio of relationships according to their strategic importance is 
discussed. 
 
(a) Industrial Economics 
 
The origins of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) can be traced back to an 
article by Coase (1937) in which he sought to explain why firms emerge within 
market economies.  Coase suggested that markets were expensive for some 
transactions and that it is more effective to form organisations.  TCE is now 
largely associated with Williamson (1975, 1996).  Its central concern is to match 
each type of transaction made by a firm with the most appropriate governance 
structure and, in this way, provide optimum operational efficiency.  Governance 
structures may be markets; hierarchies; hybrids or bureaus, and efficiency can be 
achieved by mitigating risks and reducing transaction costs.   
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According to Williamson, the most dangerous risks faced by any firm are those 
posed by the behavioural uncertainties and cognitive limitations of the human 
agents involved.  TCE does not, however, see business relationships in an 
embedded social context and has a limited view of human behaviour.  In keeping 
with its foundation in economics, TCE views economic agents as fundamentally 
self interested, atomised individuals.  In this way, it reduces the complexity of 
human behaviour so that it may become predictable. 
 
As its name suggests, within TCE the transaction is taken as the basic unit of 
analysis.  This is broken down into three constituent features, all of which are 
relevant in determining the most appropriate governance structure.  These three 
elements are: asset specificity, uncertainty, and the frequency of transactions.  Of 
these three, asset specificity is seen as the most important.  
 
Asset specificity refers to the extent to which an asset can be re-deployed.  
Where there is a high degree of asset specificity, Williamson suggests that 
vertical integration is the most appropriate governance structure.  This will have 
the effect of lessening uncertainty and mitigating risks through direct hierarchical 
control.  Conversely, low asset specificity combined with infrequent transactions 
would make the market the most efficient governance mechanism. 
 
TCE is largely concerned with governance mechanisms and discusses business 
relationships only as far as is necessary to explore this particular area of interest.  
In essence, it provides a stark choice between one extreme and another: the flow 
of goods and services through the firm may be governed either by markets (the 
‘buy’ option) or through vertical integration (the ‘make’ option).  Although 
Williamson allows for a middle ground of ‘relational contracting’, TCE does not 
explore business relationships in depth as an important governance structure and 
a way of attenuating opportunism.   
 
Other approaches within industrial economics have a similar focus and approach. 
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Cox (1996) takes Williamson’s work on TCE as the basis for his own work on 
strategic procurement management.  Like Williamson, Cox adopts the 
conception of the firm as a governance structure in which the key strategic 
decision concerns the most appropriate method of contracting with potential 
suppliers.  Such an approach forces consideration of the proper boundaries for 
the firm.  For Williamson, and Cox, such a choice will always be made with 
reference to the scope for economising because the firm exists as an 
entrepreneurial entity.  In this sense, firms are seen as flexible and fluid.  Their 
internal structures and external boundaries will shift according to prevailing 
conditions and opportunities. 
 
Cox (1996), however, differs from Williamson in his view of asset specificity.  
For Cox, it is wrong to define such assets as the sunk cost of past transactions.  
Instead, he proposes an approach based on skills that are embedded within an 
entrepreneurial view of the firm.  
 
Cox also gives more credence to business relationships than Williamson.  He 
suggests that medium asset specificity is a grey area that allows for a range of 
supplier relationships.  These range from adversarial leverage to partnership 
sourcing, and the factors that should influence the choice of relationship are 
twofold.   
 
Firstly, the degree to which firms can operate at arms-length balanced against the 
desire to vertically integrate.  Secondly, Cox argues that power influences the 
choice of relationship strategy and his treatment of power will now be discussed.   
 
For Cox et al (2000) it is the concept of power which allows managers to 
understand the workings of supply chains.  ‘Power’ is defined as ‘the ability of 
one actor to adversely affect the interests of another’. (Cox et al, 2000, p.xi)  It is 
argued that every firm is involved in power relationships and its ability to 
manage these effectively has a direct impact on profitability.  This line of 
reasoning builds on earlier work by Cox (1997) in which it was argued that 
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business success depends upon owning, controlling and leveraging scarce 
material resources that cannot easily be imitated. 
 
Taking all this into account, the question for Cox et al (2000) is ‘what, 
analytically, is the power regime that has to be managed in the extended network 
of dyadic buyer and supplier exchange relationships in the chain’. (Cox et al 
2000 p.39).  In this context four basic types of power relation are identified: 
 
• Buyer dominance 
• Supplier dominance 
• Buyer/supplier interdependence 
• Non adversarial collaborative 
 
These power relations result in four ‘basic relationship management choices’ that 
need to be made: 
 
• Adversarial arms-length 
• Non adversarial arms-length 
• Adversarial collaborative 
• Non adversarial collaborative 
 
If the balance of power were to change, a different relationship would become 
more appropriate.  However, the objective of the buyer should always be to 
influence the market and create a situation where he or she is dominant and can 
exercise that power to advantage.   
 
Porter’s (1980, 1985) approach to achieving competitive advantage is based on a 
view of the firm that is similar to Cox.  Porter identifies five competitive forces 
which a firm must manage using three generic strategies of cost leadership, 
differentiation and focus.  In common with Williamson and Cox, the firm is seen 
to exist alone in a hostile and faceless environment. 
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Writers within the category of industrial economics take a transactional approach 
to exchange.  This provides a limited view of business relationships that makes it 
inappropriate for addressing management consultancy.  By their nature, many of 
the exchanges between consultants and their clients are intensely personal and 
transactional approaches fail to take account of this context.  Individuals are seen 
as one-dimensional economic agents and this does not adequately account for the 
complexity of human behaviour. 
 
(b) Networks 
 
Writers within the Industrial Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) Group developed 
the ‘interaction approach’ for studying business-to-business marketing. 
 
The interaction approach stresses that the relationship between two active parties 
is the relevant unit of analysis and makes two assumptions: (i) that all companies 
have relationships with their suppliers or customers which must be managed, and 
(ii) that each company is enmeshed in a complex web of relationships.  
 
(b) (i)  The Relationship 
 
In an early article Hakansson and Wootz (1979) describe the kind of close 
relationships that are developed over frequent exchanges. 
 
‘Each partner is handled individually, where one partner tries to adapt to 
the activities of the other.  In other words, there are activities, and 
reactions to the reactions.  One can say that both partners actively 
interact.  A consequence of this interaction is that often very close and 
lasting relationships develop’  (Hakansson and Wootz, 1979, p.28) 
 
In a later article, Hakansson and Snehota (1992) stress the complexity of 
business relationships and the need to understand the facets and layers involved.  
They examine relationships using the two dimensions of ‘function’ and 
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‘substance’ and view relationships as variables that can take on different values 
depending on these elements. 
 
Within the element of substance, Hakansson and Snehota identify activity links, 
resource ties and actor bonds.  The intensity of these can be greater or lesser and 
will change the nature of the relationship accordingly.  Similarly, the interplay 
between the layers will affect the dynamics of the relationship.   
 
(i) Activity links develop when two companies build up a 
relationship and certain of their technical, administrative or 
commercial activities can become linked to each other.   
 
(ii) Resource ties refers to the effect on the way that two 
companies in a relationship utilise their resources.  Some 
resources may become combined and, over time, become 
specifically oriented towards each other.   
 
(iii) Actor bonds have an effect on what the parties know about each 
other and what they can exchange.  ‘There is always a margin 
for beliefs and trust that in the end become essential for the 
commitment.  The development of trust is a social process 
typical for relationship development.’ (Hakansson and Snehota, 
1992, p.160) 
 
Such relationships, according to Hakansson and Snehota, provide valuable 
advantages for companies.  The dyad exists as a ‘quasi-organisation’ that is more 
than the sum of its parts because the existing links, ties and bonds enable 
companies to perform activities and utilise resources that neither of them would 
be able to access in isolation.   
 
In addition, say Hakansson and Snehota, every relationship has a network 
function.  Because relationships are connected, change in one relationship may 
affect other relationships and companies and this will now be discussed.   
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(b) (ii) The Network 
 
The following discussion shows how the importance of the IMP’s network focus 
dominates its research agenda. 
 
Ford et al (1997) insist that it is necessary to take a ‘relationship view’ of the 
company and that the following three perspectives are required.   
 
(i) The company as an interdependent activity unit.   
(ii) The company as an interdependent resource unit. 
(iii) The company as network identity.  That is, seeing the 
company as an identity within a network of relationships.  
The company’s network position consists of its portfolio 
of relationships and the activity links, resource ties and 
actor bonds that arise from them. 
 
The latter reveals the IMP’s true focus of interest on industrial networks.  
 
‘The focus of research is, ultimately, the network and not the firm or 
individual relationship, although firms and relationships must be studied 
if networks are to be understood.’ (Easton, 1992, p.102) 
 
Relationships merely form the unit of analysis for a wider perspective of 
industrial networks and are always seen in this context.  This is illustrated below. 
 
Anderson et al (1994) examine dyadic relationships to show the embedded 
context in which they develop.  Dyadic relationships have primary functions such 
as efficiency improvements through the inter-linking of activities, and the 
adaptation of activities to deliver efficiency increases, such as just-in-time 
inventory.  However, these relationships also have secondary network functions. 
 
 84 
(i) Innovations developed as a result of interaction in several 
relationships. 
(ii) By getting close to its partners, a focal firm may have its views 
shaped by, and shape the views of, its partners. 
 
In addition, Anderson et al (1994) contend that firms develop network identities 
which capture the attractiveness (or not) of a firm as an exchange partner.  This 
identity is based on its relations with other firms and the consequent links to 
activities and ties to resources. 
 
‘…every relationship should be viewed as being part of a network.  The 
identity of the firm is embedded in the network through its 
relationships, which are connected to each other.’  (Ford, 1997, p.234) 
 
Two constructs are proposed that capture the connectedness of the focal 
relationship, as perceived by each partner firm. 
 
(i) Anticipated constructive effects on network identity: anticipated 
resource transferability; anticipated activity complementarity; 
anticipated actor-relationship generalisability. 
(ii) Anticipated deleterious effects on network identity: anticipated resource 
particularity; anticipated activity irreconcilability; anticipated actor-
relationship incompatibility. 
 
They conclude: 
 
‘By building out from focal dyadic relationships to consider effects of 
their embedded network contexts, we attempt to enrich the study of 
exchange relationships in marketing, which largely has had a dyadic 
atomisation character.’ (Ford, 1997, p.249) 
 
The IMP group is primarily interested in business networks and examines 
business relationships but sees them always in the context of a network of other 
 85 
relationships.  In their view, no firm exists in a vacuum and the IMP view of 
firms as constantly ‘interacting’ means that, for them, it is the network that is the 
focal point of interest.  The network is seen as a way for a firm to access further 
resources and expertise and, through adaptation, potentially develop unique 
processes.  It is therefore a source of added value that a firm must manage to 
advantage.   
 
In addition, the IMP approach to dyadic relationships is possibly more 
appropriate to a manufacturing context than management consultancy because it 
assumes a level and frequency of contact that is uncharacteristic of consultancy 
services.  Halinen (1997) encountered this problem when researching the 
relationship between advertising agencies and their clients and is critical of the 
lack of empirical research and theoretical models of relationship development 
within the area of professional services.  Karantinou and Hogg (2001) also point 
out that IMP concepts are based on research carried out in the manufacturing 
sector.  As such, they may not have universal application. 
 
Halinen does, however, apply the IMP approach within a service industry, 
specifically the advertising industry, but only after making appropriate 
adjustments.  
 
‘The role of technology, physical materials and investment is much less 
significant than in typical manufacturing industries….Consequently 
somewhat different factors are accentuated in agency-client 
relationships than in typical industrial buyer-seller relationships.’ 
(Halinen, 1997, p.300) 
 
In particular, the importance of individuals is stressed. 
 
‘In buying advertising services, companies purchase knowledge and 
creativity embodied in individual people.’ (Halinen, 1997, p.28) 
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In classifying advertising services as ‘knowledge-intensive’ Halinen identifies 
the similarity between management consultancy and advertising.  The stress on 
the value provided by individuals is appropriate to both types of services. 
 
Other approaches within the business relationships literature have a similar focus 
on manufacturing. 
 
Interest in networks is also apparent in the work produced on network sourcing.  
Such work does not, however, have the same interest in industrial markets as 
IMP but focuses instead on the development of supplier networks.  It is based on 
observations of the practices in Japanese manufacturing.  The following 
discussion describes the characteristics of network sourcing that provide value. 
 
Hines (1995) notes that single sourcing in Japan is not as widespread as generally 
believed in the West.  Whilst there is always a choice between single sourcing 
and multiple sourcing, the Japanese have a hybrid called a network.  The 
differentiator in network sourcing is the kyoryoku kai or Supplier Association 
and this is vital to the success of the network.  It is defined as follows and its 
primary function is to improve process. 
 
‘..a mutually benefiting group of a company’s most important 
subcontractors, brought together on a regular basis for the purpose of 
co-ordination and co-operation as well as to assist all the members to 
benefit from the type of development associated with large Japanese 
assemblers: such as kaizen, Just-in-Time, kanban, U-cell production and 
the achievement of zero defects.’ (Hines, 1994, quoted in Rich and 
Hines, 1997, p.218) 
 
These associations bring about radical changes in supplier performance and 
behaviour, particularly the rapid introduction of new technologies and practices.  
They are crucial in supporting time-based competitive strategies in the consumer 
market in three ways. 
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Firstly, the strategy of long-term supplier collaboration focuses on the quality, 
total acquisition cost and delivery of products.  This ensures the continued 
efficiency of the purchasing organisation as well as attempting to establish new 
capabilities. 
 
Secondly, the structure of the supplier association is such that it facilitates 
exposure to new ideas that can be trialled in the most efficient manner without 
duplication of effort. 
 
Thirdly, the behavioural aspects of the supplier association allow the formation 
of a ‘coalition of interest without the political dynamics associated with the 
management of a single company’.  (Rich and Hines, 1997, p.221) 
 
(c) Obligational Contracting 
 
Sako (1992) has developed models of transactional patterns following research 
within the Japanese automotive industry.  These models are termed Arm’s 
Length Contractual Relations (ACR) and Obligational Contractual Relations 
(OCR).  They are ways to manage trading relationships in a context where 
uninterrupted supply of physical materials and investment in new technology are 
vitally important considerations.  These considerations drive the definition of 
value. 
 
ACR, as the name suggests, describes a relationship where the partners transact 
at a distance without wishing to make any special concessions to the relationship.  
The framework surrounding such a relationship is formal and each party’s 
obligations are documented as fully as possible within a written legal contract.  
Any disputes are also managed within this formal framework using external 
parties and with reference to universalistic rules. ACR would, typically, be 
transactions governed by the market and with low switching costs. 
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Conversely, an OCR-type relationship is less formal.  Each party’s duties within 
the relationship are loosely documented, or not documented at all, because each 
party trusts the other to behave in a way that is not opportunistic. 
 
‘Even if the tasks and duties of each trading partner are negotiated, 
agreed and clearly spelt out in a contract before trading relationships 
commence, there is an incentive to deviate from them, to do more than 
is expected by the trading partner.  Such an incentive results from 
expectations that the act of goodwill will lead to a similar response from 
the trading partner…..’  (Sako, 1992, p.9) 
 
Sako describes the degree of interdependence and time span for reciprocity as 
capturing the essence of OCR and ACR: interdependence will be high in OCR-
type relationships but low in ACR-type relationships.  Timespan for reciprocity 
is long in OCR but short in ACR.  
 
The reason for these differences is largely because OCR relationships are based 
upon what Sako terms ‘goodwill trust’.  This is distinguished from ‘contractual 
trust’ or ‘competence trust’: 
 
‘”Goodwill trust” is a sure feeling that trading partners possess a moral 
commitment to maintaining a trading relationship.  It may manifest 
itself in not taking unfair advantage of one’s circumstances (for which 
shared principles of fairness exist) and in offering preferential treatment 
or help whenever the need arises’.  (Sako, 1992, p.10) 
 
Such trust ‘cements’ the relationship and can only be developed over time.  
Trading relationships that have a high degree of goodwill trust are characterised 
by high amounts of discretion being given to suppliers by buyers who are also 
allowed to undertake initiatives but all the while, refraining from opportunism.   
 
The features of ACR and OCR trading relationships are summarised in the table 
below. 
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ACR OCR 
(A) Transactional dependence  
Buyer seeks to maintain low dependence by 
trading with a large number of competing 
suppliers within the limits permitted by need to 
keep down transaction costs. 
Supplier seeks to maintain low dependence by 
trading with a large number of customers within 
limits set by scale economies and transaction 
costs. 
For a buyer, avoidance of dependence is not 
a high priority; it prefers to give security to 
a few suppliers, though may still dual or 
triple source (some from a fringe group of 
suppliers with whom it has ACR relation) 
for flexibility. 
For a supplier, avoidance of dependence is 
not a high priority, but it may well have 
several OCR customers (plus, perhaps, a 
fringe group of ACR customers). 
(B) Ordering procedure 
Bidding takes place; buyer does not know 
which supplier will win the contract before 
bidding.  Prices negotiated and agreed before an 
order is commissioned. 
Bidding may or may not take place.  With 
bidding, buyer has a good idea of which 
supplier gets which contract before bidding.  
Without bidding, there is a straight 
commission to supplier.  Prices are settled 
after decision about who gets the contract. 
(C) Projected length of trading. 
For the duration of the current contract.  Short-
term commitment by both buyer and supplier. 
Continued beyond the duration of the 
current contract.  Mutual long-term 
commitment. 
(D) Documents for exchange 
Terms and conditions of contract are written, 
detailed and substantive. 
Contracts contain procedural rules, but 
substantive issues are decided case-by-case.  
Contracts may be oral rather than written. 
(E) ‘Contractualism’ 
Contingencies are written out and followed 
strictly. 
Case-by-case resolution with much appeal 
to the diffuse obligation of long-term 
relationships. 
(F) ‘Contractual Trust’ 
Supplier never starts production until written 
orders are received. 
Supplier often starts production on the basis 
of oral communication, before written 
orders are received. 
(G) ‘Goodwill Trust’ 
Multiple sourcing by buyer, combined with 
supplier’s low transactional dependence. 
Sole sourcing by buyer, combined with 
supplier’s transactional dependence. 
(H) ‘Competence Trust’ 
Thorough inspection on delivery; the principle 
of caveat emptor predominates. 
Little or no inspection on delivery for minor 
parts.  (Customer may be involved in 
establishing supplier’s quality-control 
systems) 
(I) Technology transfer and training 
Only the transfer, training or consultancy which 
can be costed and claimed for in the short run 
occurs. 
Not always fully costed, as benefits are seen 
as partly intangible and/or reaped in the 
distant future. 
(J) Communication channels and intensity 
A narrow channel between the buyer’s 
purchasing department and the supplier’s sales 
department, with frequency kept to minimum 
necessary to conduct business. 
Extensive multiple channels, between 
engineers, quality assurance personnel, top 
managers, as well as between purchasing 
and sales managers.  Frequent contact, often 
extending beyond the immediate business 
into socialising. 
(K) Risk sharing 
Little sharing of risk; how risk, resulting from 
price and demand fluctuations, is to be borne by 
each party is spelt out in explicit prior 
agreement. 
Much sharing of risk, in the sense that the 
relative share of unforeseen loss or gain is 
decided case-by-case, by applying some 
principle of fairness. 
 
Table 4.1 
FEATURES OF ACR-OCR PATTERNS 
Sako, M. (1992) Prices, Quality & Trust, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press. p. 11-
12 
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OCR relationships have the capacity to increase operational efficiency by 
reducing the cost of the relationship, improving technology transfer, and 
reducing uncertainty. 
 
Nishiguchi (1994) also found that Japanese buyers were likely to foster long-
term relationships with specific suppliers, and to take a pro-active approach to 
supplier management.  Such a pro-active approach included bilateral agreements 
on price, joint problem solving, and a move away from exploitative relationships 
based on price towards “collaborative manufacturing” (Nishiguchi, 1994, p125).    
 
Such close relationships are not, however, without difficulty.  Cousins and Crone 
(2003) observe that the increase in complex exchanges involving knowledge-
based products necessitates the sharing of sensitive information.  As a result, 
obligational contracting has increased in importance.   
 
However, using a study of the UK automotive industry, they note that suppliers 
are wary of dependency on only one customer.  This is referred to as 
‘enlightened’ buyers and ‘reluctant’ suppliers.  Cousins and Crone therefore 
propose a model for the development of obligation exchange relationships based 
on the type of dependency that each party is prepared to accept. 
 
Partnership 
 
The term ‘partnership’ is used very widely and in a number of contexts.  Indeed, 
Cox (1995) believes that it causes so much confusion that it is safer not to use it 
at all.  Cousins (1995) also sees that a major problem in understanding and 
implementing ‘partnership’ is that it has ‘become perhaps one of the most 
misused and abused concepts of the 1990’s…the concept has become so 
generalised that it risks becoming a meaningless concept.’  (Cousins, 1995, p.93) 
 
It is necessary, however, to review the literature on partnering because it is 
substantial in its volume and significant in its contribution.   
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Boddy et al (1998) observe that the benefits claimed for partnering are 
numerous, particularly when companies are operating in competitive and volatile 
environments.  For example, innovation is expected to be faster because 
information sharing by key players in the design stage reduces the time required 
to bring new products to market.  Similarly quality can be enhanced through the 
more open process improvement which takes place in effective partnering.  Some 
writers support this view while others are more cautious.  Both positions will be 
reviewed. 
 
Lamming (1993) describes a four-phase model of customer-supplier relations in 
the Western automotive industry: 
 
• Traditional (pre-1975) 
• Stress (1972-1985) 
• Resolved (1982 onwards) 
• Partnership/Japanese (1990 onwards) 
 
These stages mark a gradual transition from traditional adversarial relationships 
to ones characterised by co-operation.  Features of the partnership phase include 
the arrangement of suppliers in tiers.  A supplier towards the top of a tier has a 
‘solid, long-term relationship with its customers and knows that it must 
constantly provide better service: the security of remaining a supplier to any 
particular customer is provided not by right but by fulfilling expectation.’ 
(Lamming, 1993, p.170)  Co-operation with both other suppliers as well as 
customers is essential to such a relationship. 
 
Traditional methods of placing business, such as competitive tendering, are not 
considered appropriate in partnerships.  Existing suppliers with proven histories 
of performance will be chosen and alternative methods of ensuring that the 
lowest cost has been secured will be used.  There is open discussion of costs and 
customers are clear about the genuine position on vehicle build.  Information 
exchange is therefore a key part of partnership relationships (Lamming, 1993). 
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A stage beyond partnership has been identified and this has been called ‘lean 
supply’ (Lamming, 1993).  Whilst partnership remained essentially an unequal 
alliance, lean supply requires a ‘fundamental shift of position within the 
partnership….The supplier, instead of applying all its efforts to the pursuit of 
price increases and beguiling the customer, directs its attention towards a new 
strategy of equality – leading its customers technologically in areas which it 
knows best and is best suited to explore’. (Lamming, 1993, p.209).  This will 
lead to efficiency increases. 
 
Other writers also stress the advantages of partnerships.  Ellram (1995) defines a 
purchasing partnership as: 
 
‘An agreement between a buyer and a supplier that involves a 
commitment over an extended time period, and includes the sharing of 
information along with a sharing of the risks and rewards of the 
relationship’ (Ellram, 1995, p.10) 
 
The advantages are specifically listed as follows. 
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POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES OF FORMING PURCHASING PARTNERSHIPS 
VERSUS ADVERSARIAL RELATIONSHIPS 
 
MANAGEMENT 
1. Reduced supplier base is easier to manage 
2. Increased mutual dependence lowers risk of losing supply source and creates 
greater stability through increased supplier loyalty 
3. Reduced time looking for new suppliers/gathering competitive bids 
4. Allows for joint planning and information sharing based on mutual trust and 
benefit 
5. Loyalty may increase supplier attention and customer service in areas such as: 
• Lead-time reliability 
• Priority in times of scarcity 
• Increased attention when problems arise 
6. Greater co-operation from suppliers to support the firm’s strategy 
 
TECHNOLOGY 
7. Partners may be more willing to share/give access to technology 
8. Partners may be more willing and capable of participating in product design based 
on knowledge and commitment to the other partner 
9. Supplier knowledge/involvement in design may: 
• Improve quality 
• Reduce time to market for new products or design changes 
 
FINANCIAL 
10. May share business risks through: 
• Joint investment 
• Joint Research & Development 
• Sharing of financial risks associated with market shifts 
11. Information sharing/forecasting may reduce inventory levels 
12. Long-term commitments of a partnership may lead to more stable supply prices. 
 
 
 
TABLE 4.2 
PARTNERSHIPS VERSUS ADVERSARIAL RELATIONSHIPS 
Ellram, L.M. (1995) ‘Partnering Pitfalls and Success Factors’ International Journal of 
Purchasing and Materials Management Spring 1995 pp. 36-44 
 
Likewise, Macbeth and Ferguson (1994) summarise the characteristics of a 
partnering relationship as being one in which the partners engage in activities 
such as shared design processes; shared book costing; interchange of staff; 
developing shared visions of their business; creating long-term commitments to 
each other; and engaging in joint improvement projects (quoted in Boddy et al 
1998 p.144). 
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Macbeth (1994) describes partnership as ‘actually a different way of doing 
business’ and sets out the distinction between adversarial and partnership 
relationships as follows. 
 
 
Features of Adversarial and Collaborative Relationships 
Timespan of Interaction. 
Discrete events 
Contracts for months 
Low switching costs 
 
Transaction History 
Supplier for ‘life’ 
Switching is last option 
Personal Attitudes and 
Behaviour 
Expertise closely held 
Centralise authority 
Power explicit and visible 
Buyer knows best 
Reactive suppliers 
Minimal interactions 
Customer-imposed stress 
Individual focus 
Live for the moment 
Aggressive defence 
Look good locally 
 
People development 
Devolve authority 
Power 2-way and hidden 
Supplier supports innovation 
Pro-active suppliers 
Multiple interactions 
Self-imposed stress 
Mutual respect 
Build for the future 
Open-sharing approach 
Group gains sought 
Organisational Processes 
Produce to drawing 
Hands-off 
Limited gatekeepers 
Static systems 
 
Design involvement 
Hands-on 
Many touch-points 
Technology transfers 
Measurements 
Unidirectional (vendor rating) 
Unidimensional (price) 
Internal cost reduction 
Inspect outcomes 
Limited feedback: blaming 
Learning limited 
 
Total acquisition cost 
Relationship measurement 
Supply chain effectiveness 
Control inputs & processes 
Frequent feedback: improvement 
Success shared & rewarded 
 
TABLE 4.3 
FEATURES OF ADVERSARIAL AND COLLABORATIVE RELATIONSHIPS 
Macbeth, D.K. (1994) ‘The Role of Purchasing in a Partnering Relationship’ European 
Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management 1(1) pp.19-25 
 
Cousins (2002) goes so far as to argue that partnerships do not exist and that 
firms do not trust each other.  Rather, there are collaborative relationships that 
are competitive.  A relationship is seen as a process that is focussed on outcomes 
and, in place of trust, there is risk management. 
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Value Transparency 
 
Lamming et al (2001a) propose a model for ‘Value Transparency’ within close 
relationships that, they believe, is necessary in the increasingly turbulent 
economic climate: 
 
‘…to sustain a competitive position firms must collaborate with suppliers 
in new ways; rather than simply the sources of artefacts, suppliers 
become sources of knowledge, skills and expertise, or innovation 
capabilities, in addition to the core offering of artefacts.’  (Lamming et al 
2001a p.452) 
 
Value transparency as a concept relies on a broader definition of ‘value’ than 
merely an exchange of goods or utility.  Value creation is stressed as additional 
to the mere provision of goods and services (Lamming et al 2001b).  Cost 
transparency then becomes value transparency.   
 
The approach goes beyond sharing sensitive information to risk management for 
both parties and the associated benefits.  In value transparency, the supplier takes 
an active part in the risk management process through its knowledge of the value 
stream and markets.  New value is thereby produced that would not be available 
if the transaction were made only through the market. 
 
Through a discussion of the effects of IT, Hultman and Axelsson (2004) extend 
the concept by identifying four dimensions of transparency.  These are as follows 
and stress the factors that are important to providing value within a 
manufacturing context. 
 
• Cost transparency: Exploitation of new technology increases the firm’s 
ability to source effectively leading to increased transparency of, for 
example, price. 
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• Supply transparency: New technology increases the ability to create 
transparency in the flow of goods and materials between firms. 
• Inter-organisational transparency: New technology can expand the 
range of communication between firms.  For example, e-mail can 
replace traditional modes of communication and provide a greater 
number of contact points for each firm. 
• Technology transparency: New technology can extend the horizons of 
technology because the use, development and maintenance of 
technology can be shared. 
 
Building on the development of these different relationship types, methodologies 
have been developed for applying them to different categories of company 
expenditure.  In this way, each area is classified and managed in the most 
efficient way.  ‘Portfolio Management’ is discussed below. 
 
(d) Portfolio Management 
 
Christopher and Juttner (2000) advocate a portfolio approach to relationship 
management as an efficient way of managing a company’s relationships with its 
suppliers.  Due to the resource-intensive nature of partnerships, together with the 
risks associated with increased vulnerability, it is not possible or desirable to 
develop close ties with all suppliers.  Therefore there needs to be a balanced set 
of relationships based on a company’s assessment of the role of partnerships in 
its strategy.   
 
Kraljic (1983) first developed a methodology for segmenting a company’s 
expenditure and managing each segment in the most appropriate way.  Since 
then, there have been different approaches to the segmentation process.   
 
Bensaou (1999) proposes a framework for managing a portfolio of relationships 
using mutual exchange of specific investments as the criterion for comparing 
relationships.   
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HIGH CAPTIVE BUYER 
Assymetric relationship in 
which the buyer is held 
hostage by a supplier free 
to switch to another 
customer. 
STRATEGIC 
PARTNERSHIP 
Both parties have 
posted highly 
idiosyncratic assets 
into the relationship 
 MARKET EXCHANGE 
Neither has developed 
specialised assets to work 
with the other.  Highly 
standardised product. 
CAPTIVE 
SUPPLIER 
Supplier enters the 
trap of unilaterally 
making idiosyncratic 
investments to win 
and keep the business 
with the supplier. 
LOW  HIGH 
BUYER’S 
SPECIFIC 
INVESTM
ENTS 
 
SUPPLIER’S SPECIFIC INVESTMENTS 
 
FIGURE 4.3 
PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS USING MUTUAL EXCHANGE OF SPECIFIC 
INVESTMENTS 
ADAPTED FROM Bensaou, M. (1999) ‘Portfolios of Buyer-Supplier Relationships’ Sloan 
Management Review Summer pp35 - 44 
 
Spekman et al (1999) approaches classification of supplier relationship based on 
levels of commercial complexity.  This model stresses the benefits of partnership 
but also believes that some supplier relationships are best handled as open-
market exchanges. 
 
Macbeth (2002b) adapts Kraljic’s 2 x 2 matrix to create a portfolio of 
relationships that reflects value and risk.  Such an approach helps purchasers to 
allocate resource in a more efficient manner.  Suppliers are divided into the 
following categories. 
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Bottleneck 
Try to design 
uniqueness away.  
Dual source 
 
 
Strategic 
collaboration 
No adversarial 
behaviour 
 
 
The trivial many 
Do as little as 
possible.  Use 
purchasing cards, 
electronic 
marketplace and 
outsourcing 
 
 
Leverage 
Find alternative 
sources, re-tender 
contracts, pressurise 
and negotiate for 
reduced supply costs. 
 
 
FIGURE 4.4 
PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS USING VALUE AND RISK CRITERIA 
Macbeth, D.K. (2002b) ‘Managing a Portfolio of Supplier Relationships’ in Day, M. (2002) 
Handbook of Purchasing Management 3
rd
 Edition Aldershot: Gower pp.51 - 62 
 
Each of these sectors should be managed in the most appropriate way that will be 
different in each case. 
 
Nellore and Soderquist (2000) stress the role of specifications, believing them to 
have been neglected by the portfolio approach adopted by Kraljic and Bensaou.  
Within an engineering and manufacturing environment, they believe that 
specifications need to be matched with the capabilities of the supplier and the 
supplier base managed accordingly. 
 
Portfolio management approaches provide a methodology for managing the 
supply base.  They are methodologies for mixing relationship models to 
maximise efficiency.   
 
Summary 
 
The literature discussed in this chapter presents objective approaches to 
regulating the flow of goods and services through organisations.  These 
approaches differ in their methodologies, being either process-driven or 
relational.  They have as their common foundations, however, objective value 
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constructs that consistently view business relationships and value at an 
organisational and not a personal level.  This organisational focus on objective 
value constructs was illustrated using the following examples from the literature. 
 
• Procurement process models aim for optimum quality, timeliness, quantity 
and cost using adversarial leverage wherever possible. 
• TCE focuses on matching transactions to the most appropriate governance 
structure thereby reducing the risk to the organisation of opportunism and 
bounded rationality. 
• The Interaction approach looks at relationships within a network and how 
those links, ties and bonds can benefit the organisation.  This might be joint 
resources or activities that can lead to innovation. 
• Relational approaches aim to actively develop close relationships with 
strategic suppliers.  Obligational contracting and the development of 
‘goodwill trust’ (Sako 1992) has the potential to provide a number of benefits 
such as joint research and development capability, risk-sharing and supply in 
times of scarcity.  Such relationships can increase efficiency and reduce the 
cost of the relationship to the organisation. 
 
The literature discussed in this chapter has its foundations in research conducted 
in a manufacturing, largely automotive, context that is concerned to ensure 
corresponding benefits such as efficiency in supply and product development.  
These are tangible, objective benefits to the organisation and the literature 
therefore sets out objective procurement approaches to achieve them.  They do, 
however, assume the integration of Procurement at a strategic level to establish 
and maintain the models that have been developed.  This has implications for 
Procurement’s role as a strategic function. 
 
The objective models presented in this chapter are idealised models that remain 
detached from real business situations.  The objectivity inherent in procurement 
and governance approaches does not take account of the true context of the 
business world and assumes that it is possible to implement these models in such 
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a complex environment.  They also assume the full integration of Procurement at 
a strategic level and, therefore, that collaboration with senior executives at all 
levels and on all supplier engagements is possible. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
LITERATURE ANALYSIS 
 
Introduction 
 
Research questions will be drawn from the literature discussed in the preceding 
chapters using the following areas. 
 
(i) The characteristics of professional services and associated client 
dependence on subjective responses 
 
The nature of management consultancy, and its potential political utility, 
increases the importance of the subjective responses and motivation of individual 
clients.  This was established in the following literature discussed in Chapters 
Two and Three. 
 
In Chapter Two, professional services were characterised as complex (Axelsson 
and Wynstra 2002).  This makes it difficult for clients to assess the technical 
quality of such services, sometimes even after they have been delivered (Maister 
1993; Maister et al 2000; Hausman 2003).  Such difficulties are exacerbated in 
the case of management consultancy by the ‘unbounded’ nature of the service 
provision itself.  Consultancy firms lack ‘professional’ status and users cannot 
rely on the regulatory safeguards present in the fields of medicine and law 
(Gluckler and Armbruster 2003; Kam 2004).  This is further compounded by the 
ambiguity of knowledge services and their extreme heterogeneity (Alvesson 
1993; Clark 1995; Mitchell et al 2003; Gluckler and Armbruster 2003).  In 
procuring consultancy services, clients therefore assume considerable risk 
concerning technical quality.   
 
Clients respond by developing their own strategies to reduce the high levels of 
risk involved in procuring professional services.  For example, clients rely on 
‘networked reputation’ as an indication of quality (Gluckler and Armbruster 
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2003).  In addition, high levels of brand loyalty are observed where the 
experiences of professional services have been favourable (Mitchell 1994).  It is 
also suggested that consultancy brands are used to signal legitimacy and act as a 
substitute for professionalism (Kam 2004, Nippa and Petzold 2002). 
 
Personal relationships between clients and consultants also become extremely 
important in this context because the individual consultant is taken to be a strong 
representation of the quality of the service that can be expected from the firm 
itself (Maister 1993).  In addition, and of great importance, a relationship allows 
trust to develop between the individual client and the individual consultant 
(Maister et al 2000).  This is also seen as a way of ensuring technical quality. 
 
The consequence of such risk mitigation measures is an increase in the 
significance of the subjectivity of individuals.  This is because selection 
decisions are being based upon subjective responses to consultancy brands and to 
individual consultants themselves.  Chapter Three stressed the complexity of 
individual value choices that depend upon individual contingency and context.  
Such choices are not always driven by ‘rational’ considerations such as price 
(Drakopoulos 1991, Rorty 1989, Anderson 1993).  Subjective value choices are 
therefore unpredictable.  The literature in Chapter Two also examined the 
political uses of management consultancy and this, too, increases the importance 
of subjectivity. 
 
The political benefits of using management consultancy services have the 
potential to provide considerable value to clients on a personal level, either to 
confirm their own recommendations (‘legitimisation’) or as agents of change 
(Nippa and Petzold 2002, Gammelsaeter 2002, Schwarz 2003).  Although they 
strive to establish professional status, consultants will readily sacrifice any 
constraints imposed by professionalism to ensure client satisfaction and repeat 
business (Kam 2004).  Consultants are therefore a powerful and malleable 
resource available to clients and the decision to engage them may be driven by 
subjective consideration of the personal benefits. 
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(ii) Objective methodologies exist for supplier selection and management 
that are derived from manufacturing 
 
Chapter Four demonstrated that a variety of methodologies have been developed 
to enable practitioners to effectively select and manage suppliers.  Transaction 
Cost Economics, for example, uses asset specificity inter alia to determine the 
most appropriate governance structure for supply (Williamson 1975, 1996).  TCE 
has risk mitigation as its primary concern but other approaches have a wider 
focus. 
 
Procurement methodologies use both adversarial leverage and relational 
approaches to achieve efficiency and have in common a foundation based on 
objective value constructs.  These value constructs are objective in the sense that 
they are based on rational value constructs that aim to deliver tangible benefits to 
the organisation employing them.  Attention to quality, timeliness, quantity and 
cost, for example, are of prime importance to basic procurement processes that 
rely largely on adversarial leverage (Baily et al 1998, Van Weele 2000).   
 
There are also sophisticated relational approaches that aim to drive optimum 
value from relationships with third party suppliers.  The moves away from 
adversarial and exploitative relationships towards more co-operative 
relationships based on trust appear to have distinct advantages in a volatile and 
competitive environment.  These relationships facilitate co-ordination and co-
operation among suppliers as well as between suppliers and buyers.  
Development of ‘goodwill trust’ (Sako 1992) mitigates risk of opportunism and 
can increase operational efficiency by reducing the cost of the relationship, 
improving technology transfer and reducing uncertainty.  There can be faster 
innovation through joint investment in research and a resulting reduction in time-
to-market for such innovation. In what has been termed ‘value transparency’ 
(Lamming et al 2001a) the supplier takes an active role in risk management 
through its knowledge of the value stream and markets.  The position of the 
organisation is stronger as a result of such collaboration. 
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Procurement methodologies also enable supplier segmentation that facilitates 
appropriate application of both adversarial and collaborative approaches.  
Portfolio management strategies have been developed for application to different 
categories of expenditure.  In one model it aims for a balanced set of 
relationships based on the role of partnerships in company strategy (Christopher 
and Juttner 2000); another uses levels of commercial complexity (Spekman et al 
1999); and another reflects value and risk (Macbeth 2002).  Supply relationships 
can also be analysed using power to determine the most appropriate strategy 
(Cox 1996, Cox et al 2000). 
 
The methodologies outlined above, and more fully in Chapter Four, are based on 
objective value constructs that provide tangible benefits to the organisation 
employing them.  Crucially, these benefits accrue to the organisation itself and 
not to individuals.  As such, they are not subjective and reflect a relationship that 
exists between organisations and not between individuals.  This is unlike the way 
that consultancy services are procured through greater reference to subjective 
responses to individuals and brands. 
 
In addition, the approaches described in Chapter Four are largely drawn from 
research carried out in the manufacturing, mostly automotive, sector.  Process 
driven models are ideal for supply of ‘pure’ goods (Axelsson and Wynstra 2002) 
and relational approaches have a similar focus.  The objective value constructs 
that are described reflect factors that are critical in a manufacturing environment: 
uninterrupted supply of materials; technology transfer; joint research and 
development facilitating faster time-to-market; efficient inventory management.  
These may not translate well to a service such as management consultancy where 
different considerations apply and other areas reflect different approaches. 
 
The services marketing literature already discussed above and in Chapter Two 
demonstrate a different approach to services based on a consideration of 
subjective factors at the level of the individual.  In addition, calls for a ‘service-
dominant logic’ (Vargo and Lusch, 2004) highlight the speed of change in the 
market and the need to adapt appropriately to such change. 
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(iii) Two opposing views of management consultants and their clients 
 
Two opposing views of both consultants and clients emerged from the literature 
discussed in Chapter Two.  These are discussed below. 
 
The critical perspective on consultancy asserts that the need for it is driven by the 
uncertainty that managers feel in their roles (Gill and Whittle 1992; Lundberg 
and Young 2001; Sorge and Witteloostuijn 2004).  At the same time, in an 
attempt to overcome the ambiguity inherent in their services, consultants employ 
dramaturgical techniques to manage their client’s perception of the value they are 
providing (Clark 1995; Bloomfield and Vurdubakis 2002).  Clients become 
passive victims in this process and this may be a highly significant factor in the 
way that management consultancy services are procured. 
 
At the core of consultancy is the ‘management of impressions’.  In the absence of 
a formalised knowledge base, consultants must manipulate the interaction 
between themselves and their clients to convince the client of the value they have 
provided.  To achieve this, the socio-political skills of consultants become 
indivisible from their technical skills (Bloomfield and Danieli 1995).  
Consultancy relies on ‘fads’ and this has been referred to as ‘management by 
panacea’ (Gill and Whittle 1992).  It has also been analysed using fashion theory 
(Kieser 2002) and it is suggested that consultants themselves create demand for 
their services (Backlund and Werr 2004, Bloomfield and Vurdubakis 2002, 
Sturdy 1997) 
 
In a service with so little substance, and where so much effort is spent managing 
the impression of value, the implication is that clients must be passive if they 
accept the service.  They must also be uncritical or at least unable to see past the 
image presented to them.  This lack of criticality has profound implications for 
the procurement of management consultancy when combined with the reliance 
on subjectivity already outlined.  It suggests that extreme risks are confronted by 
organisations using management consultancy because inter alia few rational 
value constructs underpin its use.  Managers rely on personal relationships to 
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judge value and such relationships are precisely the mechanism targeted by 
individual consultants to create the impression of value.  This leaves the 
organisation vulnerable to opportunism on the part of consultants. 
 
Conversely, there were writers who presented a different view in which 
managers were neither passive nor open to manipulation.  These writers 
presented evidence that managers are fully aware of the nature of consultants and 
contested their claims to legitimacy (Fincham 1999).  Also, there was strong 
evidence that managers manipulated consultants to achieve their own political 
objectives.    
 
There are frequent references to the use of consultants to ‘legitimate’ decisions 
made by managers (Sturdy 1997, Kipping and Armbruster 2002, Nippa and 
Petzold 2002, Schwarz 2003).  The same reasons are given by all the writers for 
the ability of consultants to fulfil this function, which is that they are seen as 
objective and politically neutral (Sturdy 1997, Kam 2004). Their ‘otherness’ is 
associated with rationality and scientificity (Kipping and Armbruster 2002) and 
reference to these values by clients ensures acceptance within the organisation.  
By association, clients are also imbued with the same qualities and are seen as 
importing the latest ideas and methodologies into the organisation. 
 
Value is not, therefore, necessarily demonstrated by reference to tangible project 
objectives.  This is also seen in the conscious use of brand name to ensure 
acceptance and assist in ‘overcoming dominant decision frames’ (Nippa and 
Petzold 2002).  The use of consultants for legitimisation also extends, however, 
to conscious political manoeuvring and the more unstable the structure of the 
organisation, the greater the influence of consultants (Gammelsaeter 2002).  As 
previously noted, Kam (2004) points out that professionalism will be sacrificed if 
it means compromising client satisfaction.  This means that consultants represent 
an extremely versatile and malleable resource because they will do whatever is 
required to satisfy their client, including pursuit of personal political objectives.  
They are also uniquely positioned to do this because of their association with 
rationality and objectivity.  Schwarz’s (2003) study of a strategic review in a 
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manufacturing company is particularly interesting because it demonstrates so 
clearly the political use of consultants and how they were able to achieve things 
that employees, including directors would have found extremely difficult.   
 
Conclusion 
 
A number of points emerge from the preceding discussion.  Firstly, the literature 
in Chapters Two and Four reveal a tension between the subjectivity of 
individuals and the objectivity associated with procurement on an organisational 
level.  Clients of consultancy services rely on their own subjective responses to 
assess suitability and quality.  Existing methodologies underpinned by objective 
value constructs are, apparently, not used by client executives to procure 
management consultancy.  The literature on consultancy discussed in Chapter 
Two focuses on value constructs that potentially benefit individuals and can 
therefore be judged subjectively.  Crucially, individual executives engage 
individual consultants and this results in a different business relationship to that 
envisaged in the sourcing literature discussed in Chapter Four.  
 
In a consultancy engagement, relationships exist on an organisational level and 
an individual level between executive and consultant.  However, the relationship 
that exists between an organisation and a consultancy firm is only a contractual 
one.  It is the personal relationship between client and consultant that is of most 
importance because this is where specifications are set, decisions are made, 
results agreed and invoices paid.  The client executive is, in theory, free to use 
consultancy services for his or her own purposes without reference to objective 
organisational value constructs.  While other suppliers may have multiple levels 
of interaction with their clients, a consultancy firm relies to a unique degree on 
the individual client within the organisation who engages them.  It is the client 
who has given them work and set the specification, and it is also the client who 
can also terminate the engagement.  Consequently, consultants will work to the 
client’s personal objectives and, in this sense, they are mercenaries or ‘guns for 
hire’ unlike any other supplier.   
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This situation is enhanced because consultants are also uniquely positioned to 
serve a client’s purposes and the use of consultants for political manoeuvring is a 
major motivation for clients to the extent that it may even overshadow their 
technical contribution.  Their services may be required simply to validate a prior 
decision or, more fundamentally, consultants may be used to affect the balance of 
power within an organisation.  They are effective because they are external to the 
organisation and are therefore strongly associated with values of objectivity and 
rationality.  This association is exploited by clients to secure acceptance of their 
own positions.  Externality also gives consultants the freedom to employ tactics 
and methods that clients could not expect to use with impunity.   
 
In this individualistic environment, objective value constructs and corresponding 
processes and methodologies do not fit easily and even appear anomalous.   
 
Secondly, the characteristics of professional services identified in Chapter Two, 
however, do not all appear to co-exist comfortably in the context of management 
consultancy.  This prompts questions about the true depth of the client’s ability to 
judge technical quality and this is discussed below. 
 
In addition to the complexity of professional services, Chapter Two also 
identified a high degree of client involvement in designing solutions and, 
therefore, co-production of value.  As a natural corollary to this, there were also 
extended and deep exchanges between clients and service providers (Hausman 
2003; Axelsson and Wynstra 2002; Silvestro 1999).  This is highly significant 
because it suggests that, in some circumstances, clients have a reasonable 
understanding of technical quality.  It is possible to infer from the literature on 
the ambiguity of knowledge services and its extreme heterogeneity that such 
technical knowledge is limited.  Clients are therefore vulnerable to impression 
management (Alvesson 1993, Clark and Salaman 1998, Kieser 2002, Bloomfield 
and Vurdubakis 2002).  A high degree of client and supplier contact and joint 
design of solutions is typical of management consultancy services.  This implies 
that clients have some technical ability that enables them to make a valid 
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contribution.  It also suggests that they may be less vulnerable to impression 
management in such a close working relationship.   
 
Lack of client vulnerability appears to be confirmed by literature that discussed 
the political use of consultancy.  Such sophisticated manipulation of the service 
strongly implies a clear understanding of consultancy and its effects, together 
with some ability to assess technical quality.   
 
Thirdly, the contribution of objective methodologies to the procurement of 
management consultancy remains largely untested.  Clients appear to show a 
preference for subjective reliance which calls into question the applicability of 
the processes and methodologies discussed in Chapter Four.  As discussed above, 
this literature draws on a rich heritage of research carried out in the 
manufacturing, largely automotive, sector and reflects the value constructs 
relevant to this area.  The continuing relevance of this research needs to be re-
addressed in the context of rapid change in the market.  Indeed, writers within the 
services marketing literature suggest that the boundaries between goods and 
services need to be re-addressed and have called for a ‘service-dominant logic’ 
(Lusch and Vargo 2006). 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
Introduction 
 
The literature analysis in the previous chapter established a number of themes 
which build on the tension in the literature, discussed in Chapters Two and Four, 
between subjective and objective value choices.  This literature explores 
decision-making that operates at two different levels: firstly, individual 
subjectivity and, secondly, corporate objectivity.  The distinction between 
subjective and objective decision-making is central to the research questions and 
was discussed in the previous chapter.  It is briefly re-iterated below.   
 
The literature on Sourcing in Chapter Four focuses on corporate entities and 
strategies that will deliver objectively ascertained benefits to the organisation.  
For example, Value Transparency (Lamming et al 2001b) is designed to facilitate 
more efficient risk management.  The concentration on objective value constructs 
that is found in the sourcing literature reflects its foundations in research 
conducted in manufacturing environments.  Conversely, the service management 
literature is largely based in research concerning mass-market consumer goods 
and services and therefore concentrates on individual, and therefore subjective, 
decision-making.  This focus on the response of the individual rather than 
objectively-defined organisational benefits also extends to literature that 
specifically examines management consultancy.   
 
The literature in Chapter Two identifies, in addition, the complexity of 
professional services in general and the unbounded nature of management 
consultancy in particular.  This results in clients assuming a high degree of risk 
when procuring management consultancy including potential vulnerability to 
impression management.  There is nothing in the literature discussed in either 
Chapter Two or Chapter Four, however, to indicate that executive clients choose 
to mitigate this risk using the established, objective methodologies outlined in 
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Chapter Four.  Instead, they appear to rely on subjectivity and, in particular, 
individual responses to brand and personal relationships.  This reliance is 
supported by the literature in Chapter Three on subjective value choice.  This 
concluded that individual contingency results in a complex decision-making 
process that does not necessarily refer to price.   
 
The apparent disregard for objective methodologies and reliance on subjectivity 
suggests that clients have their own personal value constructs to which they refer 
when engaging consultancy services.  There was considerable evidence in the 
literature in Chapter Two that clients use consultants for political purposes 
because of their external status and association with rational and objective 
values.   These associations not only improved the status of the client within his 
or her own organisation, but also helped secure acceptance of the client’s 
decisions.  On a more fundamental level, consultants could be used to change the 
balance of power within an organisation. 
 
The willingness of consultants to prioritise client satisfaction over the restrictions 
that would be imposed by adherence to standards of professionalism, make them 
a particularly versatile and malleable resource.  They are therefore, potentially, 
extremely valuable to executives who wish to pursue any subjectively identified 
value construct.   
 
This analysis of the literature in the preceding chapters results in the following 
research questions. 
 
Research Question 1 
On what basis do executives buy management consultancy? 
 
Established sourcing methodologies based on objective value constructs are 
examined in Chapter Four.  Despite the existence of such methodologies, 
however, the literature in Chapter Two indicated that subjective value constructs 
have a significant role in client decisions to procure management consultancy.  
The literature in Chapter Three established personal value choices as complex 
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decisions strongly influenced by individual contingency.  This suggests that 
clients exercise considerable scope when deciding to engage consultants and the 
research question seeks to examine this in greater detail and clarify client 
motivation and assessments of value. 
 
Research Question 2 
How would the objective processes developed in strategic procurement 
contribute to buying management consultancy? 
 
Procurement professionals and others have developed methodologies that focus 
on achieving benefits defined by objective value constructs.  These are discussed 
in Chapter Four.  This research question seeks to establish the extent of the 
benefit that such objective processes could deliver to the procurement of 
management consultancy despite the use by clients of subjective responses. 
 
Research Question 3 
Is there any compatibility between executive procurement of management 
consultancy and professional procurement methodologies? 
 
There appears to be a significant dislocation between the subjectivity used by 
individual executives to procure management consultancy, and the objective 
value constructs that underpin established sourcing methodologies.  This research 
question seeks to establish whether there is any degree of compatibility between 
the two approaches.  In the event of a suitable match, the implication is that 
Procurement professionals do, indeed, have a valid role in the purchase of 
consultancy. 
 
Research Question 4 
What are the implications of executive procurement of management consultancy 
for the development of strategic procurement as a professional function? 
 
Procurement aspires to be a strategic function that is fully engaged with all 
sourcing decisions.  This question seeks to establish the effect that executive 
 113 
autonomy in the procurement of consultancy might have on such an aspiration.  
This question evolved as the research and literature analysis progressed and the 
dichotomy in approaches began to emerge. 
 
 
Summary 
 
In combination, these research questions address the central dilemma for 
procurement departments of their exclusion by executives from management 
consultancy engagements.  Most significantly, they address the issue of the 
suitability of procurement methodologies to consultancy and therefore whether 
the involvement of procurement professionals is appropriate. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
(i) Introduction 
 
This chapter sets out the research design, including the methods employed to 
gather the data, and the grounds for believing the outcomes to be a valid 
contribution to knowledge.  It begins with a brief survey of the epistemological 
and ontological choices to be made and explains the adoption of qualitative 
techniques.  These techniques are then set out in greater detail.  The chapter 
finishes with a section on the difficulties encountered in carrying out the 
research, and how these issues were overcome and incorporated into the research 
design. 
 
The data is derived from a single case study of the researcher’s employing 
company and its conclusions are based on twenty-seven interviews with senior 
executives and an extended observation of a consultancy engagement.  This 
research design raises questions around random sampling and sufficiency of 
numbers that are answered in the sections on Case-Study Approach and Validity.  
The chapter argues that the role of this case study is ‘instrumental’ and 
‘revelatory’ and that its conclusions do not need to be capable of generalisation 
to a larger population to constitute valid knowledge. 
 
In particular, the chapter stresses the problems of access to senior executives and 
the rare opportunity that the insider status of the researcher presented. 
 
(ii) Research Perspective 
 
Gibson and Burrell (1979) suggest that it is convenient to conceptualise social 
science in terms of four sets of assumptions related to ontology, epistemology, 
human nature and methodology.   
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The subjectivist 
approach to social 
science 
 The objectivist approach 
to social science 
   
Nominalism ONTOLOGY Realism 
Anti-positivism EPISTEMOLOGY Positivism 
Voluntarism HUMAN NATURE Determinism 
Ideographic METHODOLOGY Nomothetic 
 
FIGURE 7.1  
A SCHEME FOR ANALYSING ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE NATURE OF SOCIAL 
SCIENCE 
Burrell, G. and Morgan, G. (1979) Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis 
Aldershot: Ashgate p.3 
 
Firstly, there are ontological assumptions about the reality to be investigated.  
The question to be addressed is whether reality is objective in nature, or the 
product of individual cognition.  At the extremes stand nominalism and realism.  
Nominalism does not admit that there is any ‘real’ structure to the world.  The 
names used to describe concepts are no more than convenient labels that help 
individuals describe and negotiate the external world.  Realism, conversely, 
holds that the social world is comprised of tangible and objective structures that 
are as hard and concrete as the natural world. 
 
Secondly there are epistemological assumptions regarding the grounds of 
knowledge, what forms of knowledge can be obtained, and how one can decide 
what is ‘true’ and what is ‘false’.  Positivism is based upon the methods used in 
the natural sciences.  It searches for causal relationships between the elements 
that comprise society and thereby to explain and predict it.  Anti-positivism, 
however, views the social world as relativistic and therefore holds that it can only 
be understood from the point of view of the individuals being studied.  It rejects 
the notion of an independent ‘observer’ who can provide objective data. 
 
Thirdly, there are assumptions about human nature and the relationship between 
human beings and their environment.  The debate is whether human beings are 
formed by their environment and merely react to it in a mechanistic or 
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deterministic fashion, or whether they create and control their own environment 
and are therefore free-willed. 
 
These three sets of assumptions have direct implications for the choice of 
methodology.  For example, if the ontological belief is that the social world is a 
hard, objective reality then it would seem appropriate to search for universal laws 
which explain and govern the reality being observed using nomothetic methods.  
Conversely, if the belief is that the subjective experience of individuals is the 
defining characteristic of reality, then the primary concern of research is to 
understand the way that the individual interprets the world around them using 
ideographic methods (Gibson and Burrell, 1979, p.3).   
 
Ideographic methods are based on the belief that the subject can only be 
understood by gaining first hand experience and getting close to it.  It therefore 
emphasises the detailed analysis of subjective accounts.  Conversely, nomothetic 
approaches stress the importance of a systemic approach and standardised 
research instruments.  It is epitomised by the approach used in the natural 
sciences such as tests and quantitative analysis of data.  
 
Although extreme positions have been presented, in reality there are many views 
that may be placed somewhere between each of the two poles (Easterby-Smith et 
al 1991, Smith 1998).  Likewise, the term ‘phenomenology’ is an umbrella term 
covering a considerable range of epistemological positions (Audi 1999, Bryman 
1988, Smith 1998).   
 
The research perspective adopted here is subjectivist and seeks to understand the 
world on the level of individual experience, using the frame of reference of the 
participant not that of the observer.  Such an approach was considered best suited 
to the objectives of the study.  It therefore, broadly, has the following 
characteristics.  
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Nominalist ontology 
Anti positivist (phenomenological) epistemology 
Voluntarist view of human nature 
Ideographic (qualitative) methodology 
 
The discussion will now add more detail to epistemology and the choice of 
research methods. 
 
As noted above, phenomenology tends to be associated with qualitative data 
gathering methods and small samples studied in depth.  Positivism, however, 
tends to concentrate on deriving fundamental laws from the observation of facts 
and is therefore associated with quantitative techniques.  The resulting variance 
in approaches to research is shown in Figure 4.2 below, although, as Bryman 
(1998) points out, the choice of research method is not necessarily related to 
epistemological conviction.  For some researchers, ‘the decision over whether to 
use a quantitative or qualitative approach should be based on “technical” issues 
regarding the suitability of a particular method in relation to a particular research 
problem’ (Bryman, 1988, p.106).  Indeed, Janesick (2000) uses the term 
‘methodolatry’ to ‘describe a preoccupation with selecting and defending 
methods to the exclusion of the actual substance of the story being told’. 
(Janesick, 2000 p.390) 
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Quantitative 
 
Qualitative 
1) Role of qualitative 
research 
Preparatory Means of exploration 
of actor’s 
interpretations 
2) Relationship between 
researcher and 
subject 
Distant Close 
3) Researcher’s stance 
in relation to subject 
Outsider Insider 
4) Relationship between 
theory/concepts and 
research 
Confirmation Emergent 
5) Research strategy Structured Unstructured 
6) Scope of findings Nomothetic Ideographic 
7) Image of social 
reality 
Static and external to 
actor 
Processual and socially 
constructed by actor 
8) Nature of data Hard, reliable Rich, deep. 
 
TABLE 7.1 
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
Bryman, A. (1988) Quantity and Quality in Social Research London: Routledge P.94 
 
Consequently, there can be considerable variety in research design varying from 
rigorous at one end to less well-structured at the other.  This is illustrated below 
in Figure 4.3.  However, it should again be seen as a continuum rather than 
mutually exclusive, opposite poles.  In reality, research methods are likely to 
contain elements of both approaches (Bryman, 1988) 
 
FIGURE 7.2 
VARIATION IN RESEARCH DESIGN (ADAPTED) 
Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. (2000) (eds) Handbook Of Qualitative Research second 
Edition London: Sage P.368 
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A significant part of the aim of this research was to understand executive 
motivation for buying management consultancy services and how this influenced 
their preferred procurement method.  The reasons underlying each individual 
instance of the use of consultancy firms will vary because the decision to use 
consultancy is essentially a subjective one.  It was therefore vital to get as close 
as possible to executives because the research focus was exclusively on 
individual executives and their attitudes and approaches to consultancy services.  
The commitment to an ideographic approach that is found in qualitative research 
methodology was seen as the most suitable way of gathering meaningful data in 
this instance.  As Fontana and Frey observe: 
 
‘If we wish to find out how many people oppose the establishment of a 
nuclear repository in their area, a structured type of interview…….is the 
best tool; we can quantify and code the responses and use mathematical 
models to explain our findings….whereas if we wish to know about the 
lives of Palestinian women in the resistance, we need to interview them 
at length and in depth in an unstructured way.’  (Fontana and Frey, 
2000, p.667) 
 
The best known method of qualitative data collection is participant observation.  
However, unstructured interviewing is also a favoured technique (Bryman, 
1988).  This has the added advantage of allowing the interviewee to respond 
freely without the confines of a pre-imposed frame of reference (Bryman, 1988).  
This was the best way to collect data for this research for a number of reasons.  
Firstly, any assumption of prior knowledge would have been extremely 
dangerous.  As discussed below, the researcher had certain pre-conceived notions 
about management consultancy that may have influenced any a priori structure.  
Secondly, the researcher also had no experience of working at a senior executive 
level and the pressures and burdens that such a position imposes.  Thirdly, on a 
practical level, there was little other option, for the reasons discussed below in 
the section on limitations to research. 
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Unstructured interviews allow for the unexpected and gave the researcher the 
freedom to pursue interesting observations and comments in greater detail.  For 
example, findings on validation benefits that formed an important part of the 
research data, emerged from a passing remark in one of the early interviews.  
This was pursued and developed adding great depth to the research.  A structured 
interview or survey is unlikely to have yielded this data due to the need to adhere 
to set questions.  Later sections in this chapter detail the sensitivities attaching to 
consultancy use.  These also make unstructured interviews most appropriate for 
data gathering because questions can be tailored to suit the individual being 
interviewed and the circumstances prevailing at any given moment. 
 
Theory was therefore inductively generated without imposing any reference 
points on the executive respondents.  Inductive research is taken to mean 
research that starts with real-world data, and categories, concepts, patterns, 
models and eventually, theories emerge from this input (Gummesson, 2000).  
Data analysis is discussed below in greater detail. 
 
(iii) Research Design 
 
(a) Case Study Approach 
 
The research was designed as a single case study of the company that employs 
the researcher as a Procurement Consultant.  This company is within the services 
sector.  All of the interviewees were from this company, with only one exception.  
The exception is a very highly graded executive (Managing Director level) 
within the banking sector.  The sample size was relatively small, comprising 27 
interviews.  The interview data was then triangulated using an extended 
observation to provide a different perspective. 
 
Criticism of case studies as a scientific method can be summarised as follows  
 
• Case studies lack statistical reliability and validity 
• Case studies can be used to generate hypotheses but not to test them 
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• Generalisations cannot be made on the basis of case studies 
Source: Gummesson, E. (2000) Qualitative Methods in Management Research  London: 
Sage 2
nd
 Edition 
 
These criticisms are discussed in a later section on validity.  The purpose of this 
section is to define more clearly the type of case study that was undertaken for 
this research because, as Ragin and Becker (1992) point out, the term ‘case’ is 
problematic because it is not easily defined. 
 
Case studies are categorised in various ways by different writers. 
 
Ragin and Becker (1992) use a ‘conceptual map’ to aid understanding of case 
studies: 
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Case Conceptions 
 
Understanding 
of Cases 
 
Specific 
 
General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As empirical 
units 
1. Cases are found 
‘researchers see cases as 
empirically real and 
bounded, but specific.  
They must be identified 
and established as cases 
in the course of the 
research 
process….Researchers 
who approach cases in 
this way see assessment 
of the empirical 
bounding of cases as an 
integral part of the 
research process.’ 
For example, Harper 
(1992) identifies 
‘community’ through 
individuals. 
2. Cases are objects 
‘researchers also view 
cases as empirically real 
and bounded, but feel no 
need to verify their 
existence or establish 
their empirical 
boundaries in the course 
of the research process, 
because cases are general 
and conventionalised.  
These researchers usually 
base their case 
designations on existing 
definitions present in 
research literatures.’ Eg, 
nation-states, 
organisations, families. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As theoretical 
constructs 
3. Cases are made 
Researchers ‘see cases as 
specific theoretical 
constructs which 
coalesce in the course of 
the research.  Neither 
empirical nor given, they 
are gradually imposed on 
empirical evidence as 
they take shape in the 
course of the research.  
For example, a 
researcher interested in 
tyranny would study 
many possible examples 
of tyranny.  An important 
subset may appear which 
would be conceived as a 
case of the same thing. 
Cases are conventions 
‘researchers see cases as 
general theoretical 
constructs, but 
nevertheless view these 
constructions as the 
products of collective 
scholarly work and 
interaction and therefore 
as external to any 
particular research 
effort’.  For example, 
‘industrial societies’. 
‘In this view, cases are 
general theoretical 
constructs that structure 
ways of seeing social life 
and doing social science.  
They are the collective 
products of the social 
scientific community and 
thus shape and constrain 
the practice of social 
science.’ 
 
FIGURE 7.3 
CONCEPTUAL MAP FOR ANSWERS TO ‘WHAT IS A CASE?’ 
Ragin, C.C. and Becker, H.S. (1992) What is a Case? Cambridge UK: Cambridge University 
Press P.9 
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This research can be located in the top right hand quadrant.  As far as the case 
concerns a company, it is an empirical unit that is an object requiring no further 
definition. 
 
Gummesson (2000) observes that case studies vary in character, but that two 
types are of particular interest: 
 
1 Firstly, there are those case studies that attempt to derive general 
conclusions from a limited number of cases 
2 Secondly, some case studies seek to arrive at specific 
conclusions regarding a single case because this ‘case history’ is 
of particular interest. 
 
He goes on to say that ‘case research is a useful strategy for studying processes 
in companies and also for explanatory purposes’ (Gummesson, 2000, p.85) 
 
Yin (1994) identifies three rationales for single case designs.  Firstly, there is the 
critical case that functions to test a well-formulated theory.  Secondly, there is an 
extreme or unique case, most commonly seen in clinical psychology.  Here, a 
condition may be so rare that any case is worth studying and documenting.  
Thirdly, there is the rationale for what is termed the ‘revelatory’ case, of which 
Yin says: 
 
‘This situation exists when an investigator has an opportunity to observe 
and analyse a phenomenon previously inaccessible to scientific 
investigation….’ (Yin, 1994, p.40) 
 
Yin illustrates this point by using as an example Elliot Liebow’s case study of 
unemployed black men, Tally’s Corner: 
 
‘By befriending these men, the author was able to learn about their 
lifestyles, their coping behaviour, and in particular their sensitivity to 
unemployment and failure.  The book provides insights into a 
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subculture that has prevailed in many U.S. cities for a long period of 
time, but one that had been only obscurely understood.’ (Yin, 1994, 
p.41) 
 
The difficulties of access to executives are set out in greater detail later in this 
chapter.  However, it is relevant to mention them here because of the similarities 
with the situation described by Yin.  It would have been extremely difficult to 
gain access to executives outside of the researcher’s own company and her 
insider status provided a rare opportunity to study the way that executives 
approach the procurement of management consultancy.  By exploiting this 
situation, the researcher was able to access information that reveals why and how 
a group of executives at one company procure management consultancy.  In this 
sense, the use of case study is truly ‘revelatory’. 
 
Further, Stake (2000) comments that ‘case studies have become one of the most 
common ways to do qualitative inquiry’ (Stake 2000 p.435) and he identifies 
three types of case study: 
 
(i) Intrinsic case studies where the researcher wants to understand 
this case alone; 
(ii) Instrumental case studies where the object of studying a case is 
to gain insight into an issue.  In this instance, the case plays a 
secondary role because its function is to facilitate understanding 
of something else; 
(iii) Collective case studies are joint studies of various cases to 
investigate a phenomenon, population or general condition. 
 
Stake also emphasises study of the particular: 
 
‘..case study method has been too little honoured as the intrinsic study 
of a valued particular, as it is in biography, institutional self-study, 
program evaluation, therapeutic practice, and many lines of work.  
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Generalisation should not be emphasised in all research.’  (Stake, 2000, 
p.439) 
 
The ‘Instrumental’ category created by Stake is similar to the ‘Revelatory’ one 
created by Yin.  The instrumental case also serves a purpose, which is to 
illustrate phenomena that are not unique and which may have application 
elsewhere.   
 
Because of the difficulties of access, this case research is revelatory in the sense 
that Yin (1994) uses the term.  In reality there was little choice of research design 
for this subject because the researcher could only access executives from her own 
company.  Therefore, the research had to be a single case study because it was 
impossible to carry out a multiple-case analysis.  Issues of validity are dealt with 
below in more detail.   
 
However, the research is also instrumental in the sense that Stake (2000) defines 
this type of case study.  By understanding this particular case study, insights into 
the procurement of consultancy elsewhere will be gained. 
 
(b) Data Collection 
 
Focus groups and observation techniques were not realistic methods for the main 
part of this study given the fact that the respondents were executives with very 
busy schedules.  It would have been extremely difficult to get more than one of 
them together at the same time. 
 
Data was collected using two methods.  Firstly, through tape-recorded interviews 
each lasting, on average, thirty to forty minutes (although one lasted for an hour 
and a half), and secondly, through an extended observation of a consultancy 
engagement in which the researcher was a participant. 
 
Interviews are a well-regarded method of collecting data.  Indeed Silverman 
(2000) comments: 
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‘Perhaps we all live in what might be called an “interview society” in 
which interviews seem central to making sense of our lives’.  
(Silverman, 2000, p.22) 
 
Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) also comment that: 
 
‘Interviews are a highly efficient way to gather rich empirical data’ 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007 p. 28) 
 
During the majority of the interviews pre-set questions were used to structure the 
interview in a very loose manner.  Questions were phrased very openly and 
encouraged more than a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ in response.  For example, 
executives were asked how they felt about certain aspects of consultancy or they 
were asked to describe certain events or processes.  They were also given ample 
opportunity to expand on areas that they thought were important.  This also gave 
the researcher the opportunity to pursue comments that were interesting and to 
gain greater detail on these points.  Using interviews in this way allowed for a 
quick response to new information.  Where it seemed that new data was 
appearing, this was tested immediately in subsequent interviews.  This resulted in 
the situation where not all executives were asked exactly the same questions and 
the researcher does not see this as problematic.  Rather, this is seen as an 
advantage.  As Stake (1995) observes: 
 
‘Qualitative case study seldom proceeds as a survey with the same 
questions asked of each respondent; rather, each interviewee is expected 
to have had unique experiences, special stories to tell….The purpose for 
the most part is not to get simple yes and no answers but description of 
an episode, a linkage, an explanation.’  (Stake, 1995, p.65) 
 
Gummesson (2000) describes an unstructured approach to interviewing in 
connection with case studies as follows: 
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‘During informal interviews, questions are not put in any pre-
established order.  The selection of questions is governed instead by the 
actual situation confronting the interviewer; it is a probing technique.  
Sometimes the interviewers may limit themselves to asking the 
questions they feel appropriate to ask on the spur of the 
moment……Particular attention is paid to what the informants consider 
to be important.’  (Gummesson, 2000, p.127) 
 
This accurately describes the situation during the interviews that were conducted 
for this research.  The questions asked, and the way they were asked, depended 
on how the researcher felt the interview was going and whether she wished the 
interviewee to expand on any points. 
 
(c) Data Analysis 
 
The interviews were analysed at regular intervals throughout the course of the 
research.  This is not unusual in qualitative research.  Miles and Huberman 
(1994) comment: 
 
‘We strongly recommend early analysis.  It helps the field-worker cycle 
back and forth between thinking about the existing data and generating 
strategies for collecting new, often better, data.  It can be a healthy 
corrective for built-in blind spots’. (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p.50) 
 
Symon and Cassell (1998) also observe: 
 
‘In qualitative research…..the distinction between data collection and 
data analysis may not be clear-cut.  In practice, for example, as a series 
of interviews progresses, the researcher will often be creating, testing 
and modifying analytic categories as an iterative process…’ (Symon 
and Cassell, 1998, p.5/6) 
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The questions became more focussed as the interviews progressed.  The first few 
interviews had very open, generic questions about the use of consultancy.  There 
were also very specific questions that were designed to test the areas identified 
by the literature.  From Interview Eight onwards questions became more specific 
and began to build on and test the themes that were beginning to emerge.  This 
process of refining and focussing continued throughout the remainder of the 
interviews. 
 
The easiest interviews to do were the later ones because they had become, by 
then, more like conversations around themes.  No doubt this was helped by the 
fact that the researcher felt more confident as an interviewer by then.  The 
process of working through certain questions in the first few interviews had felt 
wooden and artificial.  High quality material was produced during interviews that 
were more conversational. 
 
Following the interviews, the tapes were transcribed by a professional typist.  
There were, however, some gaps where words could not be deciphered.  These 
transcripts were read in great detail and each line analysed for meaning.  The 
resulting material was coded by theme.  There were no pre-conceived ideas about 
what the codes should be and they emerged from the data itself.   
 
The themes were then written up in the same format, although sometimes two or 
more themes were merged into one because of their similarities.  During the 
writing, each point made is reinforced and illustrated with the most appropriate 
quote from the interviews themselves.  Sometimes these quotes are lengthy and 
this is justified because they create greater understanding and basis for the 
conclusions.  They also create a sense of the authenticity of the interviews 
themselves.   
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(d) Validity 
 
The validity of the research findings were established in a number of ways that 
are discussed below including the difficulties inherent in conducting case studies, 
in particular single case studies.   
 
Single case studies are open to criticism.  Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) point 
out that multiple case studies ‘typically provide a stronger base for theory 
building’ although they concede that ‘single-case studies can richly describe the 
existence of a phenomenon (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007 p.27).  Whilst 
acknowledging the problems of building theory from a single case, it was 
considered important to report phenomena that are usually difficult to observe.  
As discussed above, this research is ‘instrumental’ and ‘revelatory’ in the sense 
that Stake (1995, 2000) and Yin (1994) use the term.  Its validity relies on its 
ability to shed light on consultancy procurement through unusual research 
access.  As Siggelkow (2007) observes, ‘a single case can be a very powerful 
example’. 
 
A single case study is also open to the criticism that no random sampling has 
taken place.  Even though the interviewees in this research were not randomly 
selected, the integrity of the data produced is not compromised in any way.  
Stake (1995) observes: 
 
‘Case study research is not sampling research.  We do not study a case 
primarily to understand other cases….Many of us caseworkers feel that 
good instrumental case study does not depend on being able to defend 
the typicality of (the case).’  (Stake, 1995, p.4) 
 
In any event, the executives interviewed came from a variety of backgrounds.  
Bryman (1988) refers to the tendency to approach case study as if it were a 
sample of one drawn from a wider pool of cases, and says: 
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‘….within a case study a wide range of different people and activities 
are invariably examined so that the contrast with survey samples is not 
as acute as it appears at first glance…(Bryman, 1988, p.90) 
 
He illustrates the point using Leibow’s (1967) study of street-corner men.  This is 
a small sample, not randomly drawn, yet it provides a ‘vivid, detailed portrayal 
of a small sector of social life’ (Bryman, 1988, p. 104).  The research here does 
the same thing within a corporate setting and its validity is not dependent on 
either random sampling or large numbers.  Stake (1995) stresses the 
interpretative nature of case research: 
 
‘It is not uncommon for case study researchers to make assertions on a 
relatively small database, invoking the privilege and responsibility of 
interpretation….Good case study is patient, reflective, willing to see 
another view of (the case).  (Stake, 1995, p.12) 
 
There is also, however, the problem of cases having the ability to generalise to 
other cases.  The typicality of the company is not, however, seen as an issue.  
Stake (1995) writes of case research: 
 
‘The purpose of a case report is not to represent the world, but to 
represent the case.’  (Stake, 2000, p.448) 
 
It is the opportunity to learn from the case that is the most important factor 
(Stake, 1995).  Bryman (1988) also writes: 
 
‘…the issue should be couched in terms of the generalisability of cases 
to theoretical propositions rather than to populations or universes.  Case 
study data become important when the researcher seeks to integrate 
them with a theoretical context.’  (Bryman, 1988, p.90) 
 
Core themes that continually occurred provided predictability.  Once Interview 
20 had been reached, the same themes were appearing repetitively so that 
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interviews towards the end therefore added a diminishing amount of value.  The 
number of interviews was therefore sufficient to establish justifiable themes.  As 
Gummesson says: 
 
‘The actual number of cases needed in a specific study will be 
determined by saturation – that is, the diminishing marginal 
contribution of each additional case; the researcher will have no need to 
continue with further cases when the marginal utility of an additional 
case approaches zero’.  (Gummesson, 2000, p.96) 
 
Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) point out that although interviews ‘are a highly 
efficient way to gather rich, empirical data’ (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007 p.28) 
they are also open to the charge of ‘retrospective sense-making and impression 
management’.  The research design of this study has mitigated such a risk by 
supplementing the interview data with observational data in the form of an 
extended observation. 
 
(e) Definition of Consultancy 
 
For the purposes of this study, Consultancy is defined as services provided by 
major firms such as McKinsey & Co., Boston Consulting Group, IBM, KPMG, 
Accenture and Cap Gemini.  Outsourcing is specifically excluded.  The 
definition of consultancy concentrates therefore, on the firm providing the 
service rather than the actual service itself.  Such services could comprise 
corporate strategy, IT strategy, business process re-engineering or corporate 
culture but so long as they were provided by one of the major firms, they would 
fall within the definition.   
 
This was made clear at the outset of each interview and the interviewees were 
asked to limit their answers to their experience of working with these firms.  If 
they did refer to smaller firms by way of comparison, interviewees were asked to 
make this clear. 
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This not only provided a boundary for the research, but also allowed for a 
concentration on the largest areas of consultancy expenditure. 
 
(f) Profile of Interviewees 
 
The individuals interviewed were all executives of director level who had 
experience of engaging consultants.  In the latter stages of the research, they 
were of Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer level.  They therefore 
had a central role in the assessment of value derived from consultancy.  The 
research specifically excluded any individual with an administrative function 
because the emphasis was on those who initiate consultancy and assess the 
results of such engagements.  The following job roles were obtained from the 
Human Resources Department of the company studied.  No executive below the 
Grade 6 level was interviewed.   
 
Grade 6 Leadership of a significant functional or operational area with 
some medium-term strategic input, including policy-making 
responsibility.  Involves extensive liaison both internally and 
externally.  Or a high-level technical expert. 
 
Grade 7 Strategic leadership role with breadth of involvement throughout 
own function and other parts of the business.  Responsibility for 
policy-making, vision and direction. 
 
Grade 8 No description available. 
 
The insights obtained from these individuals are rarely available because of the 
access difficulties discussed below. 
 
(iv) Limitations to Research 
 
(a) Access 
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Gaining access to such senior executives would normally be extremely difficult.  
This is due to several factors.  Firstly, they are very busy people with packed 
schedules.  For example, one executive at CEO level, had made a note to his 
secretary saying: ‘I will see her – God knows when and where!’  Secondly, the 
subject itself could be seen as sensitive and certainly some of the projects 
concerned were sensitive.  There would be a natural reluctance to discuss these 
with an outsider.  Thirdly, executives would perceive little benefit to taking part 
in such research.  There would also have been the problem of knowing exactly 
who to approach within the company.  It would not have been obvious to an 
outsider which executives were purchasers of consultancy services and, 
therefore, suitable sources of information. 
 
However, the position of the researcher as an employee of the company was 
extremely important.  Any researcher who was external to the company would 
have faced significant challenges to gaining access to senior executives.  
However, the researcher had the advantage of a written introduction from one of 
their peers, the researcher’s director, who requested their co-operation.  In 
addition, there is a less definable ‘political correctness’ factor that may have 
influenced them.  The company has carried out a number of Employee Surveys 
over the last five years and is conscious of the need to create and maintain a 
positive culture.  An employee wishing to conduct doctoral-level research into a 
job-related subject would be seen as someone who should be supported. 
 
However, even with these advantages, there was still one executive that the 
researcher was unable to access and who failed to respond to repeated requests 
for an interview.  This emphasises the fact that access had to be negotiated 
individually with each executive.  An introduction from a director was very 
useful but did not constitute an instruction to see the researcher, it was only a 
request. 
 
For those executives that did agree to be interviewed, the time that the researcher 
had with them was generally limited to thirty and forty minute slots.  There were 
exceptions where an individual clearly had an interest in the research and was 
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prepared to give more time.  For example, one executive talked for an hour and a 
half.  However, for the majority of interviews the researcher had to ensure that 
she got sufficient information within short time slots. 
 
(b) Personal Preconceptions 
 
As a Purchasing professional, the researcher is focussed on cost control and 
regarded with horror the size of the company’s spend on consultancy services.  
She also received anecdotal evidence from around the business about 
consultancy engagements that appeared to fall into the category of consultants 
‘borrowing your watch to tell you the time and then charging you for it’.  She 
heard, more than once, colleagues relating how they had spoken to consultants 
and then found their ideas and, in one instance, their exact words, regurgitated in 
consultancy reports.   
 
So, naturally, the research was approached with some preconceived notions 
about value and consultancy.  It is hoped that being aware of this preconception 
made a significant contribution towards combating its effects.  It is nevertheless 
something that should be declared at the outset. 
 
(c) Sensitivity Attaching to Consultancy Use 
 
Largely as a result of the negativity with which consultancy is sometimes 
viewed, there is the likelihood that, in some cases, the researcher was told what 
executives believed they should be doing rather than what they actually do.  The 
sensitivities around executives talking frankly about their use of consultancy, are 
seen as threefold: 
 
Firstly, there is a common belief that consultants cultivate strong relationships 
with their clients.  Indeed, lavish hospitality is often assumed.  No executive will 
want to create an impression that he or she is ‘in the pocket’ of a consultant and 
that, as the result of such an inappropriate relationship, cannot objectively place 
business. 
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Secondly, use of consultants could create a perception of dependency that could 
be seen as a weakness. 
 
Thirdly, use of consultancy could also be perceived as an admission of failure.  If 
consultants are being used, questions are frequently asked about how executives 
justify their positions.  There is a sense that consultants are doing executives’ 
jobs for them and therefore the company is paying twice.  This view was 
certainly expressed to the researcher by colleagues. 
 
Executives may have been aware of these perceptions and, in an effort to present 
themselves in the best possible light, edited their comments accordingly. 
 
(d) The Researcher’s Position in the Hierarchy 
 
The position of the researcher in the company is lower than the executives that 
were being interviewed.  This subordinate position had two effects on the 
interviews.  Firstly, the researcher was inevitably cautious in her questioning and 
would have preferred to be more direct.  This would certainly have made better 
use of the limited time available but these executives could have been offended 
by the questions.  Indeed, when interviewing a very senior person, the question 
was asked: ‘How does the relationship work at your level?’ to which the 
executive replied sharply, ‘What do you mean?’  Believing that he was offended 
about this delicate point, the researcher quickly explained that she was interested 
in whether there was regular contact and who instigated this.  He then relaxed 
and answered, but it was taken as a lesson in the need for careful phrasing of 
questions. 
 
Secondly it was difficult to steer executives back on course if they started going 
off at a tangent because of a sense of deference and, again, not wanting to cause 
offence.  After answering a couple of initial questions, one senior executive 
announced, ‘Right, I am going to give the talk’ and off he went.  For the next ten 
minutes or so, he gave a defence of the use of consultancy.  The researcher 
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believes that this was largely as a result of questions he had personally received 
at the ‘road-shows’ he had been giving at company locations around the country.  
Fortunately, there was interesting information within this and he was very 
thorough in his responses to the remaining questions.  However, given his 
position and the psychological effect on the researcher of the surroundings (a 
large and imposing office in the centre of London), she was reluctant to interrupt. 
 
The opposite problem was encountered in another interview.  The executive 
concerned was very reticent and generally gave simple ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘it depends’ 
as answers.  It was difficult to get him to expand on these answers and this was 
the shortest interview (barely 25 minutes).  In addition, the executive took a long 
phone call in the middle of the interview and appeared distracted, waving to 
people through his glass-fronted office.  The researcher would have liked to 
comment on this behaviour and re-establish the purpose of the interview, but 
again, was reluctant to do so. 
 
(e) The Researcher’s Inexperience 
 
Interviewing executives in the circumstances outlined in the sections above (that 
is, a sensitive subject, limited time and a subordinate position) was a difficult 
exercise.  It was, however, also the first time that the interviewer had ever done 
any interviewing of this kind.  Whilst her confidence increased as the interviews 
progressed, it is possible that a more experienced interviewer would have 
extracted more information. 
 
 137 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
RESEARCH DATA – INTERVIEWS 
 
Introduction 
 
This is a single company case study and, with one exception, the executives were 
all, at the time of the interview, employed by the same organisation.  They 
therefore represent a spectrum across a single organisation in the services sector. 
 
The following data is taken from twenty seven interviews that lasted 
approximately forty minutes each, giving a total of eighteen hours contact time 
with senior executives.  This may appear short relative to other qualitative 
studies but is, in reality, a significant achievement given the demands on 
executive time.  It also reflects how intensively the research was focussed on 
management consultancy, that intensity of focus being a pre-requisite to gaining 
access.   
 
This level of executive cooperation was made possible by having the status of an 
internal member of staff.  The unstructured two to three hour interview by 
outsiders that is typical of qualitative research would not have been possible in 
this context.  Firstly, that amount of time would not have been made available to 
any researcher and secondly, there would have been wariness about sharing such 
sensitive detail with outsiders.  Indeed the candid nature of some of the 
interviews was astounding and this is attributed to the high degree of comfort 
that executives felt with the researcher’s internal status. 
 
The interviews were recorded and transcribed by a professional typist.  Each 
transcript was then manually examined for detail and themes recorded and 
referenced on cards without the use of specialist software.  The eleven themes 
listed below were therefore identified by the researcher acting alone and imposed 
upon the text provided by the executives.  There were very good reasons for such 
an approach.  The issues are sensitive and pejorative and the interview and 
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analysis process is designed to expose them.  This point is discussed below in 
more detail.   
 
The use of management consultants is sensitive and, at times, controversial.  
Although in some instances its use appears logical and rational, at other times it 
can appear illogical and irrational because the motivation for using these services 
is subjective and unique to individual executives.  It could, for example, make an 
executive appear vulnerable or even weak.  This subjective motivation is 
therefore extremely sensitive and, as a consequence, there is a natural reluctance 
to reveal it directly.  No executive, for example, would admit to feeling 
vulnerable in such stark terms.  Given this reticence, themes on subjective value 
constructs are initially derived from what was said in response to indirect 
questions or asides, or observations about other executives.  Once apparent, some 
themes were directly addressed but most were derived from commentary in other 
contexts. 
 
In addition, there are differences in the way topics are described by executives 
and the way that they are set out in the literature.  Executives, for example, do 
not describe risk mitigation in precisely those terms.  They do, however, talk 
about the reasons they are wary of approaches from unknown consultants and 
why they feel secure with consultants they have known and worked with before.  
The term ‘risk mitigation’ is therefore imposed on this data even though 
executives have not described it as such. 
 
The data gathered from the interviews was analysed and then organised into the 
following themes. 
 
1  Skills, Knowledge and Experience 
2  Skills Transfer 
3  Human Resource Management 
4  Speed of Execution 
5  Co-Production of Value 
6  Approaches to IT and Strategy Consultancy 
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7  Technical Quality and Functional Quality 
8  Personal Relationships 
9  External Status 
10 View of Employees 
11 Environmental Pressures 
 
Biographical Detail 
 
The following table sets out some brief biographical details of the executives 
who participated in the interviews.  A fuller description of the grades is given in 
Chapter Seven but, for the purposes of this section, it is sufficient to note that 
grade 8 is senior to grade 6. 
 
1 The only executive external to the subject company.  She is 
Managing Director within a global investment bank in the City, 
has a finance background and is a Chartered Accountant.   
2 A grade 6 director, his background is accountancy and finance.  
He has previously worked as a consultant in the one of the ‘big 
four’ firms.  He now has procurement responsibility and has 
been with the company about 18 months. 
3 A grade 6 director in the internal communications department.  
She has an MBA and extensive marketing experience.  She has 
been with the company about 10 years and has risen rapidly 
through the ranks.  Because of the nature of her role, she has 
frequent contact with the CEO of her particular business unit. 
4 Shortly to retire, she is a grade 7 director who has been working 
on projects for a while.  She has been with the company for 
about thirty years and has worked her way up from a clerk in 
one of the branches.  Her expertise is technical, but in recent 
years she has been involved in general management at a high 
level.  She has frequent contact with senior management. 
5 Also shortly to retire, he is a grade 8 director who previously 
headed the Human Resources function.  In recent months, 
however, he has taken on a broader portfolio of responsibility.  
For example, he recently managed an expense reduction project 
using external consultants.  He has also worked extensively 
with the large consultancy firms on transformation and re-
structuring projects. 
6 She is a grade 6 internal communications director (the 
equivalent of interview 3 in a different business unit).  She is 
relatively new to the company. 
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7 A grade 8 director who joined the company about 2 years 
previously. 
8 A grade 6 IT director, he now has responsibility for telephony.   
9 A grade 6 director with a project-based commercial role.  
Twelve months ago he was closely involved with a major re-
organisation project, working with the CEO and one of the ‘big 
four’ firms.  He was previously a management consultant with 
one of the ‘big four’.  His office is on the executive floor and he 
has regular contact with the top management.  He has been with 
the company about three years. 
10 A grade 7 director with responsibility for various major cost-
reduction programmes initiated by the executive board.  He has 
been with the company for about fifteen years.  He has 
experience of working with both the ‘big four’ and the major 
strategy firms. 
11 A grade 8 audit director with global responsibility.  He has 
worked within the group for at least ten years and has 
experience of working with a broad range of consultants.   
12 A grade 6 Claims director.  At the time of the interview he was 
managing a major systems development using one of the ‘big 
four’ consultancy firms. 
13 A grade 7 director in HR with an MBA.  He has been with the 
company about three years. 
14 A grade 6 director in HR.  
15 A grade 6 director within the Executive Office.  She used to be 
a consultant herself and has been with the company about three 
years. 
16 A grade 6 Operations Director.  He has had responsibility for a 
high profile, very important outsourcing project for which he 
used consultants from one of the ‘big four’ firms.   
17 A grade 7 director with Compliance responsibility.  He has 
been with the company about sixteen years. 
18 A grade 7 director with responsibility for telephony. 
19 A grade 6 director within the telephony area.  Reports into 
interview 18 director. 
20 A grade 6 who works alongside interview 9.  They also have 
very similar backgrounds.  He, too, previously worked as a 
consultant and has not been with the company more than five 
years.  Works closely with the executive team. 
21 Chief Operating Officer.  He has been with the company about 
eighteen years and has risen through the ranks.  At one time he 
was a HR director but has also had responsibility for Client 
Services. 
22 Managing Director.  Has also been with the company about 
eighteen years and likewise risen through the ranks. 
23 CEO of one of the business units.  He has been in post about a 
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year.  Has been with the company about five years. 
24 A grade 6 who was recommended by interview 22 as being 
someone who could contribute to the research.  He has worked 
for most of his career as a consultant.  Relatively new to the 
company. 
25 Main Board Director.  Very close to the CEO for the UK.  A 
lawyer by profession, he has been with the company for nearly 
twenty years. 
25 CEO of one of the business units.  He is new to the company. 
27 Commercial Director.  He has a MBA and was recommended 
by his CEO (interview 26) as someone who would be useful to 
the research.  He is new to the company and has a banking 
background. 
 
 
1  Skills, Knowledge and Experience 
 
Executives consistently stressed that one of the primary reasons for using 
consultants was the ability to gain access to skills, knowledge and experience 
that was not available internally within the organisation.  The importance of 
individuals and their abilities was also consistently stressed so it was felt to be 
extremely important to meet the individual consultants who would actually be 
doing the work.  Only one executive added the caveat that the size of the project 
would have a bearing on whether he did this. 
 
Access to specialist skills was described as a business requirement and actuarial 
services, organisational psychology, and insight into niche markets were used as 
examples.  Executives stressed that it was not desirable to have all the skills 
required in-house because this resource would be under-utilised. 
 
‘…it’s recognised ….we can’t possess all the skills sets in IT.  We 
wouldn’t want to have all the skills sets.  Your super expert on 
telecomms to India, we only need for five days a year..’ (Interview 2) 
 
‘It is appropriate to use consultants when you need access to skills sets 
that you would not embed in your organisation because they wouldn’t 
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have a long-term role in your structure….you don’t want to be building 
a workforce that by it’s nature becomes redundant within your 
organisation.’ (Interview 22) 
 
A large part of the value that comes from using consultants derives from the 
experience they gain during projects with other clients.  This allows them to 
deliver speedier and more efficient solutions by avoiding the pitfalls previously 
encountered.  One executive described how a particular consultant’s experience 
bought value to his project. 
 
‘She was able to draw on some of the relevant experience she’s had in 
different organisations around the world.  She had recently been setting 
up a call centre in Germany.  It was a foreign country, it was setting up 
a call centre from scratch… so she had relevant experience, again, to 
draw on.  You don’t get that necessarily within a company, don’t get 
that variety of experience.’ (Interview 16) 
 
There was, however, an assumption that clients would be benefiting from 
consultant’s experience after they had actually carried out a reasonable number 
of similar implementations.  Value would not be obtained unless this was the 
case.  One executive had a salutary tale. 
 
‘They (consultants) were using us to learn the system that they were 
then going to implement…I suddenly thought “Blimey”, my assumption 
that here would be some genuinely new, lots of stuff that we didn’t 
know, was blown away by the fact that here was a bunch of guys who 
were literally learning the system, almost a chapter ahead in the manual, 
and then flogging it back to the company’ (Interview 11) 
 
Regulatory work, common to all companies within the same sector, is another 
example of the benefits of experience in terms of the speed with which 
companies are able to respond to change. 
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‘They are always doing (regulatory work) with our major competitors.  
We know we are behind the pace and by involving them, because 
they’ve seen and done it a number of times already, they can probably 
accelerate our activity because hopefully they can help us avoid some of 
the delays and errors that other people have made’. (Interview 17) 
 
This executive pointed out that using internal resource will not produce the same 
amount of value because consultants bring a unique type of exposure to the 
industry.  Experience also enables clients to discover what is happening in the 
market and what their competitors are doing. 
 
‘They will have worked with all of our competitors (and) they’ll have a 
view on where we are in the market.  They’ll know whether we’re at the 
top or at the bottom…and that’s valuable’ (Interview 13) 
 
As well as specific experience, executives valued the established methodologies 
that consultants bring: 
 
‘She came in and she was able to immediately influence and shape what 
was being done, how it was being done and who was doing what.  She 
had a tool set on which she could draw, whether it be formats for doing 
certain things, so she was really able to access the (consultancy) 
knowledge base and come up with formats for relevant RFP 
documents…..’ (Interview 16) 
 
‘What he (consultant) always brings is a great process that allows us to 
get from A to B as quickly as possible.  It’s obviously tried and tested.  I 
mean, typically, the big consultancies bring strong methodology with 
them.’ (Interview 20) 
 
One executive was keen to stress the importance that she attached to the 
discipline around process that consultants bring. 
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‘I think what they are good at is structure and quite often organisations 
like ours….aren’t particularly good at structure.  They’re much more 
“I’ve got to get this done….really really quickly”, and you forget 
process and structure around what we’re doing…’ (Interview 1) 
 
In addition to process and methodology, executives valued the intellectual 
capability of consultants to the extent that such capability was credited with a 
unique and crucial contribution to organisational success. 
 
‘The sheer calibre of some of the people being deployed, was very very 
high indeed.  On a level where even a big business like (this company) 
were at most going to have one of those sorts of people, and maybe not 
even one.  The fact that (consultancy) in that case, were able to deploy 
five or six people of immense talent, drawn from literally around the 
world, and deploy them on your problems for, in that case, over a year 
on and off, may make the difference that you simply couldn’t have 
generated’. (Interview 11) 
 
Other executives made references to consultants being ‘bright’ and ‘highly 
intelligent’ (Interview 18) which gave them very sharp analytical skills.   
 
‘(consultants have) the ability to take a complex problem and to break it 
down into the most important constituent parts very quickly.’ (Interview 
18) 
 
‘..where I think (consultants) have their greatest strength, is they are 
able, and are very good at, taking a strategy you build yourself and 
standing back and distilling it, looking at it through multiple lenses, 
pulling it back into a more focussed approach, so that you are therefore 
better able to implement and showing you where the bottlenecks are.’ 
(Interview 22) 
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These skills give consultants valuable problem-solving ability.  Also, the 
creativity of consultants had, on occasion, generated innovation that could yield 
very significant benefit. 
 
‘…what was it we were expecting from them?….For them to be able to 
look at our business, to spot the issues and to come up with good ideas 
for how to take it forward.  And when I say good ideas, (this is) 
breakthrough thinking.’ (Interview 20) 
 
Another executive remarked: 
 
‘..often you’re bringing people in because they’re smarter than we are, 
and certainly smarter than I was…’ (Interview 4) 
 
Executives, therefore, attach value to the skills, experience and intellectual 
capability that they can access through using consultancy firms.  Executives did 
not believe that these skills were available in-house. 
 
2  Skills Transfer 
 
Skills transfer played a pivotal role in securing value from consultancy.  It not 
only to enabled staff development, but also ensured that dependency on external 
third parties was avoided. 
 
‘..it’s very important.  There’s no point having consultants in to do work 
with you if they walk away with all the knowledge they’ve gained.  
Because if you need to go through the same process again, all you’re 
going to have to do is get the same crowd in.’ (Interview 8) 
 
One executive described how inadequate skills transfer had resulted in a 
problematic situation that illustrated this point. 
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‘…we failed to go and grab the necessary skills from the consultant as 
part of the exchange process…and, as such, we haven’t been able to run 
the thing adequately.’ (Interview 11) 
 
The need to avoid dependency on consultants by facilitating skills transfer was 
stressed by all, but this was not without difficulty because the right calibre of 
employee must be chosen. 
 
‘…part of the value you get should be learning.  You can only learn if 
you put people on with them (consultants) who can absorb that learning.  
Otherwise you won’t…’ (Interview 4) 
 
Where this was possible, however, it worked well.  One executive described how 
one of his members of staff had benefited from working with consultants. 
 
‘He was a wet-behind-the-ears first level project manager.  He came on 
leaps and bounds working with (consultant), to the extent that I‘ve just 
promoted him.  The way he thinks, the depth with which he thinks 
things through, the quality of the material he produces..’ (Interview 16) 
 
The experience of working with external consultants was considered especially 
valuable in a company with a low turnover rate. 
 
‘..new methodologies, new ways of working…just the experience of 
seeing how life in other businesses actually gets transacted, and that can 
give you different insights into maybe how we do things here.  There 
are some people who are able to do that, but others….think that’s it, that 
must be how it is elsewhere, when in fact, it isn’t, so it can lead to an 
insular view’. (Interview 19) 
 
There was also awareness among executives that not all skills would be valuable 
to the company.  One executive pointed out that, although electricity was 
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important to the company, he would not want his own power supply engineer 
(Interview 18).   
 
In summary, skills transfer was considered very valuable to obtain the best value 
from the consultancy services in the first instance, avoiding dependency and 
providing a way of developing employees and providing them with fresh views, 
new methodologies and skills. 
 
3  Human Resource Management 
 
Consultants can also be used as a flexible way of managing variable resource 
requirements.  This could, executives believed, be achieved in one of two ways. 
Firstly they could be used to fill in for headcount that had not yet been recruited.  
Secondly they could be used to cope with fluctuations in demand for such staff. 
 
The first use was generally acknowledged to be ineffective in the long-term.  One 
executive described it as ‘lazy’, another commented: 
 
‘…actually more latterly, it’s probably…using consultants in the wrong 
way, almost using consultants to gap fill staff vacancies.  You know, 
you’re short of resource, you’ve got to get something done fast…’ 
(Interview 3) 
 
However, the second use was seen as legitimate.  One executive illustrated this 
with an example: 
 
‘…there was a strategy in that particular area to slim down the internal 
staff, and bring in skills sets from outside in order to match business 
volume, so…we can actually downsize ourselves relatively easily 
without taking on the overhead internally.’ (Interview 2) 
 
Using resource in this way was also seen as a way of mitigating risk.  One 
executive pointed out that recruiting carries a high degree of risk. 
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‘..the risks of recruiting someone, you know, interview and selection 
processes, no matter how much each party might try and tell you are 
effective, they are risky undertakings.’ (Interview 18) 
 
However, once consultants are engaged, clients have much greater flexibility to 
change consultancy staff without having taken any of these risks. 
 
‘..we could have an agency or consultancy we’re happy with, but we’ll 
actually ask for the account managers to be changed because one of 
them may not be delivering’ (Interview 3) 
 
‘The other benefit to us is that if we don’t like any of them we can get 
rid….certainly on the projects I’ve worked on, it’s very easy to pull one 
off and say “This guy’s not the right calibre, we want to get somebody 
else in”.  So that gives you a flexibility of skill that you don’t have 
internally’. (Interview 12) 
 
One executive had mentioned ‘getting the job done’ so this was followed this up 
with a question about using consultants as resource.  He replied: 
 
‘..that can be….very valuable where resources are tight in the 
organisation and you just don’t have people waiting for a job.  So you 
can have people clued up very quickly…’ (Interview 25) 
 
Therefore the ability to have skilled resource available at short notice to either 
fill specialist requirements or to work on short-term projects was valuable to this 
executive.  Other executives described the same situation. 
 
‘….you borrow some resources for a while to help you achieve your 
objectives.’ (Interview 26) 
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‘The organisation is resourced to a particular level and often the skills 
we have got in the business do the day-to-day running but when it 
becomes unknown, unforeseen, uncertain,………you know, you need to 
get them (consultants).’ (Interview 27) 
 
Use of consultancy therefore appears to allow executives to have access to 
sufficient skilled resource without having to incur either fixed cost or the risk 
involved in permanent recruitment. 
 
4  Speed of Execution  
 
However, even where capability was available in-house, sometimes executives 
valued the speed with which utilisation of consultant knowledge could complete 
a task.  One executive illustrated this using the example of a requirement for a 
software package.  They could, he said, set aside two or three weeks to research 
the market and evaluate packages but in reality they probably could not spare the 
time. 
 
‘If we can go to one of the major consultancies that we have some faith 
in, and have them say, “For your size of business there are really three 
products you ought to consider”.  Yes, that’s clearly very helpful in 
itself.’ (Interview 11) 
 
The saving in time when using consultants was also highlighted by other 
executives. 
 
‘…speed of execution…one of the chief problems most corporates have 
now is change management and executing things…but it’s also the 
speed of delivery…’ (Interview 2) 
 
According to the executives interviewed, this could be due to two things.  Firstly, 
it could be due to developed methodologies that accelerate delivery.  Secondly, it 
could be due to the willingness and ability of consultancy firms to work whatever 
 150 
hours are required to complete the project within agreed timescales.  One 
executive gave an example of how consultants will ‘drive relentlessly’ by talking 
about a ‘really bright’ manager he had reporting to him and who was working 
with the consultants he had engaged. 
 
‘…she (the manager) was saying “well, I worked until midnight last 
night and I’m sorry I didn’t get this done” and he (the consultant) just 
said “well, why didn’t you work all night?  You know you’ve just lost 
us a day off our project, now bugger off and don’t waste my time 
again”.  You know, to (this manager) no one else would have dared do 
it.  ’ (Interview 21) 
 
In this instance, it appears that consultants were able to treat an employee 
differently and make greater demands on her time than her own line 
management.  This was valuable to the executive concerned because it increased 
pressure to meet deadlines. 
 
This executive also believed that consultants can act as a catalyst for change and 
there appeared to be two reasons behind this. 
 
Firstly, executives were more willing to provide sufficient resources to 
consultants than they were to employees. 
 
‘….if you’re spending…three to four thousand quid a day on a partner 
and they say “we need some resources to do this” you tend to give them 
to those people…you automatically…will be pushed to the front of the 
queue if you’ve got a big exercise with consultants….’  (Interview 21) 
 
Secondly, the position of consultants as temporary members of the workforce 
allows them to behave in a way that would not be conventionally acceptable. 
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‘…they’re ruthless so-and-so’s really…and I’ve witnessed this, they 
don’t have to work with the people on a long-term basis…it’s less 
important for them to establish relationships.’ (Interview 21) 
 
Politically, this could be an important source of value for executives if they need 
to expedite an important project.  Another executive commented: 
 
‘You often get pace and resolution.’  (Interview 26) 
 
Consultants therefore provide impetus to projects that would not otherwise be 
available. 
 
5  Co-Production of Value 
 
Executives were clear that their own role in the process was to be pro-active 
managers who were responsible for co-producing value.  This had a number of 
facets. 
 
To begin with, a ‘textbook’ procurement process was outlined by several 
executives. 
 
‘…we generally set up a terms of reference to try and understand and 
define the scope of what they’re doing.  We will then go into a pricing 
discussion….and then we’ll tie down a contract with them…’ 
(Interview 12) 
 
‘..when I’ve done it properly, I’ve gone in to pitch with all agreed up 
front criteria we’ll select against….we’ve scored independently, talked 
about the scores, and come up with overall scores for each…’  
(Interview 3) 
 
Objective setting, however, was considered particularly important and in 
response to more general questions about the reasons they engaged consultants 
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and selection processes, executives stressed the need to be clear about the 
objectives of each consultancy engagement. 
 
‘…for people who hire consultants, they should be really clear about 
what they want the consultant to do before they go out and do the 
hiring.’ (Interview 1) 
 
It was clear from the responses that delivery against objectives is vital to 
achieving value from consultancy use.  One executive was asked the following 
question: ‘When you come to actually assess the value, that value is assessed 
against, basically, getting what you have asked for?’  He replied: 
 
‘Yes.  That could be financial, it could be advice, it depends what 
you’re employing them for in the first place’. (Interview 7) 
 
However, although the importance of clear objectives was consistently 
acknowledged some were concerned about how well this was being executed in 
practice.  One executive observed: 
 
‘To my mind, in the past…..we haven’t been very clear about our 
deliverables, so the big consultancies have said, “well, we’ve delivered 
what we’ve said we’d do in the one page letter of A4”, but they were 
pretty kind of bland statements, so they could never be held 
accountable.’ (Interview 2) 
 
‘I’ve seen much more of, “We don’t really know what the solution is, in 
terms of the broad strategy and the broad direction of the business, so 
against that background can you offer us some detailed solutions to a 
problem we haven’t really analysed yet.’ (Interview 11) 
 
‘I’d be very interested if you could show me many consultant 
assignments where…(this company)…has presented a Terms of 
Reference.  I’d probably count those on one hand.’  (Interview 16) 
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Another executive described how they had a set of Best Practice Guidelines – 
‘classic textbook stuff’ – but did not really adhere to them.  She went on to say: 
 
‘All too often we have called people in really before we’re ready, 
anywhere near being ready, which means that the consultants get to 
drive where the objectives go….’  (Interview 15) 
 
Executives consistently agreed that setting objectives was extremely important 
but an interesting diversity of views emerged on the best way to arrive at a clear 
set of objectives.  Some executives insisted that objectives were set and 
controlled by them, the client, while others had a more relaxed approach.  The 
latter group viewed objective setting as a joint process between themselves and 
the consultants.  One executive described his experience as follows: 
 
‘Does anyone ever write a terms of reference is a big question mark, 
because it’s around, “we’re thinking of doing something in this area, 
can you give us something to think about…”  Very rarely does it get 
written down, quantified, qualified………And the consultant will 
actually come back to you with the timetable….so you actually hand 
over the project to the consultant at the outset’. (Interview 5) 
 
This appeared to be an extreme example and even this individual appeared 
uncomfortable with such a lack of control as he later commented: 
 
‘If they can cut through things that will take you ages to sort out, then 
use them again, but don’t hand the project to the consultant because 
what you’ll have is a consultant who knows everything about your 
project, your company, he’ll come along and run it….’ (Interview 5) 
 
Others described a joint objective-setting process that was controlled by them, 
the client, rather than an abdication in favour of the consultant: 
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‘I’d much rather work together as part of the process to put proper 
upfront work into planning the outcome and objectives, as part of the 
planned first phase…’ (Interview 9) 
 
Other executives also favoured a joint approach to objective setting because of 
the additional value that input from consultants could provide. 
 
‘Ones I’ve been involved in have been joint processes, and there’s no 
doubt at all, they are able to tease things out of you.  They are good at 
doing it because they’re used to doing it.’. (Interview 16) 
 
‘People do not form and shape objectives clearly, and in fact I think one 
of the things that tends to happen is people sense….that there’s a 
problem…and they’ll call in consultants to actually try and help them 
shape an objective…and that’s where you can add a lot of value because 
they actually help you define the problem in your own mind.’ 
(Interview 21) 
 
It was stressed, however, that it should be a joint, not a one-way, process because 
of the danger of losing control. 
 
‘One of the reasons you’re going for that specialised knowledge is that 
they can challenge you to think wider, differently.  The danger is that 
they take it where they want to go, their agenda.  So you have to have 
some idea of what you want to do, which is why I say it’s a joint not a 
one-way street.’ (Interview 16) 
 
This kind of value erosion was a common concern and many executives were 
disparaging about joint objective setting. 
 
‘..the people who do that wander all over the place and they go on a 
merry journey with the consultants hand-in-hand….nine times out of ten 
you have to have a clear idea of what you’re going to get out of this 
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because if you don’t you’ll be all over the place...I’ve made the mistake 
of engaging people and having a vague-ish idea of where I want to get 
to and hoping that these people can help me.  It doesn’t work that way.’ 
(Interview 25) 
 
Executives were specifically asked about managing consultants, and responses to 
other questions provided a wider picture.  The role of the client in producing 
value appeared to be broadly threefold: 
 
• Defining objectives, or working with the consultant to define objectives; 
• Ensuring that individuals from the consultancy are suitable for the 
engagement; 
• Managing the project to ensure delivery of objectives to required 
timescales, and budget in some cases. 
 
As one executive observed: 
 
‘Most of the times when things have gone wrong, it’s because I haven’t 
managed it properly…it’s back to being clear up front what is actually 
wanted.  If that changes, making that clear, and participating in 
reviews.’ (Interview 3) 
 
‘It’s critical that you manage the consultants in a way that ensures that 
they’re focussed on delivering what you want them to’ (Interview 8) 
 
There was a strong sense of caveat emptor attaching to consultancy use and a 
widespread belief that consultants have as an objective the maximisation of 
business opportunities within client organisations. 
 
‘I think where the danger comes is where the consultant tries to put the 
objective in the mind of the client…and you suddenly find that the 
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consultant is trying to find more and more things that they can help you 
with….’ (Interview 22) 
 
‘..they have been particularly good at exploiting the classic consultant 
model, which is, “I’m in there, I can see ways of promoting my cause.”’ 
(Interview 15) 
 
The search for more business is, executives believed, a priority for consultants to 
the extent that it can adversely impact the quality of the service: 
 
‘For many consultancies, their first job is to find out what the preferred 
answer is for the people that are paying the bills and can engage them in 
future consultancy.’  (Interview 18) 
 
Another executive described the way that consultant engagements grow if not 
managed properly. 
 
‘”Scope creep” is the technical term for it.  It’s prevalent and it is 
probably the primary factor in erosion of perceived value’. (Interview 
24) 
 
So, consultants needed to be well managed not only to ensure that they delivered 
set objectives, but also did not unduly expand the engagement and so increase 
cost and reduce value. 
 
6  Approaches to IT and Strategy Consultancy 
 
During the first ten interviews, one executive was asked specifically whether he 
thought there was a difference between the way that IT consultants and strategy 
consultants were engaged.  His answers indicated that this may, indeed, be the 
case. 
 
Firstly the requirements for IT were more clearly defined: 
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‘…I think the requirements are better understood up front with IT than 
they are with others because it would be about particular technical 
skills, or particular types of IT deployment skills’. (Interview 9) 
 
This in turn impacted the process which could then be more structured and the 
service treated more as a commodity. 
 
‘For IT….we were looking to engage someone to help us with delivery 
of technology infrastructure…..and there we went through quite an 
organised process…of getting down to a shortlist of evaluation 
questions, wading through evaluation questions and then going through 
a beauty parade and scoring process, and then selecting a partner.’ 
(Interview 9) 
 
This can be contrasted with the same executive describing how they selected a 
consultancy firm for some strategy work: 
 
‘…we were talking to a lot of the major consultancies at the time, about 
life and the universe and how they might help us.  And there it was 
(consultancy) were the people who talked in a language that we were 
talking….they understood what we wanted to achieve, they knew what 
target operating was, what it meant, and they could understand and 
suggest ways of going forward, and going about it.  And others just 
didn't have that thing.’ (Interview 9) 
 
The process was clearly less structured and selection based on ‘talking the same 
language’ rather than the ‘organised process’ in the IT example. 
 
Executives acknowledged that there was a difference in the way both types of 
consultancy were procured but this was related back to the reason for engaging 
them in the first instance.  So, for one executive it was the difference between 
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consultancy for knowledge and consultancy for resource, while for another it was 
about strategy and implementation.   
 
One executive (Interview 20) gave a particularly comprehensive classification as 
follows. 
 
‘Stratospheric’ strategy consultancy.  ‘I’m looking for real expertise to come in 
and real insights to the market place…For them to give us insights into what 
other people were doing.  For them to be able to look at our business, to spot the 
issues and to come up with good ideas for how you take it forward.  And when I 
say good ideas, these are breakthrough thinking…..’ 
 
High Level Strategy.  ‘The second category is where you’re trying to translate 
high level strategy into effectively a change programme for the 
business……that’s about process, that’s about methodology, that’s about being 
very canny in terms of how you engage with an executive team and with senior 
management and bring them along……In (this) middle category you have to be 
good at relationship building.’ 
 
Tactical (typically an IT implementation)  ‘You’re looking at track record, you’re 
looking at organisations that again have very good process, very good 
methodology….you’re very very focussed on the outcomes they’re going to 
deliver…you’re much more careful about time boxing and actually 
understanding what the project’s about, how much it’s going to cost and 
managing the cost of delivery.’ 
 
This classification demonstrates the difference between procuring IT consultancy 
and procuring strategy consultancy.  However, this is not because it is IT 
consultancy per se, but because it has particular features and can be classified as 
tactical implementation consultancy. 
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In other interviews, however, strategy procurement had distinct characteristics.  
One executive described the procurement of strategy consultancy in the 
following way. 
 
‘It tends to be very secret, it tends to be at a very high level….so its 
going to be more gentleman’s agreement-like.  And almost, from what 
I’ve seen, if you need to ask the price, you can’t afford it.  There’s 
almost a face-saving element to it which is, “I want you to come in and 
do this, so we’ll talk about the money later Bob.”’ (Interview 15) 
 
The relationship is one-to-one and the executives involved are reluctant to 
directly address cost.  This was also confirmed in other interviews. 
 
‘..in terms of price negotiation I have somebody who’s specifically set 
up to do that and he can be the bad guy….I’m always going to be the 
smiling face to the consultant.’ (Interview 23) 
 
‘..he (CEO) would not negotiate money, he would ask me to do it.  If 
someone was overspending on expenses, he wouldn’t tell them, he 
would ask me to do that.  I mean he wouldn’t take any of these up front, 
rather dirty things to do, and people will go round the back door to 
him…And he’d say “did she really say that?” (Interview 4) 
 
The same was true of commercial terms. 
 
‘There is no other area where I could……go to a supplier and say 
“you’ve got the work…..send us your standard contract, we’ll sign it”.  
It’s done on a very personal basis….’  (Interview 18) 
 
This is explored in more depth in the section below on Personal Relationships. 
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In summary, executives agreed that there were differences in the way that IT and 
strategy consultancy are procured.  For IT consultancy, it was much easier to 
define the objectives and there was less sensitivity about discussing cost. 
 
7  Technical Quality and Functional Quality 
 
When addressing the difference between functional quality and technical quality, 
descriptions were given to ensure consistency.  Functional quality was described 
as account management, relationship management and all the ‘soft’ things that 
help deliver the product.  Technical quality was described as technical 
knowledge, quality of advice, quality of the end report. 
 
No executive believed that the distinction between technical and functional 
quality was valid.  In all these cases, the service was described as ‘seamless’ or 
‘overlapping circles’ and that functional quality was just as important to delivery 
of a satisfactory result.   
 
Those elements described as ‘functional’ were seen as key to delivering the 
service so it was not possible to separate them out.  One executive observed, 
 
‘I’ve always seen it as more, as seamless…..In most cases you’re 
choosing them because you know they’ve got the skills…..they’ve got 
the technical knowledge…(but)…they’ve got to be able to sell it to you.  
A consultant who comes to a meeting and is unable to sell a solution, it 
doesn’t matter how good the technical skills are..’  (Interview 5) 
 
To get value from consultancy services, therefore, clients require far more than 
just the technical skills alone: communication skills are vital.   
 
Another executive described how projects fail if consultants do not engage with 
key stakeholders within the business.  As well as the ability to communicate and 
‘sell’ ideas, skills described as ‘functional’ were required to be able to gather 
information and understand the problem. 
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‘To actually produce that report that comes up with the 
recommendations….I think it’s very difficult to achieve unless, as the 
consultant, you’ve had the account management that says, we 
understand this client, we understand the issues here…even down to 
how they want the thing presented in a way that will help them 
understand it in the most effective way.’ (Interview 6) 
 
In describing the skills required to deliver quality service, executives presented a 
picture of a requirement for an active engagement by consultants with their 
clients that went beyond the usual doctor-patient metaphor.  The ‘patient’ is not 
passive and does not automatically accept recommendations: they have to be 
‘sold’ and the client ‘influenced’.  Additionally, in order to collect the 
information, the consultant has to use highly effective inter-personal skills. 
 
Executives therefore struggled to apply the functional and technical quality 
distinction to consultancy.   
 
8  Personal Relationships 
 
The interviews addressed the way that relationships between individual 
consultants and executives not only develop but then affect the way that 
consultancy services are procured.  When asked about the relationship aspect, the 
responses of some executives indicated that it was extremely important. 
 
‘it (the relationship) counts for an awful lot, it’s core to the consultancy 
getting the work, and certainly, that comfort factor is very important to 
all the executives, because they probably share more internal thoughts 
with the consultants….they use them as a basis for sounding off 
decisions that they’re going to take…’ (Interview 2) 
 
‘..the relationship is the life blood for the consultant and the 
consultancy.’  (Interview 24) 
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Specific reference was made during the interviews to the strength of relationships 
at a very senior level and the effect that this could have on selection.  One 
executive referred to this as ‘the CEO effect’ (Interview 3)  
 
Another executive described how the need to have a relationship is driven by the 
inability to judge quality of services in advance and also by the fact that it would 
be inappropriate to take references from competitors.  So, having experience of a 
firm gives a degree of comfort: 
 
‘..why would you use Accenture as opposed to KPMG, or Price 
Waterhouse, or Towers-Perrin?  It will often be around, “what have we 
done with you before..?”’ (Interview 5)  
 
‘(Senior executive) has a close relationship with (consultancy).  She’s 
worked with them before, she knows they can deliver.  If she’s got a 
really important, difficult piece of work, why would she not go to 
them?’ (Interview 15) 
 
Other executives also recognised the dependency on individuals to ensure quality 
of service and one stressed the need to understand the people who were available 
in the market. 
 
‘…it’s only as good as the people, and often you don’t know how good 
the people are going to be, and therefore your issue is about getting to 
know, being networked into the market, understanding who’s there, but 
it’s very difficult to stay current because these guys and gals, they move 
around so much..’  (Interview 27) 
 
In addition to providing reassurance about quality of service, building a 
relationship allowed a degree of trust to develop which was considered important 
given the sensitive nature of information being exchanged.  It allows clients to 
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feel safe in giving information but also has the advantage of putting them in a 
position to receive market intelligence that would not otherwise be available. 
 
The use of consultants as a member of an executive’s network was frequently 
mentioned as a way of acquiring market information. 
 
‘A good member of your network, a really good member because 
they’re so heavily networked themselves.’  (Interview 21) 
 
‘You can pick up bits of information from them about what’s going on 
in the market, who’s doing what.  You get snippets of who they’ve been 
working with recently and stuff like that.’  (Interview 16) 
 
‘You do find out something about what’s going on in other companies.  
They won’t tell you who it is…but they’ll tell you there’s somebody 
else who’s doing something in the same area.’  (Interview 5) 
 
In circumstances where the executive may feel vulnerable, trust in a relationship 
is extremely important. 
 
‘..(the CEO) had a good working relationship with (this consultant) who 
knew and understood our business.  And this was at a time of course 
when (the CEO) didn’t, remember he’d just come from (another market 
sector), so he needed more hand-holding than normal.  Therefore he 
probably needed to trust even more than usual the person concerned.’  
(Interview 4) 
 
‘..particularly with the Board, it’s people they know, which is a bit more 
than trust.  So (former CEO) for example was extremely close to some 
of the people in (consultancy).  So, yes, he trusted them, but there was 
actually more than that.  He really felt that if he needed someone, they 
would be there.’ (Interview 15) 
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Another executive described a situation where trust had been lost and she felt 
that she would never be able to work comfortably with that particular firm again 
(Interview 4). 
 
Because they are between individuals, the strength of personal relationships 
between executives and consultants can survive a change of organisation. 
 
‘…there are pet consultants who come with senior people from previous 
places’ (Interview 3) 
 
‘I can think of at least three or four cases where people have moved on 
to new companies and that relationship’s been taken with them….’ 
(Interview 20) 
 
‘This particular partner had worked with one of our directors before.  So 
there was a track record there..’  (Interview 15) 
 
‘..you might ask, “why on earth did they choose that one?”  And the 
answer very often is in long-established networks of previous contacts, 
of previous work done with them in previous guises.’  (Interview 26) 
 
An executive who had worked for several years with a major global consultancy 
observed that individuals were specifically recruited by consultancy firms 
because of their relationships. 
 
‘..you do buy in partners because they are pals with, they play golf with 
the CEO at Unilever….you buy them for that reason..’ (Interview 24) 
 
One executive described how the existence of relationships had lead to different 
parts of the organisation adopting different solutions to the same problem when 
this was detrimental to the organisation as a whole. 
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‘Really there probably should have been only one answer to this, and it 
wouldn’t have mattered which of the consultancies you used as long as 
you used the same one.  Why did we use two different ones?  Because, 
in effect, two different people had relationships.’  (Interview 5) 
 
The success of these relationships depends to large degree on the ‘chemistry’ 
between the individuals concerned.  Where this ‘chemistry’ works there is 
potential to develop very strong relationships that will last over time. 
 
‘The selection had an awful lot to do….with who the CEO and the 
MD…knew and were comfortable with personally..’  (Interview 4) 
 
‘There’s some guys who’ll come in and do a decent job for you and 
you’d never talk to them like that.  There are other guys where you form 
a relationship…it doesn’t happen a lot of the time because the 
chemistry’s not there.  Once the chemistry is there, it’s very powerful’.  
(Interview 21) 
 
‘Finding the right partner that you can trust and work with is clearly 
vital….and it’s fascinating to watch some of the engagements with 
(consultants) where you’ve got the top executive…..and a number of 
partners come through and then suddenly they latch onto one because 
they feel they can work with them and….that starts to build very long 
relationships…and consultancies get a great foothold into an 
organisation.’  (Interview 20) 
 
Other executives described a more ad hoc approach to relationship-building but 
one that nevertheless clearly showed an established relationship with a specific 
individual. 
 
‘This morning I’ve just had an hour’s catch-up with (consultant) from 
(firm) who’s their senior man for us and I’m meeting him on a quarterly 
basis just for general catching up…..they will bring in experts from 
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various countries but my relationship would still tend to be with (him)..’  
(Interview 25) 
 
An executive who had said he believed the relationship to be critical, also 
described it in terms of friendship, saying: 
 
‘I regard him (the consultant) as much as a friend as I do a professional 
colleague and it’s worked extremely well.’ (Interview 13) 
 
Within this particular working relationship, the executive and the consultant had 
developed a great deal of trust that enabled them to have a very honest exchange 
of views.  As an individual, the executive felt that the consultant had ‘humility’ 
and this made working together towards a solution not only possible but also 
very productive.   
 
This executive also felt that he benefited from the honesty with which this 
particular consultant approached the engagement.  He described a relationship 
where the consultant uses objectivity to give the client an honest appraisal, 
whether it makes him popular with the client or not.  As he pointed out, this can 
be a difficult thing for a consultant to achieve. 
 
‘It’s a trade-off between giving your client a hard time versus giving 
them something that they want, which means you get repeat business.  
It’s a difficult dynamic’. (Interview 13) 
 
Other executives also highlighted the importance of having a working 
relationship that is open enough to enable the consultant to give honest, and 
therefore valuable, advice.   
 
‘We actually got on well together.  We are of a similar age and we had 
an agreement up front that we would speak frankly to each other.’ 
(Interview 17) 
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The relationship enabled the executive to be confident that feedback was honest 
and not given in order to secure more business.  The wariness with which 
executives viewed pitches for more business was apparent from many interviews.  
A good relationship allows this concern to be minimised: 
 
‘It’s the ability to talk to somebody, and to be able to have a fairly 
honest, open conversation with them, and not all the time having to 
absolutely be on your guard, because there’s a kind of chink that they’re 
looking for, that typically is a sales opportunity.’ (Interview 19) 
 
Significantly, the relationship quality provided value in terms of a more 
productive interaction.  At a very senior level, relationships appear to be one-to-
one relationships with consultants who have ‘credibility’ in the eyes of their 
clients.  Executives at this level find them useful informal contacts who they can 
talk to as an equal about issues important to them. 
 
‘..because at my kind of level you don’t do business generally with 
consultancy firms.  Actually what you do is business with a partner 
because there’s…one person in there that you think, you know, 
understands your business or is convincing in what he does.  
Now…might not be anything in it for him, but you talk about some stuff 
with him.  So, at the very top level in terms of strategic, that individual, 
that credibility there, somebody who knows your business or you are 
convinced can help you, is very important.’  (Interview 21) 
 
A trusted consultant also appears to be able to give feedback that it would not be 
possible for an employee to give.  The same executive recalled a discussion over 
dinner with consultants and his CEO. 
 
‘(The consultants) were going through our top team and saying “have 
they got the will and have they got the skill?”  And that was interesting 
for (CEO) …because these guys knew of the business and they could do 
a rough benchmark of our executive team’. (Interview 21) 
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Very few people within the organisation would be able to provide such candid 
views to such a senior executive.  Receiving negative feedback can also create 
difficulty but is necessary.  The executive stressed that this does not happen with 
all consultants, just those with whom a good relationship existed.   
 
‘…you might ask the question, can you hit it off with somebody who is 
holding that mirror up, who is saying how really you’re not doing your 
job?  Well, you can.  You can because…you need all the help you can 
get’.  (Interview 21) 
 
Not all executives agreed with the value of creating a relationship with selected 
consultants.  One described a very ad hoc approach to maintaining relationships, 
and added: 
 
‘…I think actually it could be a nuisance if consultants are trying to stay 
in touch too much’  (Interview 22) 
 
Another executive commented: 
 
‘I have contacts with most of the consultancy firms, and we meet and 
we share market information and ideas, but we’re never giving each 
other 100% because you don’t give away…and in all of my meetings if 
it reduces to seeing only one individual of value that relationship will 
end pretty quickly.’ (Interview 23) 
 
Notwithstanding some dissenting voices, most senior executives interviewed 
appeared to have, or know of, one-to-one relationships with the relevant opposite 
numbers in the consultancy firms and to find these valuable.  The credibility of 
these individual consultants was very important, however, and in some cases, the 
relationship was more important than the firm. 
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What also became apparent was that these relationships had, in some cases, a 
psychological support function.  One executive involved at a senior level in 
developing strategy, commented: 
 
‘..we’re asking for someone to be on the bridge with us, as a coach, 
partner, mentor..’ (Interview 9) 
 
and later, 
 
‘The individual is actually quite important in terms of their credibility 
and their ability to work at that level…Get some real help on the bridge, 
help at the top level…The gap is people who can just be wise monkeys 
on the shoulders saying, “What about this? Shouldn’t you be thinking 
about gearing up for this? What are you going to do if that goes 
wrong?”’ (Interview 9) 
 
Questions that sought to uncover the psychological stresses of being isolated in a 
senior position and needing an equal in whom to confide, provoked interesting 
responses.   
 
‘What I’ve found probably is the further up I have gone in the 
organisation the more isolated I’ve become.  And the more isolated I’ve 
become has meant that I‘m more likely to need A N Other, somebody I 
can actually bounce ideas off and, I guess, share thinking with….if I 
think about the CEO it must be very lonely, right at the top as the CEO 
because who do you actually confide in? (Interview 13) 
 
Another observed: 
 
‘I think the person who’s leading a big change programme …is actually 
quite lonely.  A lonely and quite scary existence.  If I was in that 
position, I would want someone who’s sitting on my shoulder, who’s 
done it before, and is quietly whispering in my ear to say “that’s the 
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direction you need to be going” or “watch out over there”…it would be 
the first thing I’d have in place.’ (Interview 20) 
 
In cases involving extreme pressure, the support of an external ‘equal’ is 
therefore often sought. 
 
‘A good consultancy…..is a bit like the pilot bringing the ship into port.  
They are totally trusted by the Chief Exec., seen as a sort of comparable 
expert to the captain of the ship….it builds huge trust for the future as 
well.’ (Interview 11) 
 
Working together with a consultant during difficult and stressful situations can 
have the effect of strengthening existing relationships. 
 
‘If a top executive in an organisation has had a consultant working 
alongside them and they’ve succeeded and delivered, they’ve gone 
through the pain, they’ve lived through it together, that’s quite a bond 
that develops very strong business relationships and consultancies feed 
off those’. (Interview 20) 
 
There was also the sensitive area of giving ‘coaching’ to executives.  This is 
value in the sense that consultants are supplementing the executive role itself and 
acting as ‘helpers’ and mentors.   
 
‘They may even stray into providing leadership in certain parts but often 
I put that word “leadership” and bracket it and put “coaching”…actually 
in looking at strategic problems or fundamental business issues that 
there is some coaching in how to solve the problem.’  (Interview 26) 
 
‘There are consultants who do a great job of embedding themselves in 
organisations.  Generally that’s when they’ve become a coach…A 
coach is somebody that plays an important role in the business.  So a lot 
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of times when the consultant relationship compacts, collapses into an 
individual because he’s become a coach.’  (Interview 23) 
 
‘..they become so familiar with our business and our people, they 
become a cross between management coaches or executive coaches and 
business advisers’.  (Interview 21) 
 
Another executive gave an example of the context in which this kind of 
relationship could develop. 
 
‘I think the feeling that he (former CEO) wasn’t up to it, needed 
someone to help….it was a clear recognition, “I don’t have the skills to 
do this, you do, together we complement each other…’  (Interview 15) 
 
Executives may not have all the necessary skills and experience on the day of 
their appointment so need support from a trusted source. 
 
‘A lot of people come up through an operational route and they just do 
not have the skills or experience to deliver major change and to realise 
the benefits.  So, I think, you have to have the people who are 
experienced to be able to do that, on the bridge.’  (Interview 20) 
 
The strength of these relationships will clearly influence selection in those 
instances where there is a selection process. 
 
‘Quite often people will know who they want…and then they’re just 
using the scoring system to justify a decision they’re going to make 
anyway….I’ve never seen a process that was completely objective.’ 
(Interview 9) 
 
‘If you actually asked probably twenty people around this organisation, 
at senior levels, who would they use for a specific piece of work, you’d 
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probably get five different answers.  It depends on who they’ve worked 
with, who they know, who they like.’ (Interview 5) 
 
There were also examples of relationships at a senior level in the organisation 
influencing the use of consultants within the organisation and circumventing any 
structured selection process. 
 
‘….others (consultancy firms) are gifted to us.  (Firm) very recently 
engaged with us on a strategic review that was gifted to us by (CEO).  
So you kind of say, “Thank you for your gift, yes we’d love them to do 
a strategic review and work with us”’. (Interview 9) 
 
In other cases the executive may simply go to the consultant he knows and feels 
comfortable with. 
 
‘The danger is if something comes up and time is short, I’ll pick the 
phone up to an individual I know…..a lot of it comes back to the 
empathy they managed to create up front.’  (Interview 11) 
 
Personal relationships, therefore, have a pivotal role in the way that management 
consultancy services are procured because of the need for trust in sharing ideas 
and information, and also in trusting that the quality of the services would be 
good. 
 
9  External Status 
 
The external status of consultants has several effects: perceived credibility, the 
ability to give feedback to senior executives and the management of internal 
politics.  The brand of a consultancy was also an important factor. 
 
Brand was seen as important for different reasons, such as a signal of trust or an 
indication of the quality of resource. 
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‘…I’d have to say it does have an impact, without a doubt because good 
brands give a stamp of trust….that they’ve got a credibility that they’ve 
delivered over many years to many people.  ’ (Interview 3) 
 
‘(Consultant) brand name would carry more weight than an individual 
consultant no matter how skilled that person would be..’  (Interview 25) 
 
‘…if you say, “and Fred says this” people say “who’s Fred?”  Whereas 
if you say Ernst and Young say it or McKinseys say it, then it carries 
brand strength.’ (Interview 26) 
 
In a changing environment, there was a belief by some executives that the 
consultancy firm should, and did, hire good people, train them and provide some 
kind of quality assurance around their personnel.  Whilst some expressed doubt 
about this, for others the consistency of high quality people was a good reason to 
be using consultancy firms.  Talking about a particular firm, one executive 
commented: 
 
‘..I think it’s the certainty of people…they’re not called androids for 
nothing…I know from working with them that you get consistency.’ 
(Interview 9) 
 
Brand was consciously used by executives to validate decisions and 
recommendations both internally to staff and to more senior executives.   
 
‘Brand has a significant benefit.  It might sound crazy, but there are 
times when you could do the work in-house ….If the outcome of the 
work you’re wishing to do, if you like, is a message that the 
organisation as a whole might not wish to receive…so when you talk 
about brand, if you’re talking to KPMG, PWC-type response then it, by 
definition being the organisation that it is, the message that you’re 
conveying is treated with far more trust.’ (Interview 8) 
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The interviews also demonstrated that executives use consultancy as a means of 
adding credibility to their own recommendations so that they can be taken 
forward.   
 
‘…we’ll get someone else to do it because it’s the only way we’ll get 
credence for what we’re doing…..”Well, I’ve been saying that for six 
months, but bring in (consultancy firm) and they say it, and everyone 
pays attention.”’ (Interview 15) 
 
The suggestion that value accrued to executives through the validation of their 
recommendations by consultants was explored in greater depth.  All executives 
who were asked the question confirmed that consultants were indeed used for 
this purpose, even when they believed that internal resource would suffice.   
 
‘..we do tend to go to consultants too easily, without tapping into the 
expertise within the organisation…and one of the reasons you do that is 
confidence/security.  I’ve no doubt at all we could have done lots of 
what we’ve done (on this project) tapping into existing resource.  But 
there’s a confidence factor in making that sort of leap of faith that, yes, 
these people would be able to dig around, find this out, shape that..’ 
(Interview 16) 
 
One senior executive described how a consultant’s recommendation gave him the 
reassurance to press ahead with a particular course of action. 
 
‘...the business has a certain amount of faith in their own capabilities, 
but it only goes so far…my background as an accountant wasn’t (in this 
area), so I think for me it did give an immense amount of extra weight 
to the proposal, to be able to say, “And it has been reviewed by 
the…expert.”’ (Interview 11) 
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There is an assumed objectivity behind the brand of consultancy firms and 
executives prefer to deliver unpopular decisions with verification by a strong 
external third party.   
 
‘Often, I’ve seen cases where we’ve had the experience in terms of 
doing something but, it’s the objective seal of approval or just the name, 
the brand that made the difference.  Yes, absolutely.  And often, on 
cost-cutting when it’s not rocket science.’ (Interview 25) 
 
Junior executives believed that senior executives had far more confidence in a 
recommendation if it was endorsed by a consultant.  That such an endorsement 
added ‘credibility’ to a proposal, that it would not otherwise have had, was a 
constant theme.  One executive described how he used consultants for this 
purpose. 
 
‘I’m smiling because it’s absolutely the case.  They won’t take it from 
me but they’ll take it from (consultant)…..You do, and with the Chief 
Execs, you do use consultants outright….to get execs to hear a different 
voice saying it, rather than it being mine.  Because when I go into the 
room, people already have preconceptions about me and my values, and 
what I’m trying to do.  And sometimes it’s good to say, “This is not 
(me) this is people from the industry saying, this is what your 
competitors are doing”.’ (Interview 17) 
 
Another executive who was close to a senior executive team observed: 
 
‘Why isn’t it that companies have been able to build their own internal 
consultancies and be successful?  They haven’t.  People do turn to 
external advice and seek external support.  And I think a lot of it 
happens to be a sense that I’ve tested this with someone outside and this 
is what they’re saying and it has validated what I was thinking and I’m 
more willing to go ahead with it.  Which is bizarre but it does happen.’ 
(Interview 20) 
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This individual also described how consultants behave differently to employees 
in a boardroom environment. 
 
‘…some issues have been discussed but we’ve never really nailed 
things….another item has come in where consultants are involved and 
the issues will come out and the consultant will not let it go until we 
resolve things.  Because…he clearly feels he’s in a much stronger 
position to challenge the Executive Team and get to a point where we’re 
actually breaking through issues and actually coming out with answers 
and moving forward.’ (Interview 20) 
 
Part of the reason for the different behaviours may be the need for ‘self-
preservation’ felt by employees and highlighted by the same executive: 
 
‘(a consultant can) just ask the naïve questions and get away with it.  So 
if he’s trying to get to the bottom of something, he doesn’t have to 
worry about how those questions are going to come across….they’re 
going to be able to walk away…(whereas)…myself dealing with those 
guys, I’ve got to live with how I deal with them.’ (Interview 20) 
 
Other executives concurred with this view. 
 
‘…(consultants) sit above internal politics.  They can ask the question 
that nobody else wants to ask, because you can’t ask it, and they can do 
that with impunity.’  (Interview 15) 
 
Consultants had elevated levels of credibility and this was brought out in stark 
terms by one executive in particular. 
 
‘…the big criticism of consultants…is, they’ll borrow your watch and 
then tell you the time.  And, to an extent it’s true because they replay 
your own ideas back to you, but guess what, you listen to 
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them….because they somehow seem more credible than you…these 
guys know what they’re talking about….simply by being outsiders they 
actually add this kudos, this credibility to something…and it’s “life ain’t 
fair” but this is what happens’.  (Interview 21) 
 
‘You don’t trust your own people really…consultants have more 
credibility than your own people generally speaking because it’s their 
business to be on top of latest developments, to be aware of what’s 
going on in the market.  They clearly will know what your competitors 
are doing.’  (Interview 21) 
 
In one case, the executive was almost in awe of the consultant. 
 
‘Do I really know what the consultant is doing? Do I really have the 
temerity to challenge what the consultant is doing?  Particularly if the 
consultant is big, respected and quite clever.’  (Interview 5) 
 
Consultants could use these elevated levels of credibility to influence senior 
executives in a way that employees could not.  Junior executives were aware of 
this and manipulated consultants to help them achieve their objectives.  One 
executive described how he had once got the wrong consultant working for him. 
 
‘…what we wanted was someone who could engage and influence at 
executive level, and help us to engage the executive on the piece of 
work….(we needed) much stronger influencing skills, much more 
credibility at a senior level….someone who could really deliver a big 
chunk of change if that’s what you wanted.’ (Interview 9) 
 
The issue of trust was raised by others more explicitly: 
 
‘I’m pretty sure we’ll believe something when a consultant tells us and 
we pay for it, and we don’t believe it from our own people.  We will 
recruit from outside to do jobs we’ve got people perfectly capable of 
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doing on the inside.  But we don’t.  Because we can see their warts, we 
don’t appoint them.  We go and look outside and you don’t see any 
warts, not to begin with anyway….’ (Interview 4) 
 
There also seemed to be a fear of losing ground against competitors.  Consultants 
provide a degree of comfort on this point because they work for a variety of 
clients in the same industry.  Executives therefore assume that consultants have 
better knowledge of what their competitors are doing because of their external 
status and direct exposure to the market.   
 
‘At the end of the day you’ve got a better diagnosis of the issues, 
because you’re actually importing in experience which is not 
organisation-bound.  It’s market-bound by definition of where people 
operate.  (Interview 26) 
 
In addition, there appeared to be a lack of confidence, or at least a need for 
comfort, where there are greater risks. 
 
‘What we’re doing is very important to our future commercially.  So the 
question naturally arises for everyone to ask “how do we know that it’s 
really been done well?” Or, “did the local management have a 
particularly powerful paradigm of its view of the future that it’s 
followed very well?” but actually there was another model…that could 
usefully have been taken into account.  And typically I think your 
consultancy firm are quite useful in validating the policy and 
sufficiency of what’s been done’. (Interview 26) 
 
This need for a second view was identified by other executives who spoke of it in 
terms of ‘confidence’ and ‘reassurance’.  
 
‘There’s an issue of corporate confidence.  Corporate confidence in very 
big organisations seems to be enhanced by external consultants.’ 
(Interview 12) 
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‘I can see that the use of consultants just creates more confidence at 
executive level, that we’re getting a better answer.’ (Interview 20) 
 
‘You never believe your own people, so prophet in his own country 
stuff…but if someone else comes in and they’re a partner…and 
suddenly it must be true because they know more.  It’s really a self-
confidence point from an organisation.’ (Interview 15) 
 
‘I need somebody else to either say to me, “that’s just how other people 
are seeing it as well” or “Actually you’ve missed something here.”  So, 
reassurance for me.’ (Interview 17) 
 
Pressure to ensure that the organisation has made the right decisions and is 
managing its operation efficiently is intensified by increasing regulation.  This 
increased pressure exacerbates the feeling that a second view is required. 
 
‘..as governance changes its shape…independent corroboration of 
everything that a management team says is regarded as helpful…’ 
(Interview 26) 
 
Indeed, the external view that consultants provide can often enable a different 
perspective to be taken. 
 
‘..by tapping into the right type of consultant you are certainly opened 
up to a wealth of experience and expertise and insights.  And that is 
invaluable in some of the things we’ve been dealing with in (this) 
business…’ (Interview 20) 
 
Several executives thought that, in a company with a low turnover of staff, they 
needed these fresh views and different experience. 
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‘I think if you’d recently recruited some senior managers into the 
organisation, you wouldn’t use a consultant…If you’ve got an 
organisation that’s been fairly static for many years…the desire to bring 
in people would be greater, because the answer is always going to be a 
slight variation on a theme if you’re using your own people.’ (Interview 
8) 
 
The tendency to insularity and the dangers that this presents in terms of 
stagnation were also expressed by other executives. 
 
‘…you’ve got a very insular company here, with the senior people 
having been in the same function for fourteen plus years.  It’s nice to 
show them that it doesn’t have to be done by the same people in the 
same place….’ (Interview 9) 
 
One executive, however, was cynical about this view. 
 
‘..even if it’s not true, companies will feel that they don’t have that 
breath of fresh air unless they bring consultants in.’  (Interview 15) 
 
Executives also believed that the external nature of consultants allowed them to 
be extremely forthright in the way that they engaged with their clients.  
Employees, however, have to manage within a hierarchical structure and are 
therefore forced to be more guarded in their responses.  One executive described 
a consultant who became very familiar with the business and the people.  He 
recalled a conversation that a particular consultant had with the CEO over a 
dinner at which he was present.  
 
‘…(the consultant was) talking about our business and weaker areas of 
our business and challenging you know, “what are you demanding of 
this part of the business?”  You know, “have you cornered this guy 
yet?” And sometimes they hold that mirror up, that no one else can….  
(Interview 21) 
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‘…it’s not like me saying to (CEO), you know, “what are you doing 
about this?”…Now, I have a pretty good relationship with him and I do 
challenge him on stuff, but there are some things and some relationships 
where you can’t do that, and that’s where a consultant can be very very 
valuable.’ (Interview 21) 
 
Consultants can challenge the hierarchy in a way that employees cannot.  This 
was also true in the relationships between executives and consultants.  
Executives consistently said that a good, value-adding consultant would be 
honest and forthright in the way that they expressed their views.   
 
‘…a consultant that’s prepared to come in and “hold the mirror up” and 
get you to recognise those issues.  That’s valuable, that objectivity 
coming up when you least expect it.  And not having the history, the 
baggage, of being part of that organisation.’ (Interview 6) 
 
One executive was very clear that part of what he regarded as ‘good’ consultancy 
was ruthless honesty even if this meant losing business. 
 
‘..you can have them (objectives) tested and it may well be that they 
make you think again.  “Well, hang on a second maybe this isn’t, these 
aren’t the right objectives to have” or maybe “I don’t need this project”.  
And certainly I’ve had experience with some consultants who’ve really 
helped clarify that thinking, rather than blandly going off, and that’s the 
problem.’ (Interview 25) 
 
Executives also used consultancy for the purposes of managing internal politics.   
 
‘A key role to me as the client is to help me negotiate the politics.  I 
mean a good consultant will very quickly weigh up the people he’s 
dealing with, understand the baggage they’re carrying and will adapt his 
style accordingly’ (Interview 20) 
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‘..there have been cases where only by getting it outside have we faced 
the issues and brought them to bear.’ (Interview 11) 
 
The ability to manage internal politics was consistently seen as crucial to 
success. 
 
‘..there are some parts of (this company)…where a non-political person 
just wouldn’t make anything happen…’  (Interview 15) 
 
The ability of a consultant to break any political impasse and influence the senior 
executives concerned was seen as a vitally important skill.  One executive 
described how a consultant had spent time with him trying to understand the 
personalities that he would have to manage. 
 
‘..one by one round that Executive table, let me just understand those 
people, understand what makes them tick.  And he uses that information 
in terms of how he deals with them.’ (Interview 20) 
 
Other examples were given of how executives used consultants for the sole 
purpose of resolving political conflict. 
 
‘I sat in one meeting with (consultancy) where before we’d even 
engaged them, we knew what the right answer was.  However, getting 
the various sides to buy into it was beyond our internal capabilities, way 
beyond.  And I went into one meeting where two internal people, 
opposite ends of the table, literally on their feet banging the table and 
swearing at each other at the earliest meeting.  And yet by the end of the 
engagement (consultancy) had got them both willingly to sign up to a 
proposal that they wouldn’t normally have accepted…we weren’t 
engaging them in terms of technical skills…we were actually engaging 
their brokering services.’ (Interview 18) 
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Consultants are therefore able to use their external status to produce results that 
are considered beyond the capabilities of employees. 
 
A senior executive who referred to this process as ‘facilitation’ confirmed the 
point. 
 
The other thing that you’re often getting is facilitation, because 
organisations often in order to make some complex decisions need an 
awful lot of facilitation.’  (Interview 26) 
 
In summary, the fact that consultants are external to the organisation had 
extremely important benefits for executives.  In particular they were used to 
validate decisions, give reassurance and manage internal politics. 
 
10 View of Employees 
 
Executives had a positive image of consultants, albeit with important caveats.  
Employees, however, were generally viewed less favourably in terms of both 
their abilities and their objectivity. 
 
One executive was explicit about what he saw as the possible drawbacks of using 
employees who have become entrenched in an organisation. 
 
‘..if you spend too long in an organisation, often your job has become 
dependent on pleasing your boss, saying the right things, often obeying 
a hierarchy…I’m not saying it permeates everywhere but it’s certainly a 
reality that if you don’t move around a lot you end up on a corporate 
wheel and you see avoidance, disengagement, failure to confront, easy 
lives, all sorts of various behaviours that don’t go with necessarily 
challenging yourself hard enough.’ (Interview 27) 
 
Employees were seen as having vested interests in the outcome of projects and so 
could not be truly objective.   
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‘….it gives weight to something to have it externally objectively 
validated by people….whose jobs and careers aren’t tied up with it..’ 
(Interview 9) 
 
‘..you cannot be a prophet in your own land….I guess we trust outsiders 
more than our own people.  Maybe because they don’t have a vested 
interest…I might be saying “this is going wrong and you shouldn’t be 
doing this here” because actually I don’t like that person.  You know, I 
want that job or whatever…..’ (Interview 4) 
 
‘…politically sometimes you need to (use consultants) because you’re 
perceived to be carrying your own message.’  (Interview 8) 
 
These perceptions could lead to negative attitudes towards employees. 
 
‘You don’t trust your own people really…..’  (Interview 21) 
 
There were also doubts about the abilities of employees to match the standards of 
consultants. 
 
‘They (employees) would have just sat there and reinforced their own 
prejudices again and again.’ (Interview 9) 
 
‘..even though we had a lot of people in the organisation skilled in 
project management, we didn’t have anyone who was quite good 
enough.’ (Interview 26) 
 
On skills transfer: ‘The opportunity’s there……the practical application 
of it is we often can’t find the calibre of bright staff to work alongside 
them (consultants) to learn the tools.’ (Interview 12) 
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These comments are particularly interesting when juxtaposed against the 
following comments about consultants. 
 
‘Using consultants can show what talent actually looks like, compared 
to what we might think talent looks like…..actually a bright young 
college graduate can pick up ninety percent of what that person does in 
a couple of weeks, and you thought that person was indispensable.’ 
(Interview 9) 
 
‘Their analytical skills are way in excess of what we would have 
internally.’ (Interview 12) 
 
One executive observed that perceptions could be manipulated by consultancy 
firms who have dedicated marketing departments. 
 
‘…we don’t do ourselves any real favours in the way that….we sing 
about some of the successes that we have.  And other companies, 
particularly external companies have whole departments that do just 
that.’ (Interview 19) 
 
Some executives defended the abilities of employees, saying that internal 
capability was often underestimated.  The ad hoc comments throughout the 
interviews however, show that a negative perception does indeed exist. 
 
11 Environmental Pressures 
 
It emerged from the interviews that executives felt under pressure from a variety 
of sources and these pressures often directly resulted in the use of consultancy.  
 
The pressure to achieve targets within a short space of time was a common 
factor. 
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‘…you’re short of resource, you’ve got to get something done fast, 
there’s usually pressure from someone else that wants something done 
fast, so it’s not totally within your control…’  (Interview 3) 
 
‘If you don’t have the time when you’re operating up here at strategic 
level to take a view of the world, decide on a strategy approach, yes you 
need help…’ (Interview 16) 
 
There was also power-based peer pressure. 
 
‘Even at a senior level, if your boss says this is a good idea, there’s 
bound to be some peer pressure..’  (Interview 3) 
 
In an increasingly competitive market, there was the additional pressure to 
innovate. 
 
‘…it’s the innovation, it’s the new thinking….you’re always pushing up 
for the next concept, the next approach, the next technique…’  
(Interview 6) 
 
‘…getting understanding of the key issues and coming up with relevant 
innovations or creativity.’ (Interview 14) 
 
In addition to increased competition and the need to innovate, the regulatory 
framework within which the organisation operated was changing, executives felt, 
on a scale that was unprecedented. 
 
‘We’re in the middle of the largest degree of regulatory change that 
there’s ever been in the industry…..We will say that the star exploded 
or something in the early years of the twenty first century and the 
degree of change actually re-shaped everything that was going 
on…..Every night I go home with a headache…because no-one knows 
how it’s going to map out.’ (Interview 26)  
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The cumulative effect of change on such a scale is a highly significant amount of 
uncertainty and risk for the executives who have to manage within such a 
context. 
 
‘What is it going to take to win in a regulatory environment that hasn’t 
yet happened, with capital requirements that haven’t yet been worked 
out, with product and customer offerings which we think are going to 
have to change radically?’ (Interview 26) 
 
Consequently executives feel the need for a second opinion on any significant 
course of action so that they have the best chance of taking the right decisions. 
 
‘I can’t afford for my view to be the only view, because I can’t afford 
for me to have got it wrong and then find out, three years later, we’re in 
the wrong place.’ (Interview 17) 
 
In general, the issues with which executives struggle have increased significantly 
in complexity making their roles more difficult. 
 
‘…if you think how businesses made decisions back in the 60’s, 70’s 
80’s and 90’s and look at the complexity of issues that you would 
actually see on a management’s agenda to deal with and the time to 
resolve them…Not only is the complexity gone up, the ability to see 
into dependencies and relationships between various forces or issues 
within a business is such that you’re doing an awful lot of mental 
agility….’  (Interview 27) 
 
The cumulative effect of the pressure from these sources can lead to feelings of 
loss of control.  Significantly, this can then have an effect on the way that 
executives engage consultants. 
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‘..there’s this “best practice” route that I logically and rationally know is 
the route, and then you get forced off that road, which is actually quite 
an uncomfortable feeling..’  (Interview 3) 
 
‘Quite often clients can engage consultants not really being clear about 
what it is that they do want.  They’ve got a problem, they want the 
problem solved.’ (Interview 13) 
 
In summary, executives feel under pressure from a number of environmental 
sources: increased complexity and competition; time pressure; regulatory 
changes; pressure to innovate; pressure from more senior colleagues.  This can 
lead to deviations from ‘proper’ process and a feeling of loss of control. 
 
Summary 
 
This chapter has presented the data from the Interviews.  The next chapter 
analyses it in detail. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
 
RESEARCH ANALYSIS – INTERVIEWS 
 
Introduction 
 
The value constructs that emerge from the interviews are a mixture of objective 
and subjective elements, both of which are used by executives as reference 
points.  The objective value constructs, however, are those most compatible with 
procurement methodologies.  These objective value constructs are briefly 
discussed initially before moving on to the subjective. 
 
A classification of consultancy services as Tactical, High-Level Strategy (HLS) 
and Top-Level Strategy (TLS) was shared by one of the interviewees (Interview 
20).  This is taken and related to both objective and subjective value constructs.  
This classification is important to the study and provides a basis for the variation 
in procurement methodologies applied to each category by executives. 
 
Executive perceptions of the nature of consultancy services are then explored and 
the interviews revealed great sensitivity regarding the nature of consultants.  
Executives guarded against perceived sales pitches and understood the mix of 
functional and technical skills involved in delivering consultancy.  The 
approaches that were adopted to mitigating the risks of management consultancy 
procurement, however, varied according to the level at which the services were 
being procured.  Executives relied on objective process and arms-length 
relationships to procure tactical consultancy, but relied on close established 
relationships and direct experience of individual consultants to procure both 
levels of strategy services.  Even where objective process was used, however, 
there was an indication that such processes may be manipulated to achieve the 
desired outcome. 
 
Executive views of consultants were juxtaposed with their view of employees.  
There were feelings of distrust towards employees because it was felt that they 
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have a vested interest in decisions or in changes in the status quo.  There were 
also concerns about the capabilities of employees and, together, this made use of 
internal resource unattractive.  Consultants, however, were imbued with 
objectivity and superior market knowledge and abilities. 
 
(i) Objective Value Constructs 
 
During interviews, executives expressed belief that management consultancy 
services have a number of benefits for the organisation.  Some of these benefits 
are objective in the sense that they are consistent with the value constructs 
underlying the procurement literature discussed in Chapter Four.  They are 
discussed briefly below before the more subjective value constructs are explored. 
 
Consultancy firms provide a pool of highly skilled resource that is not a fixed 
cost.  It is flexible and can be engaged quickly without the risks associated with 
the recruitment of permanent staff.  Team members can be changed at will and 
can then be dispensed with easily and at no cost.  This allows the organisation to 
react more quickly to changing demands in the most cost-effective way.  The use 
of consultancy firms therefore facilitates more efficient management of the 
organisation’s human resource requirements.  The interview data affirms the 
literature (Nippa and Petzold, 2002) which also refers to the use of consultants in 
this way. 
 
Individual consultants are important because they can provide skills, knowledge 
and experience that the company requires but does not have, or want, on a 
permanent basis.  This can mean several things.   
 
It means access to scarce intellectual capability and ‘talent’ that would not 
normally be available on a temporary basis.  This would most likely be utilised at 
a very high level within the organisation to provide both input to strategy and to 
provide ‘breakthrough thinking’.  In addition, the ability to access specialist 
skills, such as organisational psychology, for short periods depending on 
requirements was necessary and valuable.   
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It also means the experience of previous engagements that consultants personally 
bring to each assignment.  Executives believed that experience gathered 
externally equips consultants with the most up-to-date knowledge that is 
available in the market and this had two benefits.  Firstly, executives felt secure 
that they were not lagging behind their competitors.  Secondly, in 
implementation projects consultants were assumed to have done the same work 
before and this brought significant advantages.  Experience can help avoid 
known pitfalls and work can therefore be done more quickly and efficiently.  The 
experience that executives find valuable is present not only in the individual 
consultants, however, but also in the wider context of the firms themselves.  This 
point is discussed below in more detail. 
 
Consultancy firms provide access to established methodologies and this is a 
major objective value construct.  These methodologies comprise intellectual 
capital that consultancies develop over time and which enables them to quickly 
provide proposals and execute them in a structured manner.  As discussed in 
Chapter Two, consultancy firms are knowledge-intensive businesses and their 
‘product’ is their knowledge and intellectual capability.  Knowledge management 
is therefore of vital importance to their survival and ability to flourish.  
Intellectual property developed in one part of the globe, must be available to 
consultants in any part of the firm wherever they are based.  This provides clients 
with the ability to access an extremely large and varied pool of expertise. 
 
The interviews therefore provide a slightly different perspective on the provision 
of skills, knowledge and expertise than that presented in some of the literature 
discussed in Chapter Two.  The knowledge that consultants claim to possess has 
been the target of much critical examination.  So, the output of knowledge 
intensive firms, such as consultancies, has been described by some as 
‘ambiguous’ (Alvesson 1993); they are viewed by others as having to create the 
demand for their services (Bloomfield and Danieli 1995, Sturdy 1997, 
Bloomfield and Vurdubakis 2002, Kieser 2002); and most significantly as 
 192 
lacking the codified knowledge-base common in ‘classic’ professions (Clark 
1995, Gluckler and Armbruster 2003, Kam 2004).   
 
The data from the interviews, however, indicates that executives are not 
necessarily using consultants for codified knowledge in the same way that clients 
use lawyers or doctors.  They want to access the consultant’s previous experience 
of implementations, for example, or utilise their intellectual capability on solving 
the problems they have themselves identified.   
 
In other respects the interviews reinforce the literature.  Executives referred to a 
‘lack of corporate confidence’, the need for ‘reassurance’ and a ‘second opinion’ 
which has resonances in literature that stresses the vulnerability of managers 
(Gill and Whittle 1992, Sturdy 1997).  The interviews showed that executives felt 
the need to access the skills, knowledge and experience of consultants in certain 
situations.  These requirements were prompted, however, by environmental 
pressures and not by consultants themselves.  Such pressures are discussed later. 
 
A major benefit of the consultant’s skills and experience is that those skills can 
be transferred to employees.  If employees can learn from consultants, the 
company should not, executives believed, need to use consultants for that 
requirement again.  It therefore improves the quality of its employees and 
reduces dependence on third parties.  Knowledge transfer was discussed by Werr 
and Linnarsson (2002) and the interview data affirms the literature. 
 
In a company that does not have a high turnover of staff, executives also believed 
that consultancy use provides fresh perspectives.  This has been included here as 
an objective value construct but may be the result of executives seeking to justify 
the use of consultancy over internal resource.  This links with the discussion of 
executive views of employees that are discussed below. 
 
In summary, then, executives believe that the use of management consultancy 
provides a source of objective value constructs.  There is a reduction in risk when 
engaging resource because individuals can be changed at will if they appear to 
 193 
lack the necessary skills.  It also enables executives to maintain permanent 
resource, and the associated fixed costs, at optimum levels.  At the same time, the 
organisation is able to access the skills it requires to compete effectively in the 
market.  This is particularly valuable when such resource is scarce and would 
otherwise mean the organisation competing to recruit and retain such resource on 
a permanent basis. 
 
Access to consultancy skills can also produce indirect cost savings through 
innovation, efficiency and more cost-effective operations.  Consultants can 
transfer new skills and techniques to employees and provide them with exposure 
to fresh ideas that prevent the organisation becoming insular.  The resulting 
organisation can be more effective at competing in the market.   
 
On a fundamental level, the use of management consultancy by executives 
enabled the rapid completion of projects.  This was a way to manage time 
constraints without compromising attention to process and structure.  It was not 
only the additional resource that achieved this, but also the previous experience 
gained in similar projects as well as the use of established methodologies.  
Consultants also added impetus to projects in which they were involved.  This 
enables an organisation to respond quickly to change in the market and to 
implement innovative strategies promptly.  
 
Time constraints and the need to complete tasks rapidly are part of the 
environmental pressures identified during the interviews.  These findings affirm 
the literature (Gill and Whittle 1992, Sturdy 1997) and also add more detail.  The 
literature identified senior peer pressure, fear of competitors, pressure to be 
innovative and seen to be using new techniques, and seeking reassurance that 
other organisations have the same problems (‘normalising’ problems).  The 
interview data for this research affirmed these and, in addition, also showed that 
executives perceive their tasks to be far more complex than even ten years 
previously.  Rapid change and expanding regulation increases the number of 
factors to consider and the need to see the dependencies between them as part of 
the decision-making process.  The research also showed that the cumulative 
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effect of these pressures changes the process by which executives appoint 
consultants.  It can force them away from the ‘best practice’ route that they may 
prefer to follow toward a much narrower appointment process. 
 
These, then, were the objective value constructs that executives identified. They 
could be clearly linked to rational project objectives and are compatible with the 
procurement value constructs identified in Chapter Four.  They enable an 
organisation to reduce cost and risk and, as a result, to be more innovative and 
efficient.  These factors result in greater profitability and greater ability to 
compete successfully in the market and, crucially, they exist at an organisational 
level. 
 
(ii) Subjective Value Constructs 
 
The data from the interviews was explicit about the way that executives reference 
subjective value constructs when referring to consultancy services.  These are 
discussed in more detail below using the themes of personal relationships and 
externality. 
 
(a) Personal Relationships 
 
Executives maintained relationships with individual consultants on a one-to-one 
basis.  In some cases this was described in terms of friendship, in others a more 
ad hoc, but nevertheless regular, contact with the same individual was clearly 
evident.  The relationships that developed were with the executive’s opposite 
number in the consultancy firms and, crucially, were with the same person each 
time.  Executives spoke of regular ‘catch up’ sessions with a named individual.  
This person was described by one executive as ‘our man’ within that firm 
indicating the exclusive nature of the relationship.  Even though other consultants 
would be assigned to particular projects, this executive said his relationship 
would always be with this individual.  The informal and personal nature of such 
relationships also enabled executives to access information and advice on an ad 
hoc basis without incurring cost. 
 195 
 
These ‘catch-up’ sessions were a valuable opportunity for executives to hear a 
different view of the markets and pick up any ‘snippets’ of information that the 
consultants had acquired through working with a variety of organisations.  Some 
executives specifically referred to this network function for consultants, but it 
was also clear from references in other interviews to the value of ad hoc contact 
with them.  The value of being able to access information that was market-based, 
and from individuals who worked closely with competitors, was consistently 
cited as extremely valuable to executives.  This information may be on 
competitor activities within the market generally or their client’s own position 
within that market.  The closer the relationship, the more forthcoming executives 
felt that consultants would be with such information. 
 
Personal relationships were, however, based on executive perceptions of 
credibility.  Executives had to believe in the ability of these individuals before 
they were prepared to invest the time in developing a relationship.  Where they 
did exist, however, they had the potential to become extremely strong and long-
lived.  Several executives were able to cite examples of other executives moving 
to a different organisation and an existing relationship with a consultant moving 
with them.   
 
The importance of ‘personal chemistry’ is extremely important in this context.  
Both consultant and executive have a personal affinity that is strengthened, in 
some cases, by going through the trauma of difficult projects together.  The 
nature of this relationship at a senior level is an informal and personal one 
between two individuals rather than a relationship between two organisations 
who are merely represented by two individuals.  This is illustrated by the 
sensitivity around cost discussions.  Executives gave first-hand examples of 
either giving this job to someone else, so they could remain the ‘smiling face’ to 
the consultant (Interview 23), or of actually being given that job to do themselves 
(Interview 4).  The personal nature of the relationship makes discussing cost 
seem inappropriate and even awkward.  The same reluctance was also apparent 
over contract terms.  In addition, there is the possibility that a disagreement 
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would make the relationship less amenable and it is the very informality of it that 
gives the most value to executives.  Preserving the relationship is therefore seen 
as extremely important, even if it means excluding any kind of commercial 
discussion over cost and terms. 
 
Such close relationships facilitated development of trust between the executive 
and the consultant.  This was very important because it enabled executives to 
have confidence in the quality of the services that would be delivered.  Judging 
the quality of professional services in advance of delivery is one of the major 
risks involved in their procurement.  Executives were fully cognisant of this 
danger and used existing relationships to minimise the risk.  This was through 
both high-level relationships and also through personally keeping track of where 
individual consultants were working.   
 
Trust in a relationship also facilitated a candid exchange of views.  Honesty was 
extremely important to executives for two reasons.  Firstly it meant they could 
have faith in the integrity of the views being expressed.  There was always a 
concern that consultants viewed each meeting as a sales opportunity and 
therefore that all suggestions needed to be treated with caution.  Secondly it 
allowed executives to receive feedback and views that normally they would not 
get because of the constraints imposed by a hierarchical environment.  
Employees had concerns about ‘self preservation’ and the importance of 
maintaining good working relationships with senior executives.  This made them 
more guarded in their responses.  Executives, however, isolated at the top of the 
organisation, found such feedback valuable.  This is discussed in more detail 
below in the context of externality but is also a function of personal relationships. 
 
Linked to this was the powerful psychological role that management consultancy 
fulfils.  Executives are under a number of different but combined environmental 
pressures such as the need to innovate, increased competition and the increased 
complexity of their role.  In the face of these threats, one executive talked 
specifically about the role that consultants play in providing ‘help on the bridge’.  
The image he used of the bridge on a ship gave a sense of isolation and distance 
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from the rest of the company and suggested the need for reassurance.  Another 
executive thought that a senior management position could be ‘scary’ and 
another thought that as CEO, it must be ‘lonely’.  All these executives linked this 
observation with the need for someone to provide reassurance and be a ‘wise 
monkey’ who would advise, reassure and be alert on the executive’s behalf.  In 
this context, the development of strong relationships based on trust is very 
important. 
 
In the context of these feelings of vulnerability and the need for reassurance, the 
role of consultants as ‘coaches’ and ‘mentors’ is particularly relevant.  These 
terms clearly describe very close relationships between an executive and a 
consultant-mentor in which advice and support is given.  Such relationships can 
facilitate skills transfer but also provide reassurance and a ‘safe’ environment in 
which to discuss ideas and concerns. 
 
The literature had already identified the importance of trust in personal 
relationships between consultants and executives (Maister 1993, Maister et al 
2000) and this research added much detail that was, significantly, from the client 
side.  For example, the way in which a one-to-one relationship can survive an 
executive moving to another organisation, as well as its significance in a 
hierarchical context.  This demonstrates the personal nature of the relationship, 
also apparent in the way that direct commercial discussions over cost were 
excluded.  This detail adds much texture to the understanding of relationships 
between consultants and executives. 
 
(b) Externality 
 
The external status of consultants was extremely valuable to executives and this 
manifested itself in various ways.  Externality meant that consultants were 
automatically imbued by executives with specific traits.  This meant not only 
wider experience and superior market knowledge, but also objectivity and an 
ability to give a fresh view that would counter any tendencies to insularity.  Such 
perceived abilities resulted in consultants automatically having very high levels  
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The issue of credibility came up repeatedly, both in the sense of consultants 
adding credibility to decisions and being credible persons with whom to discuss 
issues.  Executives also confirmed that the brand of a consultancy firm was 
exploited to give credence to work, even where it could easily be done in-house.  
Consultants were perceived as experts and specifically referred to as such.  
Executives therefore had a great deal of faith in their abilities.   
 
Employees, however, were viewed differently.  Executives directly expressed the 
view that employees would have a ‘vested interest’ in the outcomes of change 
programmes.  They felt that personal feelings about other employees and the 
desire to secure specific jobs would influence their decision-making in a way that 
would not be the case with consultants.  Even those executives who had defended 
the abilities of internal staff affirmed the objectivity of consultants at different 
times in the interviews.  So, consultants were still seen as detached and rational 
in a way that employees were not. 
 
The capabilities of employees also suffered by comparison with consultants.  
Executives could not find enough ‘bright’ employees to work alongside 
consultants.  Also, employees did not have comparable market knowledge and 
were unable to bring a ‘fresh view’ to difficult situations because of their 
insularity.  This point refers back to the fresh perspectives that executives believe 
consultants can bring to a company with a low turnover of staff.  As noted above 
in the discussion of objective value constructs, executives could be manipulating 
these points as a justification for engaging consultants rather than internal 
resource. 
 
Such a view of employees may be merely perception on the part of executives 
because, as the literature highlighted, consultants can and sometimes do 
contribute to the creation of a requirement for their services.  They may create a 
situation and then position themselves as the only ones capable of resolving it 
and this can lead to a perception of a skills shortage in the existing workforce 
(Bloomfield and Danieli 1995, Sturdy 1997, Bloomfield and Vurdubakis 2002).  
This did not, however, appear to be the case in this research and the lack of trust 
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apparent in the interviews could not be related to the scenario suggested above.  
Lack of trust in the ability of employees to be objective about change and to 
bring innovative solutions to existing situations is a fresh perspective on the use 
of consultants by executives. 
 
The option of using internal resource was therefore not attractive to executives.  
The externality of consultants, however, resulted in a variety of benefits that 
were manipulated by executives at all levels. 
 
Validation, in particular, emerged as a distinct function of consultancy services.  
For example, validation of internal recommendations to senior executives was 
often cited as a reason for using consultants.  In this case, executives felt that 
value was being added through the objectivity, superior market knowledge and 
external view that consultants provide.  The external status of consultants, and 
particularly the perceived objectivity that is assumed to be a natural consequence 
of this, were extremely important factors in influencing the opinions of key 
decision makers.  Consultants were used by junior executives to help engage 
more senior executives and win support for their favoured solution.   
 
In turn, senior executives confirmed that such validation by consultants has value 
for them when they are receiving such recommendations.  It provides an element 
of ‘comfort’ that the recommendation has been endorsed by an individual or firm 
with external status and the associated credibility that this implies.  As a result, 
senior executives felt more confident about endorsing a recommendation and 
junior executives were able to achieve their goals. 
 
Another important factor in engaging consultants was the support and advice that 
junior executives received in helping them to manage senior executives.  This 
comprised a diplomatic role in managing internal conflict, negotiating 
settlements, and also influencing behavioural change.  It included getting senior 
executives to confront difficult issues in a way that employees – junior 
executives – could not.  This role is unrelated to the standard, and usually 
unavoidable, reasons for engaging consultants such as lack of resource or need 
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for skills.  In this sense, consultants act like oil in an engine, minimising friction 
and allowing the moving parts to function freely. 
 
External status enables executives to use consultancy for political purposes 
because consultants have the high levels of credibility discussed above.  They are 
also, however, unfettered by the internal politics that constrain employees and 
are therefore able to produce results that may not otherwise have been possible.  
This freedom may also be attributed to their external status.  One executive 
described how consultants had spoken harshly to one of his managers who had 
worked hard, but in their view, just not hard enough. 
 
‘You know, to (this manager) no one else would have dared do it.  This 
guy eyeballed her and that was it…’ (Interview 21) 
 
He later described them as ‘ruthless’ because they do not have to work with 
people on a long-term basis so it is not important for them to build relationships.  
This is a crucial difference in the way that consultants and employees operate 
within the working environment.  Employees are dependant on the development 
and maintenance of good working relationships to a highly significant degree.  
This will have an inevitable effect on the way they behave towards their 
colleagues and more senior executives.  It will make them less direct in their 
challenges because of the need for ‘self preservation’ and the need to preserve 
productive working relationships over the long-term.  
 
In addition, the externality of consultants enables them to give candid views on 
the organisation and the senior personnel within it in a way that would be 
inappropriate for employees.  An executive described having dinner with the 
CEO and a consultant.  This consultant was able to give extremely candid views 
on the executive team reporting to the CEO which were valuable to the latter 
because it gave a radical and candid perspective.  The CEO would not have heard 
these views from an employee because it would be inappropriate within a 
hierarchical structure.  Consultants are regarded as equals in a way that 
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employees are not and this has important implications for the respective roles 
that they are able to fulfil.   
 
Executives repeatedly referred to the need for ‘challenge’ and did not believe that 
employees could provide that type of feedback.  Two executives (Interviews 6 
and 21) independently illustrated this using exactly the same metaphor of 
consultants holding up a mirror that nobody else was able - or willing - to show 
them.  This ability was heavily dependent on a trusting relationship because of 
the extremely sensitive nature of the views being expressed.  The word 
‘coaching’ was used in this context, possibly to mask the fact that critical 
feedback on executive performance was, or could be, given.  This type of 
observation could be given, and received, by an equal who was external to the 
organisation but not by an employee who was junior to the executive in question.  
The externality of the consultant means that the executive does not have to work 
with them on a day-to-day basis and, most importantly, there is no compromise 
of the hierarchy and therefore the individual’s sense of status is preserved.  
Therefore individual executive egos are saved from the situation where a junior 
member of staff is giving critical feedback.  In addition, the credibility attributed 
to the consultant means that advice and observations will be believed and taken 
seriously without any assumption of an alternative motivation. 
 
There was also the extremely sensitive topic of managing internal politics and 
this is also closely related to the issue of hierarchy.  There was a clear belief by 
executives that external resource with a high degree of credibility was needed to 
resolve problems around these types of issue.  In some cases, employees could be 
perceived to be part of the problem, thus the need for external support to resolve 
the problem.  However, where such internal politics involves senior executives, 
the issue of hierarchy is again relevant because junior executives could not 
effectively intervene in such a dispute.  As well as a high degree of credibility, 
the individual tasked with resolving the situation must be regarded as an equal or 
their views will not be accepted. 
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These findings on the role of consultants as external parties affirms literature 
discussed in Chapter Two (Schwarz 2003, Gammelsaeter 2002, Kipping and 
Armbruster 2002, Kaarst-Brown 1999, Hellgren et al 2004, Nippa and Petzold 
2002, Alvesson and Johansson 2002).   
 
(iii) Classification of consultancy services and the effect on procurement 
process 
 
One executive (Interview 20) set out a structure for the variation of value 
constructs according to the nature of the consultancy being engaged.  This is 
expanded and developed in Figure 9.1 below.  It provides an extremely useful 
framework with which to view consultancy procurement. 
 
The figure demonstrates how each of the identified value constructs varies 
depending on the level at which the consultancy service is being used.  The 
further to the left of the table, the more commoditised the services become.  The 
further to the right, however, the more bespoke the service and dependent upon 
individuals and the relationship between them.  This provides an explanation for 
the differentials in procurement processes that were observed between IT 
consultancy and strategy consultancy.  IT consultancy will typically be in the 
tactical commoditised category whereas strategy consultancy is likely to be in the 
highly bespoke category because they have different characteristics and this is 
discussed below in greater detail.   
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VALUE 
CONSTRUCT 
TACTICAL HIGH LEVEL 
STRATEGY 
TOP LEVEL 
STRATEGY 
SKILLED 
RESOURCE 
Teams of consultants 
of mixed levels 
Firm has track record 
of delivery 
Provides HR 
flexibility: no need to 
recruit; ability to 
change team. 
Number of high level 
individuals 
One individual 
Enduring relationship at 
a very high level 
Regarded as an equal 
Coach and mentor 
KNOWLEDGE Technical knowledge  
Knowledge of 
emerging and 
existing technologies 
Industry Best Practice 
Project Management 
Process 
Established 
methodology 
Access to firm’s 
database 
Process 
Methodology 
Creativity 
Industry best practice 
Analytical skills  
Giving shape to amorphous 
problems 
Intellectual capability 
Insight 
Market knowledge 
Expertise 
Giving shape to 
amorphous problems 
Developing strategy 
EXPERIENCE Experience of 
previous 
implementations  
Industry best practice 
Saves time and 
potentially cost 
through speedy 
implementation 
Good at building 
relationships 
Industry best practice 
Counter to insularity 
Asking naïve questions 
Market experience 
Experience of working at 
the top levels of 
organisations 
POLITICS Selling a ‘difficult’ 
message to internal 
staff. 
Helping to engage senior 
executives 
Brokering deals/solutions. 
Advising internal client on 
negotiating politics 
Ability to adapt own style 
appropriately 
Validation 
Use of consultancy brand to 
sell to senior executives. 
Use of consultancy brand 
for external and internal 
validation. 
The ‘eyes and ears’ of 
senior executives within 
the organisation. 
 
PSYCHOLOGY  Feeling isolated: ‘help on the bridge’ 
Relationship (trust) 
Lack of confidence and need for an equal to confide in. 
Industry best practice (not being left behind) 
Challenge assumptions where employees could not. 
Credibility 
Provide feedback and ‘coaching’ where an employee 
could not. 
 
COMMODITISED     NOT COMMODITISED 
 
 
FIGURE 9.1 
FRAMEWORK SHOWING CONSULTANCY OPERATING AT DIFFERENT LEVELS 
 
This classification demonstrates that consultancy interventions should be viewed 
on various levels that differ in several important respects that have a direct effect 
on the procurement processes employed.  Project-based engagements, for 
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example IT implementations in the Tactical category, are compatible with 
objective value constructs and executives will tend to use objective selection 
processes.  They are less dependent upon the strong and trusting relationships 
between individuals that characterises consultancy at both strategy levels.  It is 
easier to draft service specifications because the goals of the consultancy 
engagement can be identified and the supply market is not unduly restricted.  
Objective definitions of value therefore become much more relevant and 
important at the tactical level because delivery of tangible business objectives 
within set timescales underpins the engagement.  Strong project management and 
the ability to achieve objectives, often within tight deadlines, are extremely 
important at this level.  Such value constructs respond well to objective selection 
processes. 
 
The subjective value constructs which underlie executive motivation for 
procuring strategy consultancy, however, distort objective procurement 
methodologies.  The objectives of strategy consultancy are often vague and 
undefined at the outset, and the personal nature of the relationships exclude 
negotiation of cost and contract terms.  Not only are the relationships personal, 
but the motivation for engaging particular consultants can also be highly 
personal.  They are influenced by subjective considerations that have value for 
individual executives, and not objective value constructs that benefit an 
organisation in a rational way.  For example, the executive in Interview 5 
described how two executives in different parts of the organisation engaged 
different consultants to do the same piece of work.  This happened because each 
had an existing relationship with a different consultant.  Objectively, however, it 
would have been of greater benefit to the organisation if one consultant had been 
engaged to the work in both parts of the organisation. 
 
Fundamental differences exist between the tactical and strategy levels.  The 
services involved in strategy are intensely personal to each executive because 
they are so closely intertwined with their own work.  Subjectivity therefore 
becomes extremely important and selection is based on who they feel they have 
an affinity with, and who has credibility both with themselves and with other 
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executives.  It is easier to define the objectives of a tactical implementation 
project than to define the objectives of corporate strategy, an organisational 
restructure, or simply resolving a problem that has not been fully analysed.  In 
addition, there may be feelings of vulnerability, especially if an executive lacks 
direct experience of resolving these kinds of issues.  This could be the case, as 
one executive pointed out, if an executive only has experience of operational 
management. 
 
Even where objective process is used, however, there was a direct statement from 
one executive that objective process would be manipulated to achieve the desired 
result.  This suggests that subjective value constructs can corrupt objective 
process at any level. 
 
The classification of consultancy services in this way and the attribution of 
differing characteristics to each category gives a fresh perspective not found in 
the literature.   
 
 
(iv) Executive’s awareness of the complexity of the service and the nature of 
consultants themselves. 
 
The examination of the services marketing literature in Chapter Two included the 
use of the terms ‘functional’ quality and ‘technical’ quality (Gronroos 1983).  
These categories made a clear distinction between the outcomes and process and 
executives were asked to apply them to management consultancy. 
 
There was a recognition by executives that consultancy is a complex and 
sophisticated service requiring a unique approach to obtain the best value from 
its use.  This was demonstrated in several ways. 
 
In the interviews, executives said they believed that consultants require both 
‘hard’ technical and ‘soft’ functional skills to be effective.  There were no 
executives who believed that it was possible to separate these skills in the way 
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that Gronroos (1983) had suggested.  Consultancy services were characterised by 
executives as seamless, so it was not possible to say that one skills-set was more 
important than the other.  Consultants could not, executives believed, deliver 
their technical ‘product’ without effective functional skills because they needed 
the ability to ‘sell’ their proposed solutions.  This ability required high levels of 
credibility and ‘soft’ interpersonal skills on the part of individual consultants.   
 
Effective functional skills were regarded as particularly important because 
recommendations would not be automatically accepted and implemented by 
executives.  The service goes far beyond trite patient-doctor metaphors because 
clients will not automatically accept recommendations that are presented to them.  
Consultants have to ensure acceptance of their ideas and convince executives that 
what they are recommending is correct and the right course of action to take. 
 
The division between functional and technical quality developed in the literature 
(Gronroos 1983) does not, therefore, appear to be a valid one in the context of 
management consultancy within the single organisation that was the source of 
this data.  This is a new perspective and highlights the differentiation between 
mass consumer services and professional services procured by organisations. 
 
Executives recognised that consultancy requires significant intellectual time and 
effort on their part to produce value.  The interview data demonstrated a belief 
that value production required commitment from the executive to manage the 
engagement process itself.  This involved either unilaterally setting objectives 
prior to commencement of the service, or playing an active role in developing 
objectives in conjunction with the consultants.  It also involved ensuring that the 
individual consultants working on the project had the requisite skills and 
experience.  Finally, there was an obligation to project manage the engagement 
to ensure delivery of objectives.  This involved ensuring that ‘milestone’ targets 
were met and that the consultants remained focussed on the targets. 
 
This last point stemmed from a belief that consultants always attempt to 
maximise the hours that can be invoiced to the client, and use every opportunity 
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to search for the next engagement.  There were numerous references in the 
interviews to the tendency of executives to attempt to extend the scope of an 
engagement (‘scope creep’) and put as large a team into the organisation as 
possible.  Both of these would increase the hours that could be invoiced and 
necessitated effective management by the client to prevent additional cost.   
 
These points have considerable resonance with Chapter Two where both co-
production of value and close contact with suppliers was discussed.  These were 
seen as two of the distinguishing characteristics of professional services and were 
also highlighted in Chapter Five.  Here, it was suggested that both of these 
characteristics strongly implied that clients had a greater understanding of 
technical quality than the services marketing literature seemed to allow.  The 
interview data confirms both close contact and co-production of value.  In 
addition, the nature of this contact does, indeed, strongly suggest that executives 
have a sophisticated understanding of technical quality.  Firstly, in setting 
objectives and milestones they are playing a significant role in designing the 
solution.  Secondly, by managing the consultants to ensure delivery of objectives 
executives are assessing the technical quality of consultancy.  These points will 
be re-assessed in the light of the data from the extended observation in the 
following chapters.  This data on co-production of value, however, reaffirms the 
literature (Lapierre 1997, Axelsson and Wynstra 2002, Hausman 2003).  It also 
suggests, however, that client involvement in the procurement of consultancy 
services is wider and extends to managing the supplier: checking the suitability 
of staff, managing delivery and guarding against ‘scope creep’. 
 
There was also awareness that consultants would exploit the opportunity of 
having unfettered access to the organisation in order to search for the next 
engagement.  This would not only detract from concentration on the current 
project, but also possibly result in unnecessary consultancy interventions.  
Executives believed that the most common approaches were to recommend a 
follow-on project as part of the solution, or the attempt to develop new 
relationships with executives and, therefore, fresh opportunities to sell their 
services.  Part of the reason that good personal relationships were valued by 
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executives was that trust developed and this trust allowed executives to be sure 
that consultants were not simply looking for another sales opportunity. 
 
Executives did not, therefore, appear to be either naïve or impressionable in their 
approach to procuring consultancy.  They fully appreciated that it was a complex 
service with a high degree of risk attaching to its procurement.  It therefore 
required, they believed, a significant level of their own input to secure a valuable 
outcome.  There was an acknowledgement that occasionally this did not happen 
in practice and this was seen as a failure.  A strong sense of caveat emptor 
attached to consultancy services and approaches from consultants were viewed 
with cynicism by executives unless it was within the context of a relationship 
where trust had been developed.  These views were expressed without 
prompting, within a variety of contexts and by the vast majority of those 
executives interviewed. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Executives demonstrated a clear understanding of both the complexity of 
consultancy services and also the nature of consultants themselves in a way that 
did not show naivety.  They were cynical about the motivation of consultants and 
wary of their approaches.  Even when they were engaged, executives believed 
that consultants had to be firmly managed in order to deliver against objectives 
and the ability to do this suggests that executives have a sophisticated 
understanding of technical quality.  The risks attached to procuring consultancy 
are mitigated in different ways depending upon the category of consultancy.  At 
the tactical level, executives use objective process to select the most appropriate 
consultants although subjectivity is still likely to be a factor in selection 
decisions.  At the strategic level, however, executives develop long-standing 
relationships with individual consultants in which trust is pivotal.  These 
relationships, however, have a much greater role than just risk mitigation. 
 
Executives are driven by environmental pressures.  For example, lack of time 
propels them towards using consultants as additional resource.  Some pressures, 
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however, such as rapidly changing market conditions and increased regulation, 
cause feelings of anxiety, vulnerability and loss of control which also drive 
consultancy use.  At the strategy level, personal relationships with trusted 
consultants allow executives to seek reassurance from someone who has a 
significant level of credibility.  These relationships can develop to such a degree 
that the consultant becomes what is euphemistically termed a ‘coach’.  The use 
of this term disguises the true nature of the role which is provision of reassurance 
and support in a hostile environment.  Such support cannot usually be provided 
internally because, within a hierarchical structure, the external status of 
consultants enables them to interact with employees in a unique way.  They can 
challenge executives, provide sensitive feedback, resolve political disputes and 
demand more from employees than internal line managers.   
 
When such close personal relationships develop at senior levels of the 
organisation, the nature of the engagement changes radically from that which 
exists at the tactical level.  From being a commercial relationship between two 
organisations in which objective selection processes have been followed and cost 
and contract terms negotiated, it becomes a personal relationship between two 
individuals in which such actions would be inappropriate and awkward.  This 
fundamentally changes the way that consultancy services are procured.  
Objective selection processes become irrelevant here because choice is based on 
existing relationships which may be extremely strong and based on trust, 
‘chemistry’ and perceived credibility.  Likewise the drivers to use consultancy at 
this level are not objective and ‘rational’ but personal to the individual himself or 
herself and influenced by subjective perceptions of employee motivation and 
capabilities.  Indeed, the degree to which they are subjective and personal may be 
such that executives wish to conceal them because they appear ‘irrational’.   
 
The level at which consultancy services are being procured is therefore crucially 
important to the involvement of Procurement departments.  At the tactical level, 
it is possible to set clear objectives at the outset and follow an objective selection 
process.  At the strategic level, however, objectives can be extremely difficult, if 
not impossible, to define.  In addition, objective selection processes are rendered 
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irrelevant by the existence of strong relationships between executives and 
consultants.  Procurement professionals are able to add value to engagements at 
the tactical level but not at the strategic level because the decision is based on the 
subjective value choices of individual executives. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
 
RESEARCH DATA – EXTENDED OBSERVATION 
 
Introduction 
 
During the second half of 2004, the researcher was closely involved in engaging 
one of the ‘big four’ former accounting firms on a sensitive and important piece 
of organisational design work.  The ‘story’ of this project is told in this chapter 
using the first person to reflect the close involvement of the researcher. 
 
Background 
 
The engagement process took place against the background of a global initiative 
to implement a panel of consultancy firms for the company world-wide.  The 
virtual project team responsible for this comprised myself in the UK, two 
colleagues in the US and a team leader in Head Office.  We had got to the point 
of selecting four generalist firms who, we believed, would be able to meet at 
least 90% of our requirements.   
 
However, we were struggling to get our Legal Department to finalise the 
contracts for signature and there remained a small number of critical, unresolved 
issues.  This was causing some unrest among our panel firms because, having 
been told they had been selected, they were keen to sign the contracts and begin 
marketing themselves within the group companies.  The delay also prompted 
questions about our commitment to the process.  I had managed these by sharing 
some of my own frustrations with the process and then taking steps to press 
ahead anyway despite the contractual situation.  This good faith appeared to be 
shared by the firms who were applying the agreed rate card despite not having a 
signed contract. 
 
More worrying, however, were the whispers that the senior executive in Head 
Office with responsibility for signing off the global contracts (“Steve”) was not 
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happy with one of the firms on the panel.  Steve is the CEO’s right hand man.  
They worked together at their previous company and it is widely believed that 
Steve has his full confidence.  As such, Steve is untouchable.  A few weeks 
previously he had pulled another panel member off a project without giving a 
reason, leaving them unsure about their relationship with us.  Whilst we had 
subsequently obtained a credible explanation and reassured them, I was unsettled 
by a conversation with someone close to this specific project.  This individual 
claimed to have been actually present when Steve had said he didn’t want to use 
the firm because he didn’t like them.  This ran contrary to the explanation we had 
passed on and left me feeling uncomfortable about our strategy. 
 
Steve had also recently introduced an approval process whereby all expenditure 
on consultancy over a relatively low threshold had to be signed off both by UK 
Procurement, the Chief Operating Officer and by him, personally.  All requests 
for approval had to be on a given form that required justification for the 
expenditure as well as the name of the selected firm.  A note had been issued 
from Steve and posted on the company intranet to this effect.  My team leader in 
Head Office had warned that they would take a dim view of proposals to place 
business off-panel, and if such requests were to be approved, the decision must 
be well justified.   
 
Prior to this engagement, I had only ever used the process once and it took three 
weeks to get a response.  This put me under a great deal of pressure as the 
requester needed to start work immediately to meet business deadlines.  In the 
UK, we had heard rumours that Head Office believed they could reduce demand 
by delaying the approval process until users become so disenchanted they give 
up.   
 
Knowing the speed at which the business moves, this new procedure worried me.  
However, it was a double-edged sword because it also gave procurement the 
authority to intervene where previously we had been excluded.  It appeared, 
therefore, to open up a plethora of opportunities. 
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Whilst I represent UK Procurement on the global team, I work closely with a 
colleague in the UK (“Katharine”) on local projects where consultants are being 
used.  Katharine is a very experienced procurement professional who, like me, 
has not been closely involved with consultancy projects before.  We have always 
found that executives who buy consultancy tend not to involve procurement, 
preferring to manage projects and relationships themselves.  Consequently, it is 
not a category of spend that we, as a department, have managed as fully as we 
would have liked.  Because consultancy has been an area of huge expenditure in 
the past, this has been very frustrating.  However, both Katharine and I see the 
new approval process as an opportunity to increase procurement influence over 
the way the company buys consultancy services. 
 
Katharine and I have already held initial meetings with three of the four panel 
firms.  The object was to begin to establish a relationship with them and the 
intention is that we will hold these meetings quarterly.  Initially we asked them to 
help us understand their business and areas of expertise.  We have also asked 
them for an exchange of information.  We will alert them to suitable 
opportunities and arrange introductory meetings with key personnel and, in turn, 
they will tell us about current engagements and leads they are pursuing.  We 
have told them about the approval process and positioned ourselves as the 
gatekeepers of the company to whom they should always refer.  This seemed to 
be well received.  Two firms in particular say they are pleased to have one point 
of contact in such a large organisation as ours.  The Account Director for one of 
these firms (“Paul”) seems very keen to develop a dialogue with us.  Paul and I 
have already met and kept in touch over the global contract.  Following the 
meeting he does, indeed, begin calling me to let me know the opportunities they 
are pursuing. 
 
Tuesday 27th July 2004 
 
I have gone to Katharine’s office for a routine meeting to discuss management 
information on consultancy spend.  We need to establish who is currently 
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engaging consultants and develop a strategy for bringing this in line with the new 
approval procedure and, if possible, put it through the panel.   
 
Shortly after I arrive, Katharine shows me a completed Approval Form that 
authorises a senior executive (a grade 7) to place a significant piece of business 
with either one of two off-panel firms.  Proposals have already been received and 
the form has been faxed to Head Office for final authorisation. 
 
After some discussion with our line management, we tell Head Office that we are 
withdrawing the form until both Katharine and I have had a chance to establish 
the facts.  Katharine has already worked with the senior executive concerned 
(“John”) and we hastily arrange a meeting with him that morning. 
 
We explain to John that his project is highly unlikely to be authorised by Steve 
because neither of the firms being proposed are on the panel.  We propose going 
through a formal Request For Proposal (“RFP”) process that will include the two 
firms that John is interested in, but will also include three of our panel firms.  If 
the proposals from the off-panel firms are better, then Katharine and I say we 
will endorse John’s decision.  At least then we can show a substantial audit trail 
and some science behind the decision.  We can also show that we have tried to 
put the business through panel firms but they did not make the grade.   
 
John seems to accept this.  However, we have concentrated on stressing the 
importance of complying with process.  John is, at heart, a good corporate 
citizen.  He wants to do the right thing and listens fairly to what we have to say.  
He does have some concerns about the ability of our panel firms to do the work, 
and says of one that they will ‘oversell’.  Katharine assures him that she and I 
will control the process and will, in fact, feed that perception back to the firm in 
question.  John seems genuinely surprised, but also amused, that we are prepared 
to be so candid with them.  He smiles and describes the time when you had to be 
of a particular seniority within a client firm before they would even talk to you.  
He should know – he used to work for them. 
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John’s main concern is, however, the time-scales.  These are aggressive anyway, 
but we now have to work around the RFP process.  Speed is of the essence and 
for the rest of the meeting Katharine and I work on understanding the project in 
more detail.  We are also able to take away some draft documents that John has 
produced. 
 
We go back to our office to draw up a formal document.  We work through lunch 
and it is finished by the afternoon.  It is a short document of just over three A4 
sheets.  It sets out the background to the project, the specification of service, the 
expected level of resource, from both from them and from us, key decision 
criteria and a timetable of events.   
 
During the meeting with John, we established that there are two main reasons for 
using consultants on this project.  Firstly, there is huge time pressure and internal 
resource of this calibre is just not available at such short notice.  Secondly, there 
is a need for the skills, experience and additional capabilities that the consultants 
are expected to bring.  We use this knowledge to develop key decision criteria 
that we also include in the RFP, allowing the firms to concentrate on what is 
important to us.  Later, we also ask John to weight them.  This, we think, will 
focus everyone’s attention when the proposals come back in.  The resulting table 
was distributed to project team members and is shown below. 
 
Decision Criteria Weighting 
Suitability of team members 30 
Degree to which proposal is deemed fit for 
purpose 
30 
Knowledge transfer plan 30 
Track record of delivery in this area 20 
Project costs 10 
Proposed measurement of deliverables 10 
Degree to which solution matches aspirations 10 
 
TABLE 10.1 
DECISION CRITERIA FOR CONSULTANCY SELECTION 
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John has stressed that there is a clear exit date for the consultants because he 
does not want them involved in implementation.  Therefore knowledge transfer is 
a key consideration.  Because of this and the need for additional capabilities, the 
selection decision will be based largely on the quality of the team that each firm 
is proposing to use. 
 
We walk back over to John’s office to see if we can catch him but have to leave a 
copy of the RFP with his secretary. 
 
We also call our account contacts at the firms to alert them to the upcoming 
opportunity and find out whether they will be interested.  They do all want to 
take part and we check their availability for Question-and-Answer sessions on 
Thursday and Friday.  By this time they will have had a chance to read the RFP.  
Although it involves much diary-juggling, we are able to arrange for both 
Katharine, myself, John, and the contractor supporting John on this project 
(“Tom”), to be present at all the sessions.   
 
We are particularly careful to stress to the firms that their proposals should be 
concise because we are working to such tight deadlines.  I tell one firm: ‘we 
don’t want War and Peace’ or any ‘glossies’.   
 
We also invite the two off-panel firms to similar sessions even though they have 
already been briefed and submitted proposals.  John and Tom gave these 
briefings separately (John briefed one firm and Tom the other) and the resulting 
proposals varied dramatically in cost.  In the interests of creating a level playing 
field, Katharine and I think it best to just start again from the beginning.  We will 
follow a uniform process and ignore what has gone before. 
 
Wednesday 28
th
 July 2004 
 
John approves the document and we issue it by e-mail in the morning with the 
following timetable of events.  All communication is to be routed through 
Katharine with no direct contact to John. 
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RFP sent to firms 28.7.04 
Response submitted Noon 9.8.04 
Presentations 11.8.04 
Decision 
communication 
12.8.04 
Work commenced 16.8.04 
Work completed 11.10.04 
 
TABLE 10.2 
TIMETABLE OF EVENTS FOR CONSULTANCY SELECTION 
 
We emphasise to John the importance of allowing the firms to read the RFP and 
then clarify their understanding of the brief before submitting their proposals.  
This will allow them to put forward the best proposal they are capable of 
producing.  John takes this on board and, in fact, is proving to be a joy to work 
with.  He listens to us carefully and takes our advice but leaves us in complete 
control of the process.  In fact, he takes the Q&A sessions so seriously that he 
wants them to be held in London so that he can escape the distractions of the 
office environment and be fully engaged.  Naturally Katharine and I are 
delighted at the way this relationship appears to be developing.  We hope that it 
will open other doors for us. 
 
Thursday 29
th
 July 2004 
 
Katharine and I arrive at our company’s offices in central London mid-morning.  
They are in a restored regency town house complete with marble pillars, gilded 
ceilings and fine antique furniture.  The room we have booked is long and 
dominated by a large mahogany Sheraton-style dining table.  There is also a large 
carved marble fireplace and large paintings around the walls.  It looks out onto a 
park and is a magnificent and imposing setting.   
 
We have arranged for the first firm to arrive at 12.30.  John and Tom are already 
there.  They have settled themselves in the meeting room and are taking part in a 
conference call connected with the project.  Nevertheless, Katharine and I are 
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invited to sit with them.  This is clearly a measure of trust as, amongst others, I 
can hear that a very senior executive from the UK business is also participating.  
John is apparently not happy with the way things are going and, at various points, 
rolls his eyes upwards or exchanges an ironic smile with Tom. 
 
The two delegates from the first firm arrive on time and I collect them from the 
reception area.  Due to the extremely short notice, they have struggled to field the 
right people.  The person who would have co-ordinated it is currently on leave so 
someone who specialises in technology is managing this temporarily.  He has 
managed to bring with him someone who is a management consultant and to 
whom he has passed the RFP. 
 
Katharine introduces everyone, sets the scene and then passes over to John.  
Between them, John and Tom outline the broader context of the work and go into 
the detail of the specific project objectives.  The consultant is then given the 
opportunity to ask questions, which he does. 
 
In response to the questions, John explains that he sees this project as requiring a 
combination of ‘bodyshopping’ and existing methodology.  He says that, through 
downsizing, we have lost the layer that would previously have done this work, 
hence the requirement.  He also stresses that we need a ‘level of challenge’.  He 
is happy for the consultants to lead the project in order to ensure delivery of the 
objectives and is prepared to move the timeframes to get the right team. 
 
We have a brief discussion after they have left and the initial impression is not 
good.  The technology specialist had not been smartly dressed and John 
comments that he ‘looked as if he’d just got out of bed’.  Also, neither John nor 
Tom are impressed by the questions asked which did not, they believe, show any 
real grasp of the situation, the requirements and the vulnerabilities.  There was 
nothing dynamic or inspirational about them and all in all, as a group, we are left 
with no confidence in this firm. 
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The second firm arrives promptly at 2pm.  Again they have struggled with key 
people being away on holiday but, nevertheless, have managed to present two 
partners in the relevant practice, one of whom has direct experience in this type 
of work.  The briefing follows the same format but, when given the opportunity 
to ask questions, there are clear differences.  The lead partner is fairly quiet and 
thoughtful, not at all flash, and his approach comes across as calm and well 
considered.  Between them, they ask more questions than the previous firm and it 
is clear to me that John and Tom are far more actively engaged with them than 
they had been previously.  John emphasises the expertise and experience that he 
wants them to bring to the project.  He tells them: 
 
‘I want your prejudices in the model.  We’ve been successful but we’re 
still only (position in industry), so we need to change some of our 
practices’. 
 
‘We want to talk to experts…we want your version of the truth.’ 
 
There are strong indications of a need for the ability to give feedback to senior 
executives and the use of consultants for the purpose of managing internal 
politics.  The influencing skills of the consultants are going to be extremely 
important and the credibility of the individuals being proposed is therefore vital.  
John says: 
 
‘We need to get senior players in a room facing up to the things they’ve 
hidden in a cupboard…we need you to help us do that.’ 
 
The consultants also acknowledged this role when discussing a previous 
engagement that had not gone well: 
 
‘We take responsibility for that because we didn’t push hard enough’. 
 
In addition, John talks about ‘choreographing’ meetings between him, the 
consultants and senior executives. 
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Afterwards John and Tom confirm that they have indeed been impressed.  This 
surprises them as they had not expected it.  Katharine and I are delighted because 
this is the firm that had been expected to ‘oversell’.  We had, as we promised, fed 
back to the lead partner that they have a reputation for being pushy and going 
over the project manager’s head.  We are very pleased to see that they are a 
model of restraint. 
 
Friday 30
th
 July 2004 
 
Despite our best efforts, the third Q&A session has to take place at our local 
offices and not in London.  We have arranged it for 3pm and Katharine and I are 
duly there on time.  John, however, has been held up and we start a good thirty 
minutes late. 
 
We begin the meeting with three representatives from the consultancy firm and it 
takes the same format as the other two.  Paul is there with the VP from the 
relevant practice and a consultant.  Each of them introduces themselves and 
outlines his area of responsibility.  The VP appears distant and when asked to 
outline his firm’s experience in this area, he seems surprised.  He talks quietly, 
almost mumbling, and does not make eye contact with any of us, preferring to 
look down at the desk.  Thirty minutes into the meeting he excuses himself for a 
meeting with one of our directors and leaves abruptly.  Paul continues the 
meeting.  He seems confident that this is exactly his firm’s area of expertise.  
Apart from concerns about securing the resource at such short notice, they make 
it clear that they want the business.   
 
John stresses that knowledge and experience is paramount.  He again talks about 
the need to assist and drive meetings with senior executives.  He wants 
‘facilitative consulting’, ‘real presence’, ‘negotiating’ and help with the question 
‘how do we engage the executive team?’ 
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The discussion between Katharine, myself, John and Tom afterwards centres 
around the behaviour of the VP.  We are all very unimpressed and believe that 
his behaviour was arrogant.  In fact, it goes down like a lead balloon, taking the 
firm’s reputation with it.  Afterwards, Katharine tells Paul that bringing the VP 
along created a bad impression and he must work hard to correct it.  She asks if 
he was annoyed at being kept waiting but Paul does not know.  Nevertheless she 
is adamant that this individual is not to be involved in any presentation they may 
give the following week.  Paul takes it on the chin but this has clearly presented 
him with a challenge.  He tells us that they view this as a prime opportunity to 
create a good impression on a high profile piece of work.  Katharine and I agree 
with him and encourage this belief. 
 
Wednesday 4
th
 August 2004 
 
Today there is a Q&A session with one of the firms that have already been 
briefed.  The other firm has declined the opportunity.  I have other commitments 
and Katharine tells me afterwards that they were impressive.  As a small firm, 
their MD is taking a very active part and had been present.  Katharine says that 
he let his team handle the questions while he sat back, appearing to absorb what 
was going on. 
 
We also have bad news.  We have heard that neither of the firms we saw last 
Thursday want to propose.  They do not believe that they can put the right people 
on the project at such short notice.  We are all, including John and Tom, 
extremely disappointed that the second firm will not be participating.  This now 
leaves us with three firms, only one of which is a panel member. 
 
Paul leaves me a message asking if their lead consultant can speak to John to 
clarify some points.  We refuse because we believe that this will give them an 
unfair advantage.  Katharine is annoyed that he even asked and points out that 
they had their opportunity at the Q&A session. 
 
 
 222 
Monday 9
th
 August 2004 
 
Katharine and I receive the responses from all three firms that are still 
participating.  We take copies over to John and Tom for them to review. 
 
Paul’s proposal is, as we would have expected from such a large firm, a polished 
series of colour slides and flow diagrams.  To us, it shows a robust, highly 
structured approach and both Katharine and I score it highly.  We both want to 
see them go through to the next stage and provide a presentation.  It is, however, 
the most expensive proposal but expressly leaves open the possibility of 
negotiating on price. 
 
The proposal from the off-panel firm that attended the Q&A session on 
Wednesday also appears concise and structured.  Although their costs have 
doubled from the first proposal, we put this down to a clearer understanding of 
the brief.  We also want to see them go through to the next round. 
 
The third proposal from the other off-panel firm, however, is not at all what we 
were expecting.  It is easily three times the length of the others and goes into a 
huge amount of detail.  They have sent full CV’s for each of their proposed team 
members and some of these run to three and four pages each.  I read the 
document but am unable to form a clear picture of exactly what is being 
proposed.  We are disappointed to see that it is virtually exactly the same 
document that was submitted before and they appear to have taken very little 
notice of what we have told them.  Apart from the muddled impression that we 
get from the proposal itself, we have other concerns. 
 
Firstly, the firm is small and, rather than employing consultants full-time, it uses 
‘associates’ which it engages when the need arises.  Their ability to secure the 
right resource therefore worries us, as does their ability to make these individuals 
behave like a team. 
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Secondly, through speaking to him, we have learned that the MD is dealing with 
a personal crisis.  Someone close to him is seriously ill and, more than once, he 
has been speaking to us from a hospital.  Because the firm is so small, his 
involvement will be crucial but it is only natural that his attention will be 
elsewhere.  Katharine and I see this as a major vulnerability and, on a project as 
important as this one, do not believe we can take the risk. 
 
Our recommendation to John will be that we de-select this firm and request 
presentations from the remaining two. 
 
Tuesday 10
th
 August 2004 
 
We have a meeting with John, Tom and the Project Manager to decide next steps.  
We have all scored each firm against the key decision criteria but first discuss 
each of the proposals.   
 
John is not surprised by Paul’s submission and says that it is just what he would 
have expected from them.  However, he warns against being carried away by 
smart graphics.  Likewise, the other firm’s proposal generally has approving 
comments.   
 
When we come to the third firm, the one that Katharine and I think should be de-
selected, there is agreement among John, Tom and the Project Manager that they 
are strong contenders.  Katharine takes a deep breath and says that we think they 
should be de-selected.  John looks at her in amazement and says, ‘Why? The 
CV’s of the people they are proposing are awesome!’   
 
Katharine explains that the document they have produced does not do what we 
had asked of them.  We had asked for something that was concise and they have 
sent a long, muddled document.  She also sets out our concerns over the use of 
associates.  Neither John nor Tom see this as a problem and, although they 
acknowledge the state of the document, they excuse this by pointing to the 
creativity that they have seen the MD produce in the past.  All three of them have 
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worked with him before and the Project Manager explains:  ‘What you get with 
him is real, out-of-the-box creative thinking’.  Tom agrees and says that if they 
want a truly innovative solution that will differentiate them from the competition, 
they are more likely to get it with this firm.  Paul’s firm is seen as very 
disciplined but not as creative. 
 
Katharine then asks if any of them are aware of his personal problems.  There is 
immediately concern around the table and it is clear that this is news.  Katharine 
stresses the serious nature of the problem.  Our worry is the vulnerability created 
by reliance on one person who may be called away at any time and whose 
attention will, inevitably, be elsewhere.  There is immediate and unanimous 
agreement that this is too great a risk and there is no further discussion.  The firm 
will be de-selected and it is agreed that they will be eliminated from the next 
phase.  Katharine will handle the communication. 
 
We talk about the presentations and Katharine says we should be firm about the 
time the consultants have to present.  She believes, and I agree, that they should 
be allowed only twenty minutes.  Otherwise there is a danger that they will not 
be focussed and we will waste time listening to waffle and not have enough time 
for questions and answers.  John disagrees but Katharine holds her ground and, 
in the end, her view prevails. 
 
We then reveal our scores on the Key Decision Criteria.  Katharine and I have 
scored Paul’s firm highest, while the others have been far more conservative.  
They had scored the de-selected firm highest. 
 
As soon as we get back to the office, Katharine makes the calls and arranges the 
presentation dates.  She tells the firms that their presentation must be no longer 
than twenty minutes.  She also asks that the team members they are proposing to 
use on the project are present so that John and Tom can assess them. 
 
Wednesday 11
th
 August 2004 
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Paul’s firm presents their proposal at 11.30 in our London office.  They have sent 
the two senior consultants that will actually carry out the work, although the lead 
consultant is ill and cannot be present.  They have also sent an alternative VP 
following our objection to the one that attended the Q&A session.  This VP will 
be responsible for relationship management and quality checking the work.  
From our side, both Katharine and I are present together with John, Tom and the 
Project Manager. 
 
For the presentation, they have produced a shortened version of their proposal 
that captures the main points.  Each consultant presents the part that they will 
have responsibility for delivering, outlining process and previous experiences.  
There follows a question and answer session in which John, Tom and the Project 
Manager ask the questions.  They direct these to all the consultants present and 
the responses are confident and authoritative. 
 
John describes how the consultants will have to work with a group of senior 
executives who are equally experienced and will challenge them hard.  As a 
result, he stresses how important it is that this group has faith in them.  The VP 
replies: 
 
‘This is what we do for a living…twisting, challenging, 
adding…Blending and being able to articulate better (and) in a 
compelling way challenge points of view….We bring the best out of an 
organisation and embed our own knowledge and experience.’ 
 
John also stresses that they will not be given a free rein to do as they please: 
 
‘We don’t want parallel vehicles…(you) must be comfortable working 
within a programme’. 
 
We finish promptly at 12.30.  The discussion afterwards is brief.  We are all 
impressed by the individuals who appeared confident and experienced.  The 
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presentation had been very polished and there is consensus that they can do the 
job.  However, everyone is waiting for the final presentation tomorrow. 
 
Thursday 12
th
 August 2004 
 
The presentation from the other short-listed firm is due to take place at 9am, 
again at our London office.  I arrive about 8.15 and John and Tom are already 
there.  The Project Manager arrives shortly after me.  Katharine has stayed 
overnight in London and arrives about 8.45. 
 
The firm arrives promptly and we follow the same format as before.  The MD is 
present and takes an active role.  He begins the presentation but uses prompt 
cards.  This stops him making eye contact as often as he could and, frankly, looks 
a little amateur-ish after the slick presentation we had yesterday.  He then hands 
over to the consultant who will lead the team if they are successful.  This 
individual appears nervous.  He is trying to look casual by sitting back in his 
chair and crossing his legs, but, to me, this only emphasises his discomfort.  John 
asks him a question on the cost model that really throws him.  He stutters, 
blushes and struggles to answer the question.  It looks really bad. 
 
The discussion after they have gone is one of disappointment.  Their process is 
not strong and, despite questioning, no one could get a clear view of how they 
would manage the project.  It seems that this would happen on a day-to-day basis 
and makes John, Tom and the Project Manager very nervous.  There is a concern 
that engaging this firm will take too much of our management time and require a 
significant amount of leadership and hand-holding.  Basically there is a fear that 
nothing concrete will be delivered at the end. 
 
There is also little faith that the individual consultants would command enough 
credibility with the executive team.  John thinks they would be led by the strong 
personalities there and not provide sufficient challenge. 
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Paul’s firm, by contrast, had come across as highly competent and professional.  
There was clearly a rigorous, disciplined process and an established methodology 
that would be executed by a carefully managed team and quality-checked by a 
VP.  This gave considerable comfort in their ability to deliver a critical piece of 
work on time and to a high standard. 
 
The quality and experience of the individual consultants themselves was also 
impressive.  Their anticipated credibility at a senior level was high and, in 
particular, it was felt that the VP would carry enough gravitas to be able to 
present to the executive team if required. 
 
There was little discussion afterwards because the decision was fairly self-
evident and Paul’s firm gets the business.  Katharine will handle the 
communication.  She wants to negotiate more on the fees and John is happy for 
her to do this.  He is just pleased to have the right team in place. 
 
Katharine and I take a taxi back to the train station and Katharine calls Paul on 
her mobile.  Naturally he is delighted to have the news.  Katharine tells him the 
amount by which she would like him to reduce his costs.  It is not insignificant 
and represents a further 14% discount.  He promises to discuss within his firm 
and come back to her tomorrow. 
 
Friday 13
th
 August 2004 
 
Paul speaks to Katharine mid-morning and confirms that they will reduce their 
costs by the requested 14%.  They also agree that he and the lead consultant will 
come on site next week for two days, at no extra cost, to begin work with the 
Project Manager.  There is also some discussion about the excluded VP.  Paul 
explains that, because of his position, he should have some involvement.  
Katharine agrees but refuses to accept additional cost and still wants him to be 
kept away from John and Tom.  Paul agrees and the deal is finalised. 
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I complete an Approval Form, obtain the relevant signatures and fax to Head 
Office.  I stress the urgency and chase regularly afterwards. 
 
We also need to do something about a contract.  The framework agreement has 
not been signed in Head Office so we have little choice but to do something 
locally.  We therefore agree a variation on Paul’s standard Terms of Business 
that clearly incorporates their proposal.  They are then contractually bound to 
deliver what they have promised us.  We are also careful to tie the project 
deliverable milestones to payment so that if the deliverables are not signed off, 
no payment is due. 
 
A few days later, Procurement in Head Office tell me that they have obtained 
approval from the Chief Operating Officer (who is senior to Steve) and that we 
should go ahead on this basis.  They cannot get hold of Steve but believe this will 
suffice. 
 
We let John know that he can go ahead.  He is clearly very pleased with the 
result and he sends the following note to both of us. 
 
Katharine, Debbie 
 
I wanted to thank you for the support you have provided over the last 
few weeks. 
You have managed the process excellently and I believe we have as a 
result got a much better outcome. 
My perception is that the corporate governance has been successfully 
managed by you.  As a consequence all meetings and interventions you 
have made to this process have been total value-add. 
Additionally I wanted to specifically comment on your management of 
the suppliers.  At all times they have been given very direct but positive 
feedback.  I think this has been a key factor in each of the parties 
providing the best possible bid.  Your actions have eliminated 
weaknesses and possible distractions before they ever reached the table. 
I look forward to the next time I work with you.  It has been a pleasure. 
 
He tells Katharine that he had initially been sceptical of the process but now 
believes that it works. 
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Both of us believe that ongoing management and Procurement involvement in 
the project is vital to delivery and Katharine is instrumental in ensuring that 
regular communication meetings are scheduled at the right levels.  She 
establishes weekly project review meetings for the lead consultant and the 
project manager, that she will also attend.  At these meetings the project 
deliverables will be signed off to trigger payment.  Katharine also establishes bi-
weekly relationship management meetings for her, John, Tom, Paul and the VP.  
Because the relationships are so new, we are keen that the panel firm is seen to 
shine.  Katharine, however, will take the ongoing management forward.  She will 
keep me up-to-date with progress so that I can feed back into the global team 
how the panel firms are performing. 
 
6th – 17th September. 
 
I leave the office for two week’s holiday feeling relieved that it is finished and 
that the work is going so well.  The last thing I hear is that Paul’s team is 
‘delivering to time and quality’.  During the second week, however, Katharine 
calls me at home.  Although I had specifically asked to be contacted if anything 
happened, she apologises for disturbing me at home.  However, she thinks that I 
will want to know that Steve intends to sack Paul’s firm and bring another firm 
on board (‘ABC’) to finish the project.   
 
I am almost speechless because I know that the project has nearly reached its 
half-way point and will be difficult for any other firm to pick up at this stage.  To 
the best of our knowledge, Paul has made every effort to meet our deadlines and 
put their best people on the project.  This is bad enough but there is also an issue 
over money.  We have negotiated a fixed fee for this project and have to pay the 
full amount whatever happens. 
 
Katharine is unable to provide any reasoning for this apparently draconian 
decision because she has not heard it direct from Steve.  It has filtered down to 
her from John via the Project Manager. 
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22
nd
 September 2004 
 
Since I’ve been back, it has been difficult to get any clarity on Steve’s decision 
and whether there is any possibility of getting it rescinded.  We know that Steve 
requested a copy of the RFP and the response and that copies have been supplied 
to him.  Katharine has managed to gain some intelligence but not much.  She has 
spoken to Paul and he has passed on what he has managed to glean.  He was told 
by our MD that the reason ‘appears to be political’.  There is something about 
them, as a firm, that has caused an issue with Steve but, at this stage, nobody 
knows what.  
 
I’ve e-mailed my team leader in Head Office asking whether he has any news.  
Because we have heard nothing, I say: 
 
‘I guess we have no choice but to assume that it is OK to continue?  We 
are already almost half way through and into significant cost if we 
terminate now.’ 
 
He replies: 
 
‘’I have made myself clear to (the COO) that I would support it, if we 
will continue with (Paul’s firm), but currently it is with him, Steve and 
(the UK CEO) to decide.  I just called (Steve’s PA) and she told me that 
she has handed out the RFP and the proposal to Steve and doesn’t know 
about any further actions or decisions.’ 
 
Paul is naturally concerned about the relationship between our two companies.  
He tells me:  ‘If Steve doesn’t like us then, we’re all adults, so let’s just walk 
away’.  They clearly have no wish to waste valuable time and resource flogging a 
dead horse.  However, because neither Katharine nor myself can come up with 
any answers, we look as if we have little authority within our organisation.  Paul 
is therefore by-passing us and tapping his contacts elsewhere within our 
company to try and get answers.  He has already mentioned that he will make 
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contact with the Finance Director in Head Office with whom he worked 
previously. 
 
27
th
 September 2004 
 
It appears that nothing can be done to change the situation.  The Project Manager 
is agreeing with Paul what can realistically be done in the time remaining to 
them.  Steve has said that they must be off-site in seven days but John is trying to 
negotiate fourteen.   
 
A transition meeting has been held and the project is divided up into discrete 
parts.  Paul’s firm will be allowed to complete one part and the other part will be 
resourced internally and with contract staff.  ABC’s role has not yet been 
decided.  The Project Manager writes to me: 
 
‘…the discussions with Steve are sensitive and ongoing – all that is 
being established is how we can disengage from (Paul’s firm) with the 
maximum added value from the deliverables to date.’ 
 
Thursday 30
th
 September 2004 
 
It is still unclear why Steve sacked Paul’s firm.  Katharine writes to our manager, 
copying me: 
 
• ‘ABC have not instigated this change of consultant and are in fact 
uncomfortable, knowing it’s not their core skill. 
• They are really struggling to find the resource, which just seems a 
ridiculous situation 
• However, they will pick up the “high level challenges” on the basis that 
they have Steve’s authority to do so 
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• (Our MD) has advised Paul that there is no barrier to them continuing to 
work with us, so (the Project Manager) is retaining 2 consultants…for 
another 4 weeks 
• (Paul’s firm) have also been told by (our MD) that they have every 
opportunity to win implementation work. 
• This seems to us (Katharine and the Project Manager) to be a complete 
contradiction to the information we have, which is that Steve doesn’t 
want them on site.  I feel it’s vital that we have an answer to this….how 
do you believe we can get this?’ 
 
There seems little point in continuing any relationship-building efforts with the 
panel firms until we know the role that Steve envisages for ABC.  I hear from my 
team leader in Head Office that Steve has an agreement with ABC and we 
repeatedly try to get a copy of the agreed rates and the contractual documents.  
However, these are never forthcoming.  We therefore suspend meetings with the 
panel firms until the picture clears.  In the meantime, the situation on the project 
itself sounds desperate.  Katharine has heard that John and Tom are really 
struggling with the poor quality of the ABC personnel and the time-scales have 
been pushed out. 
 
We are also aware of executives who are engaging consultants but not going 
through the mandated approval process. 
 
1
st
 October 2004 
 
Katharine speaks to Paul and he tells her what he knows.  Paul has been told by 
our MD that ‘the reason ABC have been engaged is that he (Steve) had just 
signed a global agreement for them to get all strategic projects, world-wide.’  
Our MD has plainly tried to give some comfort to Paul but he remains nervous. 
 
Katharine and I have no knowledge of this deal and she concludes:  
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‘Unfortunately of course we really don’t know what’s in Steve’s mind 
but I think (we) should try very hard to find out.’ 
 
Thursday 25
th
 November 2004  
 
I have a conversation with Katharine.  She has heard that our MD in the UK, 
John, Paul and his VP had dinner together this week.  Katharine assumes that 
they were ‘no doubt discussing future business’.  I also add that Paul has not 
responded to me on a contract query.  It appears that both Procurement, and the 
process, are being avoided. 
 
The only answer we eventually get, through my team leader in Head Office, as to 
the reason behind Steve’s intervention is that he wants ABC to do all ‘strategic’ 
work.  However, we still do not really understand because the work that Paul’s 
team was engaged to do was not what anyone would call ‘strategic’.  They were 
designing an organisational structure following a strategy that had already been 
set – by ABC. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
 
RESEARCH ANALYSIS – INTERVIEWS AND EXTENDED 
OBSERVATION 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter One outlined the problems that attempting to control management 
consultancy caused the Procurement Department of the subject organisation.  
The difficulties of gaining involvement in consultancy engagements were also 
demonstrated in the extended observation.  The data presented in Chapter Ten, 
however, extends the picture from the initial difficulty of gaining access to give 
further insight into the entire procurement process and the effectiveness of the 
methodologies employed.  The difficulty of applying procurement methodologies 
to consultancy becomes visible and this adds considerable depth to the data and 
the subsequent analysis.  It demonstrates the true scale of the difficulty that 
consultancy presents to procurement practitioners.  That is, it extends far beyond 
merely gaining involvement and also encompasses problematic application of 
procurement methodologies. 
 
These difficulties then have profound implications for the academic view of 
Procurement as a strategic function aspiring to full integration.  If the difficulties 
of access are compounded by difficulty applying procurement methodologies to 
consultancy then this aspiration appears fundamentally flawed. 
 
In addition, the sensitive nature of the data collected in both the interviews and 
the extended observation reaffirm the methodological choices made for data 
collection.  Also, such close access to the data in the extended observation would 
only rarely be available to anyone other than an employee who was also a 
participant in the project.  Repeated requests for an opportunity to observe 
executives engaging consultants had produced no results.  However, actual 
involvement in the project guaranteed unrestricted access to the data.  The 
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observation made possible the provision of data from a different perspective than 
executives alone. 
 
The following analysis of data from both the interviews and the extended 
observation is structured around the research questions. 
 
1  On what basis do executives buy management consultancy? 
 
Data from the interviews in Chapter Eight revealed that executives apply a 
combination of objectivity and subjectivity to consultancy engagements.  
Subjective value constructs included the need for external validation and 
reassurance as well as consideration of personal relationships in selection 
decisions.  Critically, however, the dominance of either subjective or objective 
value constructs is dependent upon the category of consultancy being procured.  
Chapter Nine then developed the distinction between the categories that were 
labelled Tactical Consultancy; High-Level Strategic (HLS) Consultancy and 
Top-Level Strategic (TLS) Consultancy.  Objectivity tended to dominate the 
procurement of Tactical consultancy but subjectivity tended to dominate 
decisions within the strategic consultancy categories. 
 
This variation was also apparent during the extended observation where both 
objective and subjective value constructs were important factors in the selection 
process.  Although the interaction between the two was complex, the final 
selection decision was driven by subjective responses.  This is discussed in 
greater detail below. 
 
The selection process itself was managed by Procurement and all the steps that 
would be expected from an objective process were followed and documented.  
The apparent objectivity of this process was, however, corrupted in subtle ways 
by the subjectivity of the underlying value constructs.  Although the vague nature 
of the selection criteria would have enabled manipulation had their use ever been 
decisive, as the project progressed they became increasingly irrelevant.  The 
selection was, in reality, driven by the subjective views of the lead executive 
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regarding the individual consultants, and the quality of their ‘performance’ 
during the final presentations.   
 
In accordance with standard objective selection process, decision criteria were 
established.  At the outset, the stated reasons for using consultants comprised 
objective value constructs only.  The executive leading the project was under 
extreme time pressure and could not acquire internal resource with the right skills 
at such short notice.  There was the need for technical skills in the form of the 
experience and established methodologies that consultants would bring.   
 
It also required, crucially, the ability to challenge senior executives, secure their 
agreement and manage internal politics.  However, although there were vague 
references to ‘additional capabilities’ at the beginning, these requirements did not 
become clear until later in the process.  During the Q&A sessions with the 
consultants, the executive began referring, for example, to the need to ‘engage’ 
the senior executive team and provide a ‘level of challenge’.  Within the Key 
Decision Criteria for selection, although a weighting of 30% was allocated to 
‘suitability of team members’, it was not specific about precisely what qualities 
would make individuals suitable.  As the process moved forward, however, it 
became clear that personal credibility and the ability to manage senior executives 
were as important as their technical ability.   
 
Other selection criteria were also wide enough to allow the exercise of a 
considerable degree of subjective choice.  For example, ‘degree to which 
proposal is deemed fit for purpose’ and ‘degree to which solution matches 
aspirations’ are vague statements and yet, when combined, accounted for 40% of 
the final scoring.  Throughout the course of the selection process, these criteria 
were only used for scoring on the one occasion of the short-listing exercise and 
then only after the decision had been made.  They were not formally used or 
referred to again and never influenced decision-making to any significant degree.   
 
The final selection decision was based on consideration of different elements.  
Confidence in the individual consultants themselves, however, was the factor that 
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dominated the final decision above anything else.  Nothing else in the selection 
criteria was discussed or considered.  The successful firm was the only one 
considered capable of delivering a credible solution with minimal leadership 
from the responsible executive.  Crucially, they were also considered to have the 
ability to ‘sell’ that solution to the senior executive team.   
 
The ‘performances’ that both firms gave under pressure during the presentations 
was largely the measure used to assess their ability to deliver what was required, 
although other factors were considered.   
 
Objective value was evident in the knowledge-base and established 
methodologies that enabled the successful firm to respond very quickly to the 
brief and produce a robust and structured project plan.  The proposal itself was 
an impressive document that clearly outlined an approach to the project that was 
based not only on the personal experience of the assembled team themselves, but 
also on the experience of the wider firm itself.  The other short-listed firm also 
provided a proposal that was well-structured and concise.  Although the clarity of 
purpose seen in both proposal documents was important, it was not sufficient by 
itself to secure the engagement.  The decisive factor was the firm’s ability to 
convince the responsible executive that their team contained individual 
consultants who had the personal qualities and gravitas to successfully manage 
senior executives.  The quality of their ‘performance’ during the presentation was 
therefore highly significant because the selection decision was driven by 
subjective responses to it. 
 
The emphasis on the importance of the ‘performance’ makes explicit a clear link 
with the dramaturgy literature discussed in Chapter Two.  The quality of the 
people being put forward by both firms was of crucial importance to the success 
of the engagement.  Although they had provided a proposal document, the image 
they projected during the presentation was also a highly significant way of 
assessing the suitability of the individuals who would be providing the service.  
Therefore, the confidence with which they expressed themselves, their body 
language and their appearance were all factors in making a judgement.   
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The unsuccessful firm gave a very disappointing ‘performance’ and this was 
accentuated by the highly orchestrated and thoroughly rehearsed presentation on 
the previous day.  At crucial points, the lead consultants failed to impress.  The 
Managing Director was not confident enough to speak without prompt cards 
making him appear stilted and inarticulate.  The lead consultant stumbled when 
asked an important question and was unable to provide a satisfactory response.  
These were not only taken as direct indications of technical competence but an 
example of their inability to present to the Executive Board.   
 
The successful consultants, however, appeared confident and were able to 
respond to all questions in an articulate and persuasive way.  This gave an 
extremely positive impression of their overall abilities and competence.  The VP 
in particular created the impression of someone with a high level of credibility 
who was professionally very capable.  Based on this, judgements were made 
about his ability to influence the senior executive team.  As a group, they were 
also able to convey the sense of co-ordination and unity of purpose that was 
expected of a team. 
 
The ability of the executive who was procuring the consultancy to critically 
assess technical quality was also apparent.  Not only was he formerly a 
consultant with one of the firms invited to propose, he also had a very clear 
vision of what he wanted to achieve from using consultants.  Detailed technical 
questions were asked at the presentation sessions and very clear objectives and 
milestones were set.  In addition, a project manager was appointed to ensure that 
timescales and quality requirements were met.  Progress was therefore rigorously 
monitored and milestones only signed off when the executive was satisfied.  
These milestones were also tied to payment.  Such close management would not 
have been possible without the ability to assess technical quality. 
 
Another factor in the variation of procurement processes across the categories of 
consultancy was the use of the different processes to mitigate risk.  During the 
interviews, executives described how they used, or aspired to use, objective 
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selection processes at the tactical level.  This was made possible by a potentially 
wide supply market in which a number of firms could undertake the work.  
Individual relationships are less important at this level because the issues are not 
as sensitive as they are at either of the Strategy levels.  Robust management 
against clear objectives ensures delivery of value at the Tactical level. 
 
Within the category of TLS, however, relationships, personal chemistry, and trust 
are used to mitigate risk.  At this level, there is a limited supply market because 
only a small number of individual consultants will be able to develop the levels 
of trust and credibility necessary to maintain such relationships.  Standard 
procurement process that manipulates a competitive situation will not, therefore, 
be as effective as it would be within the Tactical category. 
 
The extended observation was particularly interesting because it demonstrated 
the influence of subjective value constructs in driving the need for consultancy 
and the subjectivity involved in selection within this intermediate category of HL 
strategy.  It also demonstrated, however, the value that process added despite the 
influence of subjectivity.  The interviews showed that there was willingness and 
a desire on the part of executives to use process, but that they were frequently 
prevented from doing this by various environmental pressures such as time or 
power-based peer pressure.  This was also evident during the extended 
observation where process was being used prior to Procurement involvement, but 
in an undisciplined and inconsistent manner due to time pressure.  Process 
therefore has a significant role in risk mitigation at this level of consultancy 
procurement because it provides a robust framework in which both objective and 
subjective value constructs can be developed.   
 
In summary, although the selection of consultants by executives is based on a 
mixture of subjectivity and objectivity, the balance of these within any selection 
decision is likely to be influenced by the categorisation of the consultancy itself.  
Objectivity is more likely to dominate any decision within the Tactical category, 
but decisions within the HL and TL strategy categories will never be purely 
objective because of high levels of subjectivity within both the value constructs 
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and the final selection decision itself.  It is also difficult for Procurement to 
influence these subjective responses because they are so personal to the 
individual executive himself or herself.    
 
2 How would the objective processes used in strategic procurement 
contribute to buying management consultancy? 
 
The sourcing literature discussed in Chapter Four is based upon the objective 
methodologies developed by Procurement professionals and others to manage the 
purchase of goods and services by organisations.  These methodologies cover 
basic process but are also based upon business-to-business relationships.  As 
such, they focus on rational strategies that are designed to generate tangible value 
for organisations, such as lower cost and continuity of supply.  These value 
constructs are the products of empirical research and Procurement professionals 
apply the techniques and methodologies consistently and objectively in 
conjunction with ethical codes of practice.  They will consider the entire business 
requirement, aggregate as appropriate and manage using professional processes.  
Their application to management consultancy would attempt to ensure the 
dominance of objective value constructs and process, while the influence of 
subjectivity would be minimised appropriately. 
 
The influence of these ideas and methodologies can be observed in the data 
generated through both the interviews and the extended observation in two ways.  
Firstly at a micro level, the use of a structured process to select firms and, 
secondly, the use of relational strategies at a macro level to improve control and 
reduce risk. 
 
Firstly, data from the interviews identified the objective value constructs that 
underpin the procurement of Tactical level consultancy.  Objective process 
supports these value constructs well because the objectives of the consultancy 
can be clearly identified and the supply market is not unduly restricted.  A 
Specification of Service can be prepared to which several consultancy firms can 
respond with a full service proposal.  A competitive situation is thereby created 
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and valid comparisons can be made.  Cost and contract terms are negotiated 
appropriately.  Objective value constructs and objective process complement 
each other well and executives view the use of objective process within this 
category of consultancy as the natural and obvious way to select the most 
appropriate firm.  They wanted to be able to apply such processes to Tactical 
consultancy procurement but were often prevented from doing so by 
environmental pressures. 
 
The use of objective procurement process was also observed during the extended 
observation.  Although this involved consultancy procurement within the HLS 
category not the Tactical category, Procurement was still able to introduce 
standard selection process.  Final selection decisions were still largely driven by 
subjective responses to individual consultants but the objective process did have 
value and worked to improve the final result.  Adherence to standard 
procurement Request for Proposal (‘RFP’) process ensured that the following 
tasks were undertaken and were, most importantly, undertaken in a consistent 
manner across all firms taking part. 
 
• A much wider selection of firms were considered than had originally been 
identified by the executive. 
• A service specification was produced that clearly documented what had to be 
delivered and the timescales within which it had to be delivered. 
• Thorough briefings with key staff took place to ensure that the firms 
understood the service specification. 
• Formal proposals were received enabling valid comparisons. 
• Formal presentations were arranged where the executive responsible for 
appointment could directly question the consultancy staff who would actually 
be carrying out the work. 
• A competitive situation ensured that a significant reduction in fees was 
secured. 
• Potential threats were identified and eliminated. 
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All the participating firms were given the opportunity of presenting the most 
comprehensive proposal that they were capable of producing and accurate 
comparisons could be made because of the consistency with which the process 
was managed.  In this way, the process acted as a framework which enabled 
informed decision-making on a ‘level playing field’. 
 
However, the influence of professional Procurement methodologies on the 
purchase of management consultancy was also apparent at a macro level in the 
extended observation.  Procurement had established both a panel of consultancy 
firms and an approval process governing demand for their services.  It was 
therefore, firstly, attempting to aggregate expenditure across the organisation so 
that demand could be focussed on a smaller number of suppliers.  Preferential 
rate cards could be developed with these suppliers due to the increased volumes 
of business.  Adequate reporting and strong relationships could also be developed 
to ensure greater visibility of the services being delivered and robust contracts 
mitigated commercial risk.  Secondly, through the approval process, Procurement 
was attempting to manage demand for consultancy services, as well as ensure the 
channelling of business through the panel firms. 
 
Whilst there had been limited success introducing objective process at a micro 
level, Procurement encountered great difficulty implementing both the approval 
process and the panel strategy.  There was strong resistance to the approval 
process and non-compliance was a major issue.  Executives simply did not seek 
approval but continued to exclude Procurement and select consultancy firms 
alone.  At the time of the extended observation, the process had been publicised 
under the name of an extremely senior executive sponsor from Head Office but 
this still failed to improve compliance.   
 
In summary, Procurement would seek to increase objectivity within the selection 
and use of management consultants.  To do this, it would use both process and 
macro-level relational strategies as well as a strong governance structure.  
However, the data indicates that such approaches are not easily applied to 
management consultancy.  Objective procurement process is successful within 
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the category of Tactical consultancy but has increasingly limited application 
within the HL and TL strategy categories.  In addition, executives resist 
governance structures that limit their ability to choose the consultants they prefer 
and require them to justify the decision to use such external resource. 
 
3 Is there any compatibility between executive procurement of management 
consultancy and professional procurement methodologies? 
 
Value can be assessed in different ways across an organisation.  It exists on two 
levels, objective and subjective, and can be viewed through each of these 
different lenses, either alone or in combination.  Inevitably subjectivity will have 
some influence in selection decisions, even in the most objectively established 
process.  In a rational procurement model, therefore, subjectivity and objectivity 
would be synthesised as shown in Figure 11.1 below to produce a definition of 
value. 
 
FIGURE 11.1 
RATIONAL PROCUREMENT MODEL 
 
The degree to which either subjectivity or objectivity will influence decision-
making varies according to the category of consultancy being procured.  
Objectivity tends to dominate Tactical consultancy but this differs within both 
the HLS category and the TLS categories.  Here the model is skewed towards the 
individual and their subjective responses.  This was illustrated during the 
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extended observation where subjectivity influenced the selection to a significant 
extent.   
 
The influence of subjectivity is pronounced to a greater degree within the TLS 
category.  Here, the relationships between consultants and executives described 
in the Interviews exist on a personal basis and not at an organisational level.  
This has a fundamental impact on the way that value is defined.  In a close 
relationship between an executive and a consultant, value is defined by these two 
individuals without, necessarily, any reference to external objective value 
constructs.  This definition of value is then imposed upon an entire organisation. 
 
Such a situation has advantages for both consultant and executive.  The 
consultant has the opportunity to manipulate the definition of value by 
influencing one individual executive rather than a group of Procurement 
specialists equipped with objective definitions of value.  The executive can use 
the consultant for ‘help on the bridge’ or ‘coaching’ without ever having to 
reveal any vulnerability.  Where the relationship exists between two individuals, 
however, the client organisation is never able to formulate an appropriate 
response to the consultancy firm using its internal expertise.  This is illustrated in 
Figure 11.2 below. 
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FIGURE 11.2 
DEFINITION OF VALUE IN STRATEGIC CONSULTANCY 
 
This situation does not preclude consultants from establishing a separate 
relationship with Procurement.  For example, in the observation data, the account 
director from the successful consultancy firm was in the process of developing 
just such a relationship.  However, this relationship was not actively pursued 
following the sudden and untimely conclusion of his firm’s involvement in the 
project.  This individual then moved on to another firm and Procurement now (in 
2008) has no contact with his old firm.  It is significant, however, that he ceased 
contact with Procurement when it became clear that they could do nothing to 
influence a senior executive’s decision.  Instead, he immediately fell back on 
established relationships with other senior executives to gain the information he 
needed.  Consultants will not, by choice, cultivate a relationship with 
Procurement unless they are compelled to do so because this will mean exposure 
to objective value definitions.   
 
Within the categories of TLS and HLS, therefore, both consultants and 
executives have powerful motivations for excluding Procurement and the 
methodologies they utilise.  At the tactical level of consultancy procurement, 
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however, the situation differs because value is more likely to be defined within a 
relationship between corporate firms that is based on objective value constructs.  
Process is therefore highly significant within this category in mitigating the risks 
associated with procuring consultancy.   
 
Process can also bring significant advantages within the category of High-Level 
Strategy (HLS), as demonstrated in the extended observation, even though the 
final decision was based on subjective responses.  In this instance, however, the 
executive had to have such advantages demonstrated to him because his initial 
view was dubious. 
 
In summary, there is a high degree of compatibility between Procurement 
methodologies and Tactical consultancy because of their common foundations in 
objective value constructs.  The rigour of Procurement process can also provide a 
robust framework for subjectively based decision-making within the HLS 
category.  Within the category of Top-Level Strategy (TLS) consultancy 
however there is very little, if any, compatibility because of the intensely 
subjective value constructs being referenced by executives. 
 
4 What are the implications of executive procurement of management 
consultancy for the development of strategic procurement as a 
professional function? 
 
The exclusion of Procurement and the limitations of its processes are seen most 
clearly in the extended observation.  This is discussed in greater detail below. 
 
The appointment made as a result of the process ultimately failed when a senior 
executive from Head Office became involved.  This individual reversed the 
selection decision that had been made, despite the considerable cost that this 
entailed with no direct explanation to Procurement.  This action, and the rationale 
behind it, was never communicated directly to Procurement who had to rely on 
second hand information from the project manager and the consultants 
themselves.  Eventually it became apparent that an appointment had been made, 
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by the same senior executive, of a global firm to handle all ‘strategic’ projects for 
the entire organisation.   
 
The reasons for such an appointment can only be a subject for speculation.  It 
would, however, be a good way for this particular executive to retain control 
over certain aspects of the organisation’s activities in the event that he did not 
trust employees to comply with directives.  Within such a large and disparate 
organisation, issues of control may be problematic so this would seem plausible.  
It is also possible that relationships with the consultancy firm were firmly 
established at senior levels within the organisation and these overruled 
relationships with employees. 
 
It does, however, provide a confirmatory example of the exclusion of 
Procurement from TLS consultancy engagements.  Although a breakthrough had 
been achieved in the success with the initial appointment, this was rapidly 
reversed in the events that followed.  From a position of controlling the process, 
Procurement was then excluded from all communications with Head Office 
connected to this project.  Negotiations to try and salvage the project took place 
directly between senior UK executives and Head Office without any involvement 
from Procurement, despite the best efforts of senior Procurement personnel.  
Procurement was then also excluded from subsequent meetings and 
communications between the consultancy firm and senior executives in the UK.   
 
It is also worth noting that, in addition, Procurement had no involvement in the 
initial appointment of the preferred strategy firm that was imposed on the UK 
business by Head Office.  Procurement also failed to obtain even a copy of the 
contract or the rates that had been agreed.  Despite repeated requests, the terms of 
appointment were always withheld and the relationship managed by one senior 
executive. 
 
In summary, the subjectivity involved in the selection of consultants within the 
TLS category has profound implications for the position of Procurement as a 
strategic function.  It implies an exclusion from this area of expenditure that 
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cannot be overcome so there will always be a pocket of supplier expenditure that 
Procurement is unable to control or even influence.  This runs contrary to models 
of procurement that envision it as a fully integrated strategic function that has 
unlimited access to, and influence over, all areas of expenditure.  The data from 
both the interviews and the extended observation suggest that full integration will 
never be possible. 
 
Conclusion 
 
A rudimentary classification of consultancy engagements into three categories 
was suggested by one of the interviewees.  This was adopted and utilised as a 
useful framework and consultancy engagements were viewed as either Tactical, 
HLS or TLS.  It was also evident from the interviews that the value constructs 
underlying Tactical engagements were compatible with the objective value 
constructs underlying procurement processes.  In addition, the observational data 
from the extended observation demonstrated that the procurement process can 
have limited effectiveness when applied to HLS engagements. 
 
Such objectivity fails, however, within the TLS category.  This is where 
corporate strategy is being formulated by a small group of executives including 
the CEO and his or her opposite number in the preferred consultancy firm.  In 
these instances, the objectivity of Procurement process meets with the subjective 
value choices of the individual executive resulting in an inevitable conflict.  
Procurement will struggle to change this situation because it operates within a 
hierarchical structure.  The subjective value choices of senior executives, such as 
the CEO, are therefore likely to take precedence because their status and 
authority are senior to procurement and the value constructs are important to 
them on a personal level.   
 
When senior executives look for consultants to help them with inter alia 
corporate strategy, they are looking for credible individuals with whom they feel 
they can form a trusting and productive working relationship.  These are 
individuals in whom they can confide, find reassurance and discuss difficult 
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issues as an equal.  It is also extremely likely that they want a strong consultancy 
brand to validate their strategy both internally and externally.  In these instances, 
subjectivity and personal chemistry will be more important than objective 
selection process.  The exclusion of Procurement on these occasions is 
compounded by consultants who have powerful motivations for restricting the 
way they engage business to a one-to-one relationship of individuals.  These 
consultants have considerable influence with senior executives because of their 
external status and have no reason to co-operate with Procurement. 
 
The use of consultants to deliver subjective value, such as ‘help on the bridge’, 
external validation and management of internal politics, suggest that executives 
manipulate consultants to achieve their own objectives.  These ‘irrational’ drivers 
for consultancy are unlikely to change.  On occasion, the rationale behind a 
decision to engage a consultancy may be so personal that executives do not want 
it to be open to scrutiny by Procurement.  The value constructs may be 
vulnerable to objective scrutiny and, as such, executives will not expose them.  
For example, in the extended observation, the senior executive decision to 
change consultancy firm part-way through a fixed cost project did not appear 
rational and Procurement was completely excluded from all decision-making and 
communication.  The interview data also demonstrated that executives will 
engage consultancy firms even if they know the work could be done by internal 
resource.  Both these instances would not fit easily with the rational objective 
value constructs that underpin procurement methodologies. 
 
The conclusion drawn from the research data is that objective procurement 
processes can be applied to tactical level consultancy engagements, and even to 
HLS engagements.  It is not possible, however, to apply them to TLS 
engagements instigated by CEO-level executives because of the incompatibility 
of value constructs and, therefore, the inappropriate nature of procurement 
methodologies. 
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Methodological Conclusions 
 
The nature of the data that was collected during both the interviews and the 
extended observation was extremely sensitive and often given in response to ad 
hoc questions or told in stories and illustrated by examples.  This reaffirms the 
decision to use loosely structured interviews and observation as data collection 
techniques.  Quantitative techniques are unlikely to have produced the same 
depth of data because the rigid nature of these techniques is not as well suited to 
the purposes of this research.  It was extremely important that executives were 
allowed to speak in their own terms and not respond to prepared questions. 
 
The extended observation, in particular, allowed the collection of data that is 
unlikely to have been easily accessible by any other researcher.  The difficulty of 
gaining access to executives for interviews has already been discussed in 
Chapters One and Seven.  The observational data is of a kind only rarely 
available to anyone other than an employee.  It is highly unlikely that any 
external researcher would have been permitted unlimited access to such sensitive 
data.  The decision to concentrate on a single organisation therefore appears 
justified. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The subtle distinctions between objective and subjective value constructs that 
inform supplier selection by executives have far-reaching implications for the 
role of Procurement within organisations.  These distinctions are found within 
the literature and were also reflected in the research data.  They are reiterated 
below and the wider implications examined. 
 
The services marketing literature examined in Chapter Two portrayed service 
provision from the basis of research rooted in the study of mass-market consumer 
goods (Parasuraman et al 1990, Gronroos 1983 and 1998, Normann and Ramirez 
1993, Wikstrom et al 1994, Normann 2000).  This literature therefore takes the 
perspective of the individual consumer, and the subjective nature of the value 
choices that he or she makes, as its reference point.  This is also seen in the 
literature specifically concerning management consultancy where the effect of, 
for example, dramaturgy on the choices of individual managers is discussed (e.g., 
Clark 1995, Gill and Whittle 1992, Clark and Salaman 1998, Clark and Fincham 
2002, Kieser 2002).  The relationships that are focussed upon are those between 
individual consultants and individual managers.  The way in which personal 
subjectivism at a micro-level influences choice is therefore pivotal to the 
literature examined in Chapter Two.   
 
In contrast, however, Chapter Four presented macro-level objective approaches 
to sourcing produced by industrial economists, the IMP group and procurement 
specialists.  Various strategies, both transactional and relational, are presented as 
optimal methodologies for organisations to procure goods and services.  For 
example, the use of governance mechanisms, implementation of supplier 
networks, appropriate adoption of obligational contracting relationships and 
portfolio analysis.  These all describe ways of maximising the potential value 
derived from suppliers.  This analysis, notably, takes place at the organisational 
rather than the individual level.  Relationships are envisaged as existing between 
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organisations and are merely facilitated by multiple individuals within each 
organisation who engage at different levels. 
 
The processes and values that are the foundations of the sourcing literature and 
procurement practice are presented as unrelentingly objective.  This reflects their 
origin in research based in the manufacturing sector where uninterrupted supply 
of materials and Research and Development, for example, are key factors in 
maintaining competitive efficiency.  The processes described allow little scope 
for variation.  For example the process described by Van Weele (2000) is 
mechanistic and inflexible.  Axelsson and Wynstra (2002) describe a process for 
procuring services that is more open to variation.  However, it is clearly based on 
objective concepts of value that reduce everything to consideration of price.  In 
the process of value analysis, users are encouraged to attach economic values to 
everything, even where this will be extremely difficult.  For example, although 
the ‘meta value’ provided by consultancies such as McKinsey is acknowledged, 
little guidance is given on how to account for it in the decision-making process 
other than attempting to reduce it to price.  Relational procurement strategies are 
also based on objective constructions of value, for example joint Research and 
Development activity or the ability to access resource in times of scarcity (Sako 
1992, Lamming 1993, Nishiguchi 1994, Hines 1995, Macbeth 1994).   
 
Within this section of literature, the analysis of value creation is therefore at an 
organisational level and this is conflicts with the concentration on personal 
relationships and preferences in Chapter Two.  The concept of subjectivism was 
examined in greater detail in Chapter Three where a contingent approach to value 
choice was developed.  This does not rely on price as a ‘choice-indicator’ or 
place restrictive assumptions on the value-judgements of individuals.  As such, it 
provides a much wider frame of reference for the data analysis and allows a 
fuller consideration of the role of subjectivism in decision-making.  The sourcing 
literature, however, appears to marginalise the importance of subjectivism and 
remains mired in its preoccupation with cost and, in some instances, pre-
established notions of human behaviour that reflect foundations in industrial 
economics (Williamson 1975 1996, Cox 1996, Cox et al 2000). 
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A tension therefore exists in the literature between the objectively presented 
approaches seen in the sourcing literature and the subjective approaches seen in 
both the service and management consultancy literatures.  This has significant 
implications.  In order to obtain detailed insights into the procurement of 
management consultancy, it was necessary to examine literature from outside of 
the established body of purchasing and supply literature (e.g., Maister 1993, 
Clark 1995, Maister et al 2000, Gammelsaeter 2002, Alvesson and Johansson 
2002, Schwarz 2003).  It was only within this other literature that the subjective 
preferences and motivations of individuals were duly considered and, in so 
doing, rich insights into the political use of consultants, for example, were 
gained.  Consideration of these subjective factors deepens the understanding of 
management consultancy procurement to a significant degree.  Their absence in 
the purchasing and supply literature is therefore conspicuous. 
 
This gap in the purchasing and supply literature stems from its concentration on 
the delivery of value at an organisational level rather than an individual level.  
Value, as previously noted, is defined within the sourcing literature in terms of 
what will benefit the organisation.  This includes, for example, faster product 
development or joint research initiatives.  The motivation of the individual 
executive and its impact on procurement decisions are not considered and this 
omission impoverishes the literature because, unless it is acknowledged, an 
accurate picture of procurement reality will not be obtained.  The current 
assumption seems to be that all procurement decisions tend to be made without 
reference to some subjective considerations and this is unrealistic. 
 
The sourcing literature in Chapter Four implies a cohesion that does not actually 
exist within organisations.  To implement the strategies described would require 
that the executives leading the business are fully aligned with Procurement and 
that both share common value constructs.  This is directly contradicted by the 
research data presented in Chapters Eight and Ten which suggest that cohesion 
and alignment is not consistently true for all areas of corporate expenditure. 
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The tension between objectively and subjectively presented approaches that was 
found in the literature was also evident in the research data.  Important to 
analysis of the research data was the segmentation of consultancy into three 
categories: Tactical; High-Level Strategy and Top-Level Strategy.  Within each 
of these categories there was a subtle variation in the selection criteria used by 
executives and Procurement.   
 
Objectivity dominated executive decisions within the Tactical category of 
consultancy.  Within the other two categories, however, close personal 
relationships between executives and consultants had the potential to develop and 
these could monopolise the definition of value.  Executives were able to use 
consultants for a variety of purposes from personal ‘coaching’ to validation of 
recommendations.  Such uses were subjectively judged by executives to be 
valuable to themselves as individuals working within the context of a 
hierarchical organisation.  The tendency of executives to rely on subjective 
responses increased as the category of consultancy being procured became more 
strategic and high-level.  The personal relationships that developed at this level 
became so strong that, sometimes, they moved with the executive to different 
organisations. 
 
Within the extended observation, executives were influenced to some extent by 
subjective responses while, in contrast, Procurement established process-driven 
selection methodologies that attempted to introduce objectivity.  Relational 
approaches and attempts at aggregation were also instigated because of the 
objective value that such approaches would deliver to the organisation. 
 
The relationship between value construct and consultancy category is illustrated 
below in Figure 13.1.  
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FIGURE 13.1 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONSULTANCY CATEGORY AND VALUE 
CONSTRUCT 
 
The sourcing literature assumes that executives have the same objective value 
constructs as procurement professionals and that both will work together as a 
cohesive unit.  This does not appear to be consistently true and assuming that it is 
masks the reality of organisations that comprise individuals who make choices 
using a combination of objective and subjective value constructs.  Organisations 
comprise both objective and subjective processes so that, in reality, the industrial 
environment mediates the objectivity with which Procurement approaches 
decision-making.  The sourcing literature does not allow for these additional 
influences. 
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This could be seen in the interviews where executives favoured particular 
consultants and, also, during the extended observation where process was 
corrupted by subjective responses to individuals and their ‘performances’.  
Where the consultancy services being procured were for corporate strategy or 
‘coaching’ of senior executives, for example, subjectivity was a primary driver in 
making selection decisions.  Executives alone are able to decide whether 
‘personal chemistry’ is present and objective considerations are only a part of the 
final selection decision.  Conversely, for Tactical consultancy, executives were 
not only willing to use objective process but actually believed that this was the 
correct methodology to employ because different considerations apply.  There 
was, therefore, a much greater degree of compatibility with Procurement 
methodology within this category. 
 
The research data therefore provides empirical evidence that organisations 
comprise objective and subjective processes and values and they co-exist 
relatively harmoniously.  Neither the sourcing literature nor procurement 
processes acknowledge this diversity, however, and both persist with the attempt 
to impose a rigidly objective frame of reference on all procurement activity 
undertaken by executives.  There is, however, only a partial match in the 
compatibility of procurement methodologies used by both Procurement 
professionals and executives.  To overcome this difficulty and avoid unnecessary 
conflict, Procurement must re-calibrate its measures of success and acknowledge 
its limitations because consultancy use is a powerful force within organisations. 
 
The research data suggests that consultants will always have a role within 
organisations at a strategic level because they are used by executives to achieve 
their own personal objectives.  Executives appeared to find significant value in 
the ability to refer to consultants.  Furthermore, their uses for the purposes of 
inter alia validation and managing internal politics suggest that executives, far 
from being passive, actually act as manipulators.  They manipulate the 
‘professional’ image engineered and exploited by consultants to add credibility to 
themselves and their recommendations.  Consultants, in turn, are prepared to be 
manipulated and place the personal satisfaction of their executive client foremost 
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(Kam 2004).  They are, therefore, a malleable and powerful resource for 
executives that has the potential to develop into a highly symbiotic and powerful 
relationship.  Consultants will continue to be used by executives who will also 
continue to procure these services using the same subjective value constructs 
identified in the research data. 
 
This situation is compounded by the senior positions that executives hold within 
the hierarchy of organisations.  So, not only do they have the desire to use 
consultants, but in many cases they also hold positions senior to Procurement.  
Executives are therefore affected by different issues of accountability to those 
managed by most employees.  They also confront different challenges.  Their 
audience comprises other executives before whom they must maintain an image 
of authority and efficiency.  It is here that highly significant decision-making 
takes place but this is a hinterland that Procurement does not enter and is unable 
to influence.  The hinterland that Procurement inhabits is different and requires 
delivery of quantifiable value to the organisation, usually in the form of verified 
cost savings.  It also has clearly defined reporting lines and accountabilities.  The 
role and purpose of Procurement is therefore much more clearly defined and 
procurement professionals cannot transgress boundaries and roles in the same 
way that executives are able to do. 
 
In addition to subjective responses, however, there were also indications that 
executives are able to assess the technical quality of consultants and play a 
significant role in co-creating value.  The observational data contained an 
example of an executive who had previously worked as a consultant with one of 
the firms that was asked to provide a proposal.  Such cross-fertilisation would 
further reinforce the assertion that executives are not naïve purchasers of 
consultancy services.  This must also raise further questions over the value that 
Procurement is able to add to the engagement of consultants. 
 
It seems highly unlikely that Procurement will ever be able to influence the 
purchase of strategic consultancy use at the highest levels of the organisation for 
a variety of reasons.  As already noted, the personal relationships between 
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executives and consultants can not only become very strong indeed, but also 
exclusive in nature.  The issues being addressed at this level are so intensely 
close to executives that trust and ‘personal chemistry’ become vital 
considerations.  Cost reduction, so integral to Procurement objectives, is not 
necessarily a success factor in this situation.  So, even if Procurement were to 
become involved, there appears to be limited scope for achieving the kinds of 
value practitioners would traditionally seek.   
 
There is a fundamental mismatch of value constructs at this level which makes 
Procurement involvement in top-level strategic consultancy use inappropriate.  
The reality of the way that organisations operate is rich and complex.  It is a 
mixture of objective and subjective value constructions made by a variety of 
individuals, each of whom performs before a different audience and has different 
accountabilities.  In this situation, the blanket imposition of an objective 
procurement process is inappropriate.  Procurement must recognise the diversity 
present in organisations and become more selective about the situations in which 
it attempts to impose its methodologies. 
 
Chapter One discussed the problems encountered by procurement professionals 
attempting to control consultancy expenditure within the subject company.  It 
also discussed the academic problem caused by the definition of procurement as 
a fully integrated strategic function.  These two difficulties are related because 
practitioners have adopted the same view as academic writers and pursue goals 
of integration and collaboration in the struggle to define the function as strategic.   
 
Procurement must acknowledge that it cannot be involved in all areas of 
expenditure at all levels of the organisation.  If this continues to be the vision of 
what a ‘strategic’ function must achieve, the attempt to achieve it will continue to 
fail.  This does not mean, however, that Procurement is incapable of adding 
considerable value to the organisation.  The interviews demonstrated that 
executives wanted to follow Procurement process within the category of Tactical 
consultancy.  In addition, the extended observation demonstrated that, within the 
High-Level Strategy category, such process was an important framework within 
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which to exercise more subjective choices.  Within the Top-Level Strategic 
category, however, Procurement was completely excluded. 
 
Acknowledgement of the diversity of value constructs and the reality of decision-
making within organisations would allow Procurement to concentrate on those 
areas where it can add greatest value.  If academic views of strategic 
procurement were similarly revised, unrealistic ambitions of full integration and 
collaboration would be contained.  This would have lessened the scale of the 
problem perceived by the Procurement department described in Chapter One.  
Consultancy expenditure could have been segmented appropriately according to 
whether it was Tactical, High-Level Strategy or Top-Level Strategy and in this 
way use of procurement resource would have been optimised.  As it was, 
consultancy as a category was being approached as a monolithic whole and the 
research demonstrates that, in reality, it is variable and should be treated as such 
by Procurement.   
 
The true role of objectivity in selection decisions must also be considered in the 
procurement of services other than consultancy.  The literature discussed in 
Chapter Two stressed the difficulty and risk involved in procuring a variety of 
professional services, largely due to their highly fluid and heterogeneous nature 
(Maister 1993, Hausman 2003, Mitchell et al 2003, Kam 2004).  The result is a 
high degree of risk in the purchase of these services and, consequently, there is 
an inevitable reliance on the subjective responses of individuals to other 
individuals.  Strategic consultancy is not the only service that relies on 
subjectivity in this way.  Advertising for example, has similar features and may 
be another such area.  Therefore the true contribution of a purely objective 
approach to the procurement of professional services must be questioned because 
the conclusions drawn here about consultancy may have a wider application. 
 
Both of the methodological techniques used, interview and observation, were 
well suited to the research and produced deep and complex data.  It was 
important that executives were free to respond as they wished using their own 
reference points and language to describe their experiences.  The data therefore 
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reflects their version of reality and facilitated inductive generation of data.  
Quantitative techniques require that questions be decided in advance and it is 
therefore not as well suited to this type of research.  Use of observational data 
provided a different perspective and therefore acted to triangulate the interview 
data. 
 
The interview techniques used in the initial part of the research yielded data that 
was startling to the researcher because it was so candid.  Such data was drawn 
out using open questioning techniques and encouraging executives to illustrate 
their answers using examples.  Often, they would do this by ‘telling stories’ from 
previous encounters with consultants.  These ‘stories’ were rich in detail and 
added great depth and texture to the data.  Likewise, the extended observation 
used observation techniques to collect data so that executives and consultants 
could be observed freely interacting unrestricted by any framework.   
 
The methodology also overcame the difficulty of access to executives.  These 
difficulties were twofold: firstly there is shortage of time in executive schedules, 
and secondly, there was the difficulty of an outsider being given access to such 
sensitive data.  The subject organisation is split across several sites spread over 
the south of England so use of single interviews meant that there was no travel 
involved for the executive.  Also, a forty minute appointment was short enough 
for executives to manage but long enough to gather sufficient data.   
 
The researcher’s status as an insider was highly significant in gaining access that 
may otherwise have been denied.  There was no tangible return to the executives 
who agreed to give interviews and it was effectively a ‘favour’ to the researcher.  
Some of the executives were known personally to the researcher, but the others 
were familiar with the Procurement function and wished to help because of the 
internal nature of the request. 
 
The research data reflected the subjective and objectively presented distinctions 
in approach that were found in the literature.  This data does, however, consider 
subjective response and it is a strength of the methodology used that access was 
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gained to the executives who were actually engaging consultants.  The choice of 
methodology was pivotal to the generation of data of sufficient quality and 
quantity to support this study.  Management consultancy is a complex service 
and required exploration of the subjective experiences of individuals.  The choice 
of a subjectivist approach using ideographic methodology reflected this and was 
extremely effective.  In this way, valuable insights were gained through first-
hand accounts into executive motivation, the environmental pressures that 
prompted consultancy use, and the way that executives assessed value from 
consultancy use.  In addition, the data gathered during the extended observation 
allowed first-hand observation of the interaction between procurement 
professionals and executives.   
 
 
Contributions 
 
This research has made a number of contributions which are set out below. 
 
Firstly, Chapter Eight developed eleven themes that emerged from the interview 
data around the value that executives attach to the use of consultants.  Although 
some of these value constructs had already been identified in the literature 
discussed in Chapter Two, some of them were either new or provided fresh 
perspectives on existing literature.   
 
Secondly, this research has provided unique insights into the procurement of 
management consultancy by executives.  In so doing, it has highlighted the 
importance of subjectivity in decision-making and the marginalisation of this by 
the traditional academic procurement and practitioner approaches.  By 
encouraging consideration of the role of subjectivity within the procurement 
decisions made by executives, a clearer picture of procurement activity within 
organisations may be gained.   
 
This, in turn, encourages a reconsideration of the role of Procurement as a 
strategic function.  Given the importance of the subjective choices of executives 
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in certain procurement decisions, practitioners and academics must re-calibrate 
their measures of success.  Procurement cannot expect to apply the objective 
methodologies in every situation and therefore the definition of success as being 
complete involvement in all areas of expenditure cannot continue.   
 
Thirdly, the use of observation as a methodology differentiates this research 
within Procurement literature.  In addition, the observation of executives is rare.  
Schiele (2007) also investigates Procurement involvement in consultancy 
engagements in the context of the public sector but uses only interviews as a data 
collection method.  The additional use of observation in this study provides a 
different perspective.  Interestingly, this observation followed a similar course to 
the Schiele research: a standard process was followed and the executive leading 
the project provided extremely positive feedback on Procurement involvement.  
However the conclusions reached from the observation are that such process had 
limited benefits.   
 
In this respect, the study is unusual because it presents procurement failure.  
Procurement as a function is relatively young and, as yet, lacks the confidence to 
criticise itself and confront the implications of such failure.  This research takes 
an initial step in such a process. 
 
 
Limitations 
 
The research data is limited to large corporate organisations in the service sector.  
It is also a one company study so, whilst revelatory and a powerful example of 
consultancy procurement, the findings cannot be generalised to other 
organisations.  The insider status of the researcher is also a factor because, 
although this acted as a strong enabler, it is also a limitation because it prevents 
replication of the findings elsewhere.  In a multi-case approach, such replication 
would have been possible.  It would also enable consideration of the impact of 
variables such as staff turnover.  Low staff turnover was cited by executives as a 
factor in requiring the fresh perspectives that consultants bring.  It was suggested 
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by the researcher that this might be justification that masks other motivation.  A 
multi-case approach would make possible comparable analysis of staff turnover 
as a variable. 
 
It is also a limitation that the research is only from the client perspective.  Data 
from the consultancy firms themselves would have further enriched the study.  
Similarly the observation data concentrated on the bidding process and there was 
little on the delivery of the services.  Observation on the interaction between 
consultants and clients during service delivery would have added greater depth to 
the observation. 
 
Manual coding was used to analyse the data.  If the research was repeated, 
software would be used to achieve this. 
 
 
Further Research 
 
Recommendations for further research fall into four areas which are outlined 
below. 
 
Firstly, this research initially adopted a specific focus on procurement processes 
and their application to management consultancy.  As it progressed, however, the 
complex nature of consultancy engagements in an organisational context became 
increasingly apparent.  For example, the hinterland within which executives 
operate, the political nature of their interactions and the subjective value 
constructs underlying consultancy use.  This was illustrated towards the end of 
the observation data by one senior executive’s use of the power of his seniority to 
ensure that a favoured consultancy firm was used.   
 
These perspectives should be used to inform further research on the procurement 
of management consultancy within organisations.  Using approaches developed 
within the field of Organisational Behaviour, consideration of politics and power 
would give considerable further insights into the use of consultancy by 
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executives.  In general terms, the role of political behaviour and subjective 
decision-making in procurement activity should be given wider consideration 
than it is at present because it reflects the reality of organisational complexity.  
This has a direct impact on the practical application of methodologies emerging 
from procurement research and should be accounted for more fully than it is at 
present. 
 
Secondly, recent work on Evidence-Based Management (Pfeffer and Sutton 
2006) should be assessed for its relevance to management consultancy 
procurement.  The intangibility of professional services was noted in Chapter 
Two.  Such evidence-based approaches may assist in value assessment by 
providing procurement practitioners with the tools to challenge both the need for 
consultancy engagements as well as their outcomes.  As Pfeffer and Sutton 
observe, ‘Evidence-based practice changes power dynamics, replacing formal 
authority, reputation, and intuition with data’. (Pfeffer and Sutton 2006 p.74).  
This is particularly relevant to strategic management consultancy which operates 
in a highly-charged political atmosphere. 
 
Thirdly, as noted in Chapter Five, the sourcing literature draws on a rich heritage 
of research based in the manufacturing sector.  This is not, however, balanced by 
a similar volume of data on either mass consumer services or professional 
services.  Although the differences between manufactured goods and services 
may be increasingly blurred, there remains a distinction between the two.  It 
would be extremely beneficial to be able to access research within the sourcing 
literature that is based on services, particularly professional services.  This would 
allow for consideration of their distinctive aspects and the development of 
strategies to manage suppliers and indirect expenditure. 
 
Lastly, research data from the perspective of the management consultants 
themselves would add another dimension to understanding the relationships 
between senior executives and their opposite numbers in the strategic 
consultancy firms. 
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Recommendations 
 
Recommendations based on the research are given below.  Allowance must be 
made, however, for the varying priorities and motivations of the different 
audiences.  The bias in the recommendations is towards delivery of objective 
value constructs at an organisational level.   
 
(i) Academia 
As discussed above in the recommendations for further research, the sourcing 
literature discussed in Chapter Four should account for subjective decision-
making to a greater degree than is currently the case.  Existing sourcing 
methodologies do not anticipate the friction caused by political conflict, 
subjectivity and the influence of existing relationships within a hierarchical 
structure.  This makes such methodologies difficult to implement in certain 
situations, such as the procurement of strategic consultancy or executive 
‘coaching’.  Sourcing methodologies need to account for organisational 
complexity to a greater extent.   
 
Reference could be made to other bodies of work, such as the critical consulting 
literature discussed in Chapter Two.  In addition, research on professional 
services, rather than manufacturing, would provide greater diversity and 
alternative perspectives.  These may contribute to the provision of methodologies 
that are not only attuned to the reality of organisations, but which also allow for 
the differences between manufacturing and service provision to be considered 
and addressed.   
 
(ii) Procurement practitioners 
The research demonstrated that existing sourcing methodologies were least 
effective at the strategic level where senior executives engaged with consultants 
on a one-to-one basis.  A decision to entirely exclude such expenditure would be 
reasonable because practitioners should be realistic about the extent to which 
they can effectively influence corporate expenditure.  Focussing their efforts 
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where existing methodologies can be most effective would deliver the greatest 
amount of value.  Segmentation of organisational expenditure along these lines 
may assist in effective allocation of resource.   
 
A challenge to strategic consultancy that encourages use of objective 
methodologies may be appropriate, however, in certain circumstances.  Firstly, 
where resource is sufficient and secondly, where Procurement is represented at 
board level and therefore able to challenge senior executives from a position of 
power.  Use of evidence-based approaches to value may be beneficial in reducing 
the significance of subjectivity in the decision-making process. 
 
(iii) Management Consultants 
Where consultants are working individually with senior executives, value will be 
defined by those individuals for the whole organisation.  In this situation, the sole 
concern of the consultant will be to satisfy his or her client.  If the engagement 
becomes open to scrutiny by other parties, however, that situation will change.  
This is particularly so if the third parties are procurement practitioners because 
they will always attempt to impose discipline, structure and objective value 
constructs on the work.   
 
Wherever consultancy engagements are open to scrutiny, therefore, evidence of 
value should be documented by the consultant.  It should be clear why the 
engagement took place, what work has been done to address the identified 
problem, and what value has been delivered.  This is, however, good practice and 
should be done whatever the visibility of the engagement.   
 
(iv) Senior Executives 
Literature discussed in Chapter Two expanded on the way that consultants 
manage impressions to create the perception of value.  The risk of consultants 
delivering little of any real substance can be mitigated by creating clarity around 
objectives.  Evidence-based approaches may also provide a rationale for a given 
course of action as well as a methodology for assessing outcomes. 
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It is important that senior executives feel a degree of compatibility with the 
consultants they work alongside.  Intuition and subjectivity need to be balanced, 
however, with objective assessments of an individual consultant’s capabilities.  
In addition, it may not be sufficient to rely on the brand of the consultancy firm 
to ensure the quality of individuals.  The selection of new consultants must 
therefore be tempered with some objective criteria until direct experience of the 
individual’s work can be used as the basis for further engagements. 
 
Executives can become reliant on consultants and examples of this have been 
documented (O’Shea and Madigan, 1997).  This hazard is especially great where 
the working relationship is close and between just two individuals.  It is 
important for users of consultants to remember that they are an expensive 
resource that should only be used where a requirement has been defined.  They 
should then be managed appropriately for the good of the organisation. 
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